An Israeli leftist finds glimmer of hope

An Israeli leftist finds glimmer of hope - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East

I had the occasion to meet former Knesset member dr. Einat Wilf and professor Mohammed S. Dajani, and have great respect for both. Einat Wilf has a doctorate in Political Sciences, Mohammed Dajani is the founder of Wasatia, a moderate Islamic movement.

 Can this common declaration, written by Einat Wilf and Mohammed Dajani, unite Israelis and Palestinians around the divisive issue of Israel as a Jewish state and Palestine as the Palestinian people's homeland?

"The Jewish people around the world and Palestinian people around the world are both indigenous to the Land of Israel/Palestine and therefore have an equal and legitimate right to settle and live anywhere in the Land of Israel/Palestine, but given the desire of both peoples to a sovereign state that would reflect their unique culture and history, we believe in sharing the land between a Jewish state, Israel, and an Arab state, Palestine, that would allow them each to enjoy dignity and sovereignty in their own national home. Neither Israel nor Palestine should be exclusively for the Jewish and Palestinian people respectively and both should accommodate minorities of the other people.
Who else will join us in our journey to find true partners on both sides?"


How can we guaranty the sustainability and safety of the sharing of the Land of Israel/Palestine between two nation states, a Jewish state, Israel, and an Arab state, Palestine, in a sharing allowing everyone to settle and live anywhere in this land? How are we going to prevent religious or nationalist extremists from both side to torpedo any such agreement?

The fact that Prof. Dajani asked to change the word "partition", used by Mrs. Wilf, to "sharing" is very significant in this perspective.

In my view, the solution is to include those two states into a federation, the only sovereign onto the undivided land, having one federal army and Jerusalem as united federal capital. I don't see another possibility.

We propose to get out of the usual partition rationality and try another, a sharing rationality:

This land belongs to God and shouldn't be divided. It should be shared.
Neither Jews nor Arabs should have sovereignty: our common Creator alone is the Sovereign, we can only be independent and free from each other under His supranational rule of Law and Justice. This religious ideal has to be politically translated into the rule of a supranational and secular Federation of the two peoples.

I wouldn't justify the right of either of both peoples to self-determination in this Land by indigeneity:
- the ancestors of many Palestinians, may be most of them, came from diverse regions of the Ottoman Empire when no political borders existed inside the Middle-East.
- the ancestors of most Israeli Jews emigrate from abroad, and none can prove his descent from the Jews of 2000 years ago...

The point is that as Nations, both Jews and Palestinian Arabs don't conceive of any other homeland than this Land of Israel-Palestine. This is the way we both define ourselves. We have to reciprocally recognize this fact, despite its apparent subjectivity, because it is a political and historical fact.

For Wilf, only this recognition by Palestinians will allow a real peace. The problem is that if we wait for Palestinians to understand Jewish identity and Zionism, we might wait for a long time.
The federal model we propose is based on a covenant between the two peoples themselves, and not between states; the constitutional democracy neutralizes the demographic problem. It means that the political frame really embodies the mutual recognition of the peoples and their right to live on the Land of Israel-Palestine.
It can be hoped that this federal frame and the fruit of civil peace will influence individuals to progressively  understand the point of view of the other side, but we don't need to wait and reach this stage in order to create the Federation of Israel-Palestine.


Here is the article by Einat Wilf. Emphasis is mine:

An Israeli leftist finds glimmer of hope
I was born into the Israeli left. I grew up in the left. I was always a member of the left. I believed that the day that the Palestinians would have their own sovereign state would be the day when Israel would finally live in peace. But like many Israelis of the left, I lost this certainty I once had.

Why? Over the last 14 years, I have witnessed the inability of the Palestinians to utter the word "yes" when presented with repeated opportunities to attain sovereignty and statehood; I have lived through the bloody massacres by means of suicide bombings in cities within pre-1967 Israel following the Oslo Accords and then again after the failed Camp David negotiations in 2000; and I have experienced firsthand the increasing venom of anti-Israel rhetoric that only, very thinly, masks a deep and visceral hatred for the state and its people that cannot be explained by mere criticism for the policies of some of its elected governments.

But one of the most pronounced moments over the past several years that has made me very skeptical toward the left were a series of meetings I had with young, moderate Palestinian leaders to which I was invited by virtue of being a member of Israel's Labor Party.

I had much in common with these young Palestinian leaders. We could relate to each other. However, through discussion, I soon discovered that the moderation of the young Palestinian leaders was in their acknowledgement that Israel is already a reality and therefore is not likely to disappear. I even heard phrases such as, "You were born here and you are already here, so we will not send you away." (Thank you very much, I thought). But, what shocked and changed my approach to peace was that when we discussed the deep sources of the conflict between us, I was told, "Judaism is not a nationality, it's only a religion and religions don't have the right to self-determination." The historic connection between the Jewish people and the land of Israel was also described as made-up or nonexistent.

Reflecting on the comments of these "moderates," I was forced to realize that the conflict is far deeper and more serious than I allowed myself to believe. It was not just about settlements and "occupation," as Palestinian spokespeople have led the Israeli left to believe. I realized that the Palestinians, who were willing to accept the need for peace with Israel, did so because Israel was strong. I realized that, contrary to the leftist views in Israel, which support the establishment of a Palestinian state because the Palestinians have a right (repeat: right) to sovereignty in their homeland, there is no such parallel Palestinian "left" that recognizes the right (repeat: right) of the Jewish people to sovereignty in its ancient homeland.

These did not remain personal reflections. For the following years, these conversations impacted my political career as I found myself within the Labor Party increasingly alienated from what I began to term as the "self-flagellating left," to which the conflict was entirely due to Israel's actions and which demanded no responsibility or recognition from the Palestinians. As a member of the Knesset, on behalf of the Labor Party, I helped carry out a split within the party between its dovish and hawkish wing in order to allow the hawkish wing headed by then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak to remain in the coalition with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This realization has also motivated my continued work around the world to defend Israel and Zionism, insisting that all peace must be rooted in the mutual recognition of the equal right of both peoples to the land.

So, it was somewhat ironic when, just several months ago, I received an email from the Israeli-Palestinian meeting's organizer to write a response to one of the program's core funders as to whether the program had an "impact on anything or anybody." I was asked to "reflect back a few years" and to write whether the program "had any impact on you — personally, professionally, socially, politically … " Naturally, I responded. I wrote that the program had a "tremendous impact on my thinking and I continue to discuss it to this day in my talks and lectures." I shared the above story with the organizer, recognizing that "it is probably not a perspective you want to share with your funders."

In response, the organizer sent me an email saying that there are "many, not one, grass-roots and political Palestinians who truly believe that Jews have a right to part of the land." I responded enthusiastically that meeting even "one Palestinian who believes that the Jewish people have an equal and legitimate claim to the land would be huge for me," and that "I've been looking for someone like that ever since I participated in the program many years ago."

Shortly thereafter, I received the following quote from a Palestinian participant who expressed a desire to renew the program so that "we can reach a resolution to this conflict by having an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as it's capital living in peace side-by-side with the State of Israel." I responded, "I do not see that this individual writes that he recognizes the equal and legitimate right of the Jewish people to a sovereign state in their own homeland." I was then asked to write precisely what would convince me that we have a true partner for peace in the Palestinians. So, I drafted the following phrase:

"The Jewish people and Palestinian people are both indigenous to the Land of Israel/Palestine and therefore have an equal and legitimate claim to a sovereign state for their people on the land." I added that this sentence could be expanded to say, "Both the Jewish people and the Palestinian people around the world have an equal and legitimate claim to settle and live anywhere in the Land of Israel/Palestine, but given the desire of both peoples to a sovereign state that would reflect their unique culture and history, we believe in partitioning the land into a Jewish state, Israel, and an Arab state, Palestine, that would allow them each to enjoy dignity and sovereignty in their own national home." I would also add here that it should be clear that neither Israel nor Palestine should be exclusively for the Jewish and Palestinian people respectively and both should accommodate minorities of the other people.

The organizer promised to get back to me. Weeks and months passed, and I was about to publish this piece, opening up the conversation, hoping to find partners who share my belief, so that I could rekindle my hope that peace is possible. At the last minute, I was contacted by professor Mohammed S. Dajani Daoudi, the head of American Studies at Al-Quds University and founder of the Palestinian centrist movement, Wasatia. All he asked was to change the word "claim" to "right," and "partition" to "sharing," saying that "right" was more positive, and "partitioning" had in the deep psyche of the Palestinians the negative connotation of the 1947 UN partition plan recommendation. He emphasized that 67 years later, he hopes that Palestinians would realize that sharing the land by a Jewish state and a Palestinian state, as envisioned by the UN resolution, was "the right thing to do" in 1947, since both people do have a legitimate right to the land, and remains "the right thing to do" today. I found these changes wholly acceptable and welcome. So the statement we share now reads as follows:

"The Jewish people around the world and Palestinian people around the world are both indigenous to the Land of Israel/Palestine and therefore have an equal and legitimate right to settle and live anywhere in the Land of Israel/Palestine, but given the desire of both peoples to a sovereign state that would reflect their unique culture and history, we believe in sharing the land between a Jewish state, Israel, and an Arab state, Palestine, that would allow them each to enjoy dignity and sovereignty in their own national home. Neither Israel nor Palestine should be exclusively for the Jewish and Palestinian people respectively and both should accommodate minorities of the other people."

Who else will join us in our journey to find true partners on both sides?

Hannah Arendt's federation of councils "שיטת המועצות" של חנה ארנדט

Israel as the state of all its citizens in the light of the  "method of councils" of Hannah Arendt

Avner Dinur

Summary 

(Translation is mine)
I do not know if Arendt was right when she suggested, shortly before the establishment of the state, that a federation of councils is the only way to save the Jewish homeland from the threatening clutches of the Jewish nation-state.
From the perspective of the passed 50 years, it is clear that the Israeli - Palestinian conflict is fueled by fiery nationalist ideas, Zionist and Palestinian as well, and it is hard to imagine a substantial federation between Jews and Arabs.
But you can also see the bloody conflict as a kind of historic opportunity.

In the State of Israel, in this era between the second and third Intifada, both Israeli and Palestinian publics are aware that a nation-state following the classical model will never exist here. It might be precisely because of the continuing impasse in the conflict that the Israeli public will not have any choice but to look elsewhere for a solution.

I want to learn from the method of Arendt's councils that the war against the nation-state and the atrocities and distortions that it produces on the ground does not have to be realized  through a generalized anarchist revolution, nor through the establishment of a Palestinian nation-state, nor even through the establishment of the State of all its citizens.
The struggle against the nation-state can bear the character of a voluntary association, coming from the bottom, and of free connections among individuals, between Jews and Arabs, among Arabs themselves and even, as hard to imagine, among Jews themselves.

Arendt's conceptual framework can improve the contemporary Israeli discourse in its struggle for the definition of a Jewish nation-state

Here is the full article in Hebrew:

ישראל כ"מדינת כל אזרחיה" לאור "שיטת המועצות" של חנה ארנדט

ישראל כ"מדינת כל אזרחיה"
לאור "שיטת המועצות" של חנה ארנדט

אבנר דינור

מבוא
________________________________________

חנה ארנדט (1906 – 1975) נחשבת בעיני רבים ל"הוגה הפוליטית"[1] המשפיעה ביותר במאה העשרים ובתור שכזו לכאורה אין חשיבות ליהדותה ולכתחילה נקראו כתביה מבלי להדגיש את "האספקט היהודי”, אולם בשנות התשעים כשהחל גל גדול של מחקר סביב הגותה החלו קריאות של ארנדט הטוענות שהפילוסופיה שלה נועדה בראש ובראשונה להתמודד עם המצב הפוליטי שבו שרויים היהודים בעידן המודרני[2]. הדברים שלהלן מצטרפים במידה רבה לזיהוי הזה של ארנדט, לא רק כ"הוגה פוליטית" כפי שנהגה לכנות את עצמה, אלא כ"הוגה פוליטית יהודית" ובתור שכזו, לנצל את הדיון שלה על מדינת הלאום בכדי לבחון את המחלוקת על "מדינת כל אזרחיה" בפוליטיקה הישראלית. בכוונתי להציע שיש במסגרת המחשבתית של ארנדט בכדי לקדם את השיח הישראלי העכשווי הנאבק על הגדרתה של מדינת הלאום היהודית. בכדי לעשות זאת אבחן תחילה את גישתה של ארנדט למדינת הלאום ולציונות, לאחר מכן אציג בקצרה את הויכוח על מדינת-כל-אזרחיה, ולבסוף אציע את "שיטת המועצות" של ארנדט כדגם שיש בו להועיל לבחינתה של הפוליטיקה הישראלית הנמתחת על הדיכוטומיה בין שני קטבים מנוגדים.
ארנדט טענה שבמדינת הלאום טמון פרדוקס: מצד אחד מדינה השולטת על שטח מסוים, שואפת כל העת להרחיב את גבולותיה ולהתפשט על פני שטחים נוספים שבעזרתם תוכל להגדיל את המשאבים העומדים לראשותה. מצד שני כל ניסיון להתפשט אל מעבר לגבולות המדינה הקיימת, כולל בהכרח סיפוח של בני לאומים אחרים ומערער על הגדרתה כמדינת לאום:

“Of all forms of government and organizations of people, the nation-state is least suited for unlimited growth because the genuine consent at its base cannot be stretched indefinitely, and is only rarely, and with difficulty, won from conquered people. No nation-state could with clear conscience ever try to conquer foreign people...”[1]

פרדוקס נוסף הנובע ממדינת לאום מתרחבת הוא שכיבושיה מפתחים תמיד תודעה לאומית אצל הנכבשים הגורמת להם להתקומם כנגדה ולבסוף גם לנצח אותה[2]. הלאומיות אחראית לדעתה לכמה מהטרגדיות הגדולות והעקובות מדם ביותר של העת החדשה. במדינות הלאום השתלט הלאום על המדינה ותבע להעניק זכויות רק לבני הלאום[3]. הענקת זכויות זו לא היתה בעייתית אילולא היתה המדינה הכוח היחידי המעניק זכויות בעולם המודרני. ארנדט הדגישה שזכויות אינן טבעיות אלא הן תמיד פוליטיות, כלומר הן נובעות מהכוחות המרכזיים המופעלים בחברה, וכוחות אלה, במאה העשרים הם בראש ובראשונה לאומיים. כיוון שלדעת ארנדט אין בעולם המודרני זכויות מלבד זכויות במסגרת המדינה, הרי שהענקת זכויות על בסיס לאומי-פרטיקולרי יוצרת בהכרח עיוות מוסרי. לדעת ארנדט יש ללאומיות אפקט מונוכרומטי הצובע גיוון תרבותי ומחשבתי בגוון אחד וכך יוצר זהות מיותרת וכוחנית בין שונים[4]. כל התשובות לבעיה הלאומית הן רעות לדעתה כיוון שהן תוצר של חיבור כפוי בין אינדיבידואלים. למרות ששפיכויות הדמים הקשות של המאה העשרים נעשו על ידי, ובשמן של מדינות, "ארנדט מציעה לראות את הרע בלאומיות, לא במדינה"[5]. הלאומיות היא פרוורסיה של המדינה, והיא נסמכת לדעתה על שילוש קדוש: עם, שטח ומדינה[6].

ארנדט גיבשה את עמדותיה על הלאומיות המודרנית בעיקר לנוכח "הבעיה היהודית". היא חשבה שיש למצוא פתרון פוליטי לבעיה היהודית אולם בניגוד לציונות המדינית, היא חשבה שהיהודים הם הנפגעים העיקריים של מדינת הלאום במאה העשרים ולכן יהיה זה אבסורד שהיהודים עצמם ירצו להקים מדינת לאום. היהודים לדעתה הם מאז ראשית העת החדשה הפרדיגמה הברורה ביותר של חסרי-מדינה ולכן הרעיונות הלאומיים מהווים כמעט תמיד בעיה עבור יהודים. ארנדט סווגה לא פעם כיהודיה שונאת עצמה (self hating Jew)[7] המכתב של גרשום שלום אליה, בו הוא טוען שאין בה שמץ של "אהבת ישראל"[8] הוא אולי המפורסם ביותר לעניין זה, והסיבה המרכזית לטענה זו היא שרבים הבינו את התנגדותה למדינת הלאום המודרנית כהתנגדות ללאומיות יהודית באשר היא. אולם ארנדט לא היתה אנטי-ציונית. עוד לפני קום המדינה היא טענה שהציונות השיגה תמיכה רחבה כל כך בעם היהודי עד שרק בודדים, שאף אחד לא מתייחס אליהם ברצינות, נשארו אנטי-ציונים[9]. ארנדט העריכה מאוד את המפעל הציוני וראתה בו את הניסיון הרציני היחיד בעת המודרנית להחזיר את היהודים למצב פוליטי, מצב שממנו לא יכלו עוד להתחמק לאחר האמנסיפציה. הציונות שלה היא במידה רבה ציונות תרבותית בסגנון אחד-העם[10] והפתרון הפוליטי לבעיה היהודית שעמד לנגד עיניה הוא הקמתה של ארץ-מולדת (homeland) עבור היהודים, ולא הקמת מדינת לאום (nation state)[11]. הישוב היהודי בפלשתינה, לפני קום המדינה היווה לדעת ארנדט צורה מסויימת של ארץ מולדת יהודית, כלומר החלוצים לדעתה הגשימו במידה רבה אידיאל פוליטי יהודי. הישוב היה טריטוריה פוליטית שמאפשרת לתרבות היהודית להתקיים ולפרוח מבלי להזדקק לריבונות לאומית.
דאגתה לקיום היהודי אחרי השואה הביאה את ארנדט לבקר את הציונות על אדישותה כלפי הקיום היהודי בגולה. הציונות לדעתה היא הדרך שבאמצעותה מתייחס רוב מוחלט של יהודי העולם לזהותו היהודית אולם דווקא משום כך מהווה לדעתה הציונות איום על עצם הקיום היהודי. הציונות המדינית היתה מודעת לעובדה שבמדינת ישראל אין מקום מספיק כדי להכיל את כל יהודי העולם. התשובה הציונית לבעיה זו לבשה לדעת ארנדט שתי פנים, מצד אחד היו אלה שטענו שרק החלק הטוב של היהודים יעלה לארץ ואילו היתר ילכו ויתבוללו אל תוך העמים שמסביבם. תשובה מעיין זו מדגישה את אדישותם, אולם למעשה היא לא התקבלה. התשובה השניה, שבתחילה היתה עמדתם של הרביזיוניסטים בלבד, היתה בדומה לכל הלאומנים הקיצוניים של אירופה: "פאן-שמיות כתגובה לאנטי-שמיות”[12], כלומר הציונים הפנימו את שאיפות ההתרחבות הלאומניות שהיו נחלתן של התנועות הפאן-סלאביות והפאן-גרמניות ובכך נכנסה הציונות למילכוד שטמון לכל לאומיות המעוניינת להתרחב.


[1] ארנדט, OT, מהד' שלישית עמ' 126.
[2] ארנדט, OT, מהד' שלישית, עמ' 134.
[3] ארנדט, OT, מהד' שלישית, עמ' 230, ראו גם: ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 51.
[4] קוקס, על לאומיות, עמ' 223. אולם קוקס לא הבחינה שהמניע לעמדה זו של ארנדט הוא בדיוק מחוייבותה ליהדות ולשמירה על פרטיקולריות יהודית בתוך מדינת הלאום הלא-יהודית.
[5] לאור, אף מילה על ציונות, עמ' 18.
[6] ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 51.
[7] קוקס, על לאומיות, עמ' 225.
[8] שלום, דברים בגו, עמ' 92.
[9] ארנדט, להציל את המולדת, עמ' 180.
[10] פלדמן, היהודי כפריה, עמ' 35.
[11] ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 49.
[12] ארנדט, הציונות בראיה מחדש, עמ' 151.

מדינת כל אזרחיה ומדינת לאום בישראל
________________________________________
הפרדוקס של מדינת-לאום-מתרחבת, ממש כפי שתיארה אותו ארנדט, עומד במרכז הדיון הציבורי בישראל בשנים האחרונות. המודעות לדרך שבה מסכנת מדינת הלאום את עצמה בכיבושיה, הביאה רוב מוחלט של הישראלים להסכים לשלם מחיר טריטוריאלי בכדי לשמור על הגדרתה של המדינה כמדינת לאום יהודית ודמוקרטית. יותר מ70% מהציבור הישראלי תומך בעשור האחרון בתוכניות נסיגה שונות, אך גם מעבר לרוב מוצק זה נראה שיש הסכמה ברורה גם של המפלגות שימינה מהליכוד, שהשאיפה למדינת לאום יהודית חשובה מהשאיפה לארץ ישראל השלמה (אגב, ביטוי שכיום נעלם כמעט לגמרי מהשיח הפוליטי הישראלי). הויכוח בין ימין לשמאל איננו על הגדרתה של המדינה כמדינת לאום. אם יש בכלל ויכוח מדיני בין המפלגות הרי שהוא עוסק במחיר שהן מוכנות לשלם על מנת לשמור את המדינה כמדינה יהודית. לעומת הסכמה רחבה זו, מיעוט קטן בפוליטיקה הישראלית, מציע להפוך את המדינה ל"מדינת כל אזרחיה"[1]. לשם הצגה ברורה, גם אם מעט פשטנית של רעיון זה, אני נעזר בדבריו של ישעיהו לייבוביץ:
“המדינה אין לה אלא משמעות שימושית בלבד, באשר היא אינה אלא מנגנון (כלי, מכשיר, אינסטרומנט) לפעולה, ומהות פעולתה – הכפיה. המדינה אינה "עוסקת בהבהרת יחסים וכו'” [...] אלא כופה יחסים ... במובן זה אמרתי שהמדינה (כל מדינה) היא אויב האדם. [...] אולם בעקבות ההתפתחות ההיסטורית (מדור הפלגה ואילך) היתה המדינה לרע הכרחי של המין האנושי ואין לאדם היום מפלט ממנה..."[2]
ברור שעבור ליבוביץ "מדינת לאום יהודית" איננה רק "רע הכרחי", כדבריו, בדומה לכל מדינה אחרת, "מדינת לאום יהודית" הינה פשוט צירוף מילים חסר פשר. אין מדינה יהודית ולא יכולה להיות מדינה כזו. יהדות היא דבר אחד ומדינה היא דבר אחר בתכלית. לא כאן המקום להרחיב על עמדותיו המורכבות והסותרות של לייבוביץ' בשאלה הציונית, אולם לעניינינו די אם נראה כי לדעתו מדינה לא אמורה להשפיע על זהותו, תרבותו ובוודאי לא על דתו של אדם. מדינה הינה מכשיר טכני שעניינו הפעלת כפיה על הפרט. נידמה לי שגם אם רוב התומכים ב"מדינת כל אזרחיה" לא קראו את לייבוביץ ממש, יסכימו רובם שהמדינה אמורה להוות מנגנון מעשי בלבד.

בויכוח שבין מדינת-כל-אזרחיה לבין מדינת לאום, אפשר לצפות למצוא את ארנדט כתומכת של מדינת-כל-אזרחיה. אולם החשיבות שארנדט מקנה לכניסת היהודים למצב הפוליטי, הצורך בארץ מולדת ליהודים, ההערכה הרבה שרכשה למפעל הציוני, גם כאשר הסתייגה ממנו, והכוח שהיא זיהתה במדינות הלאום, כל אלה מלמדים שהדגם הפוליטי שעמד לנגד עיניה הוא דגם שלישי, שכמובן איננו מדינת-לאום (שאת ההתנגדות אליה ניסחה ארנדט במפורש כפי שראינו) אך הוא גם שונה ממדינת-כל-אזרחיה בכך שיש לו יומרות ברורות להשפיע על זהות האזרחים וכן בכך שהוא נמנע מחלק ניכר של אותה כפיה המהווה את הבסיס לכל מדינה לדעתו של לייבוביץ. את הדגם הזה שרמזים לזהותו פיזרה ארנדט בין כתבים שונים, היא מכנה "שיטת המועצות", "Council System", וברצוני לטעון שיש בו בכדי לקדם את השיח הפוליטי בישראל התקוע, זה כמה עשורים על הדיכוטומיה הבלתי מתפשרת בין מדינת-לאום למדינת-כל-אזרחיה.

[1] בעוד שמדינת הלאום זכתה לדיון נרחב למדי בהגות הפוליטית בחצי השני של המאה העשרים, הרי שהמושג "מדינת כל אזרחיה" אינו מופיע בדיון התיאורטי ולמעשה, למיטב ידיעתי, הוא תוצר של הדיון הציבורי הישראלי. בדיון התיאורטי מופיעה הבחנה בין מדינת-לאום-אתנית (שמקבילה פחות או יותר לרעיונות שראינו אצל ארנדט), לבין מדינת-לאום-אזרחית (ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 50). מדינת הלאום האזרחית בנויה על ההנחה שכל אזרח במדינה שותף במידה שווה ביצירת הזהות הקולקטיבית של המדינה. נידמה לי שאלה בישראל הדוגלים ב"מדינת כל אזרחיה" מציעים רעיון מעט שונה, על פיו למדינה אין כל יומרה להשפיע על זהותם של אזרחיה. המדינה לדידם היא רק מכשיר טכני שנועד להסדיר את היחסים בין האזרחים.
[2] מכתב לצוריאל אדמנית ודב רפל, מאי 1970, מתוך: ליבוביץ', רציתי לשאול, עמ' 371 – 372.

שיטת המועצות
________________________________________
במאמר ממאי 1948 שנקרא "להציל את המולדת היהודית”, מציעה ארנדט, בעקבות יהודה לייב מאגנס להקים בפלשתינה מדינה פדרטיבית יהודית-ערבית[1]. כמה חוקרים כבר הצביעו על הקשר שבין דעותיה של ארנדט על מדינת הלאום היהודית לבין העמדה הדו-לאומית של אנשי קבוצת ברית-שלום, בעיקר לפני קום המדינה[2] אולם עיון מעמיק ברעיון הפדרציה בכתבים אחרים של ארנדט מגלה שיש בשיטה גישה מהפכנית בהרבה מהתביעה של אנשי ברית-שלום לכך ששני העמים יחיו במדינה מאוחדת. לטענתי אי אפשר להבין את קריאתה של ארנדט לפדרציה יהודית-ערבית מבלי להידרש לדיון נרחב יותר של ארנדט על פדרציה של מועצות, דיון שהיא עורכת במהדורה השניה של ספרה הנרחב על מקורות הטוטליטריות[3] ובספרה על המהפיכה[4]. אמנם במאמר ממאי ארבעים ושמונה אין היא מפרטת את השיטה, וב"מקורות הטוטליטריות" ו"על המהפיכה" היא אינה מזכירה את ההקשר הישראלי-פלסטיני אולם אם נחבר בין השניים (חיבור בשיטה שהרמב"ם מכנה "השב פרקיו זה על זה"[5]) יתברר שהרעיונות האוטופיים של ארנדט בסוף ספרה על הטוטליטריות אינם אלא פתרון לבעיית היהודים ולהתגלמותה במדינת ישראל.

שיטת המועצות היא מצב של השתייכות פוליטית וולנטרית עם רמת מחוייבות הולכת ופוחתת שבה אדם מחוייב באופן עמוק לקהילה מקומית (למשל שכונה, ועד עובדים, ועד הורי בית ספר וכולי), וקהילה זו מחוייבת לקהילה רחבה יותר (למשל עיר) שבעצמה מחוברת לקהילה רחבה יותר (מחוז, מדינה) וכן הלאה. רמת המחוייבות של האינדיבידואל לקהילות הרחבות תהייה אם כן קטנה, אך בכל זאת לא מבוטלת. אולי מוטב להדגים את עקרונות השיטה באמצעות התנועה הקיבוצית[6]. כל קיבוץ בפני עצמו הוא התארגנות וולנטרית של בודדים המעוניינים להתאגד, לוקחים חלק פעיל בפוליטיקה הפנימית של הארגון ומעוניינים להשפיע גם על העולם שמחוץ לארגונם הקטן. התנועה הקיבוצית גם היא התארגנות וולונטרית של מספר מועצות מקומיות כאלו שהתאגדו לשם קידום ענייניהן. מחוייבותו של חבר קיבוץ לקיבוצו גדולה מאוד ואילו לתנועה הקיבוצית המחוייבות קטנה בהרבה ובכל זאת, חבר קיבוץ מזוהה מיד כחבר בתנועה (על פי לבושו בדרך כלל). נידמה לי שמה שעמד לנגד עיניה במועצות הוולנטריות שלה, לא היתה כל כך התנועה הקיבוצית (שלה רכשה ארנדט הערכה רבה) אלא דווקא הקהילה היהודית המסורתית שבה כל קהילה היא התארגנות וולנטרית ויש קשר בין קהילות שונות בעולם כולו. ניתן לטעון כמובן שהקהילה היהודית אינה נקיה מיחסים של כוח וכפיה ושהיא מפעילה על חבריה כפיה רבה בדרכים מגוונות – גם אם לא דרכים של חוק ריבוני. כפי שהראה פוקו, אין במציאות אירגון חברתי כלשהו שאינו מפעיל מנגנונים סמויים וגלויים של כפיה וכוח, ובכל זאת נזקם של מנגנוני הכוח והכפייה של הקהילות קטנים בהרבה מנזקה של קולקטיביות פוליטית בסגנון מדינת הלאום. הכוח הפנימי של הקהילה לפחות לא מביא ברוב המקרים לשפיכות דמים.

ארנדט איננה מציינת במפורש בשיטת המועצות שלה, לא את התנועה הקיבוצית ולא את הקהילה היהודית משום שעיקר עניינה בדיון על המועצות הוא בדרך שבה משמרות המועצות את הרוח המהפכנית לאחר סיומה של המהפיכה. התקדים ההיסטורי שהיא מוצאת לשיטה הוא בהפיכה ההונגרית ב-1956. ארנדט טענה שמועצות דומות לאלה שקמו בהונגריה הופיעו עם כל התקוממות עממית מאז אמצע המאה ה-19, אך כולן דוכאו ונעלמו תחת מכבש הטוטליטריות שאפיין את המשטר שבא בעקבות המהפיכה[7]. ארנדט רואה במועצות אלה מצב פוליטי אידיאלי שבו מתקיימות כפיה וריבונות ברמה המינימלית ההכרחית לשם קיום חברתי. המועצות הן "מרחבים של חופש"[8] שנועדו למסד את הרוח המהפכנית ולשמר אותה לאחר המהפיכה מפני כוחה של הרפובליקה. כישלונם של המהפכנים לראות את החידוש שטמון בשיטת המהפיכות[9] הוא שהוביל לדריסת הרוח המהפכנית ושקיעתה אל תוך משטרים טוטליטריים חשוכים.

המועצות הוולנטריות עומדת כמובן בניגוד גמור להגדרתה של המדינה שראינו אצל לייבוביץ. לייבוביץ טען שכל מהותה של המדינה היא כפיה. ארנדט שואלת האם ניתן לדמיין מצב פוליטי שאינו מבוסס על כפיה, או לכל הפחות מנסה לצמצם את מימד הכפיה לרמה המינימלית. "מדינת כל אזרחיה", שאיננה אלא מכשיר שלטוני שמאגד קבוצת אזרחים שאין ביניהם כל קשר בסגנון לייבוביץ איננה ברת מימוש לדעת ארנדט וגם איננה רצויה. היא איננה ברת מימוש מכיוון שגם לו "רצתה" המדינה להיות רק עניין טכני היתה מייצרת זהות קולקטיבית ברמה מסויימת, והיא אינה רצויה משום שבכל מדינה נדרשת מידה של אמון ודבק חברתי מינימלי בכדי לקיים את מוסדות השלטון. מעצם היותה וולנטרית, מחייבת פדרציית המועצות של ארנדט הזדהות לא מעטה של האזרחים עם המסגרת הגדולה ולכן צריכה הפדרציה להשפיע ולעצב את זהותו של האינדיבידואל. היא אינה יכולה להוות מכשיר שלטוני בלבד.

שיטת המועצות נראית אוטופיסטית לגמרי. קשה היום לדמיין מדינה שתיבנה כך לאורך זמן, וגם אם מציאות כזו תיתכן, הרי שמדינה וולנטרית שכזו תעמוד בפני איום משמעותי ממדינות לאומיות שמסביבה ומי יודע אם כוחה יוכל לעמוד לה. אולם ארנדט רחוקה מלהיות הוגה אוטופיסטית. כהיסטוריונית וכהוגה פוליטית (לא "פילוסופית", כדבריה) היא הקפידה לבסס את ביקורת הלאומיות שלה על מקרה היסטורי ולכן היא מזכירה את רעיון הפדרציה בקונטקסט של המהפיכה ההונגרית, אולם היא לא עשתה זאת משום שחשבה כי רק בזמן המוגבל שלאחר המהפיכה יכולים האזרחים ליצור לעצמם "מרחבים של חופש", אלא משום שמהפיכה היא הביטוי המובהק ביותר לביקורת הנובעת מלמטה, מהאזרחים עצמם, על השלטון. ביקורת מהפכנית בדרך כלל מציעה אלטרנטיבה מדויקת של המצב הרצוי לאחר המהפיכה. ביקורת פוליטית יכולה, ולדעתי גם חייבת, לסמן כיוון שלאורו יהיה עלינו לשפוט את המציאות המשתנה.

אולי מדינה של מועצות מקומיות איננה מן האפשר, אולם אני מבקש ללמוד מארנדט שפוליטיקה הדלה ביחסי כפיה וריבונות היא כיוון ראוי שההתקדמות אליו איננה עניין של אוטופיה אלא של מגמה מתמשכת בהווה. יתכן שפתרונות פוליטיים אמיתיים אינם מסוג הדברים המגיע במהפכות ולכן עלינו לשאוף ולהגשימם צעד אחר צעד, ביצירת צעדים בוני אמון בין יהודים לערבים, ביצירת חיבורים על בסיס מקומי ועל רקע אינטרס משותף צר, חיבורים וולנטריים שייצרו קהילות קטנות המתחברות לקהילות גדולות יותר, המתחברות לקהילת-על בסדר גודל של המדינה המודרנית.

מדינת כל אזרחיה ומדינת לאום בישראל סיכום

[1] ארנדט, להציל את המולדת, עמ' 191.
[2] רז קרקוצקין, דו-לאומיות; אדון, שולם ארנדט והפרדוקס.
[3] מעניין לציין אולי שהדיון על שיטת המועצות במהפיכה ההונגרית היא תוספת שהוסיפה ארנדט למהדורה השניה של הספר והשמיטה מהמהדורה השלישית, כיוון שהיתה "מיושנת" לדבריה.
[4] ארנדט, על המהפיכה.
[5] הרמב"ם, מורה נבוכים, חלק א, צוואת ספר זה. שוורץ מתרגם מעט אחרת: פרש את פרקיו זה לפי זה" (עמ' 19).
[6] במקומות אחרים ארנדט ביטאה התלהבות לנוכח הרעיון והביצוע של תפיסת הקיבוצים.
[7] ארנדט, OT מהדורה שניה, עמ' 500.
[8] ארנדט, על המהפיכה, עמ' 268.
[9] ארנדט, על המהפיכה, עמ' 284.

סיכום
אינני יודע אם צדקה ארנדט כשהציעה, זמן קצר לפני הקמת המדינה, שפדרציה של מועצות היא הדרך היחידה להציל את המולדת היהודית מציפורניה המאיימות של מדינת הלאום היהודית. בפרספקטיבה של חמישים שנה שעברו מאז, ברור שהסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני מלובה על ידי רעיונות לאומיים עזים, ציוניים ופלסטינים כאחד, וקשה לדמיין פדרציה משמעותית בין יהודים לערבים. אולם אפשר גם לראות בסכסוך העקוב מדם סוג של הזדמנות היסטורית. במדינת ישראל, בעידן שבין האינתיפאדה השניה לשלישית מודעים הציבור הישראלי והפלסטיני כאחד, שמדינת-לאום במודל הקלאסי לעולם לא תתקיים כאן. יתכן שדווקא בשל המבוי הסתום המתמשך בסכסוך לא תהייה לציבור הישראלי כל ברירה אלא לחפש את הפתרון במקום אחר. אני מבקש ללמוד משיטת המועצות של ארנדט שהמלחמה במדינת הלאום ובזוועות והעיוותים שהיא מחוללת במציאות לא חייבת להתממש, לא במהפכה אנרכיסטית כוללת, לא בכינונה של מדינת לאום פלשתינית ואפילו לא בכינונה של מדינת-כל-אזרחיה. המאבק במדינת הלאום יכול לשאת אופי של התאגדות וולנטרית, מלמטה, ושל חיבורים חופשיים בין אינדיבידואלים, בין יהודים וערבים, וגם בין ערבים לבין עצמם ואפילו, עד כמה שקשה לדמיין זאת, בין יהודים לבין עצמם.

יש במסגרת המחשבתית של ארנדט בכדי לקדם את השיח הישראלי העכשווי הנאבק על הגדרתה של מדינת הלאום היהודית.

Toward confederation

Interesting article by a Professor of Political Science.

In his confederation, Palestine is supposedly sovereign but have no army.
No solution for borders and sharing of Jerusalem...
He does not explain either why "A federation called The United States of Israel and Palestine is not much better" than a unitary state.
A confederal treaty not mentioning Jerusalem, borders and refugees could be a first step, but it will have to evolve into a true supranational federation: like Europe, made too of different nation-states.

Emphasis is mine.

Toward confederation
By RONALD TIERSKY
08/05/2012

Palestinians know approximately what they will have to accept. Finding the least bad solution consonant with defeat is their unenviable task.

Israel’s strategic problem in historical terms is, ultimately, how to win a war well. The Palestinian problem is to avoid losing this war in the most drawn-out, worst possible way.

Palestinians (including any realistic Hamas leaders), know approximately what they will have to accept. Finding the least bad solution consonant with defeat is their unenviable task. Yet neither is Israel completely free, because victory can be dangerous. Israel needs a strategy that isn’t in the end self-defeating.

Realistically, the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma is this: In what circumstances could the strong safely show magnanimity and the weak believe they are getting an acceptable result? Intractable conflicts can sometimes be unblocked by enlarging the problem, by increasing the number of players, stakes and potential rewards.

All the “one-state” solutions – whether bi-national or a federation – are non-starters because Israeli Jews rightly refuse to sacrifice their own interest in a grand gesture of philanthropy.

Majorities in Israeli and Palestinian public opinion would doubtless accept a simple two-state solution if leaders agreed on it. Israel’s current government, however, seems not really interested whatever lip-service it is given from time to time. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s “economic peace” formula in effect replaces the creation of a Palestinian state with Israeli-sponsored economic development in the West Bank combined with an oppressive, volatile political status quo.

A way forward is to find a larger formula that increases the rewards and reduces costs for Israelis and Palestinians, and involves outside states as guarantors. Complexity and flexibility in this case are advantages. What is necessary is an institutional structure that limits to a minimum the binding links for Israel and at the same time provides time and space for Palestinian self-government and proof of competence to evolve, including stopping the violence on both sides.

A minimal, complex and flexible Israeli-Palestinian confederation, here meaning a two-state solution within the confines of a larger confederation, is a promising alternative.

Two sovereign states wrapped in a semi-state, a less-than-a-state.

Confederation – political and economic – could provide what Israelis and Palestinians, and outside powers, want most: guaranteed mutual security of the two states, reliable peace in the region, diminished capacity for Islamist terrorist groups to use the conflict as a pretext, and economic and social progress.

What is a confederation, how does it differ from a one-state solution, and what would be its international legal basis? A confederation differs from a binational single state and also from a federation of two states.

Some states are unitary, ruled entirely from the national capital (France). Others are federations in which power is shared in some balance between a national government and the states that compose it (the US, Germany). A few are confederations (Switzerland is a modern example).

Unique in world political development, the European Union is extremely complex: a hybrid combination of historical nation-states and national capitals with European-level institutions located in Brussels and elsewhere.

EU institutions are in part confederal (EU summit meetings in various cities), part federal (the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, the European Central Bank in Frankfurt) and part strict national sovereignty (major foreign policy decisions, above all decisions for war or peace in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya).

In the EU, complexity is often a curse but it does provide benefits as well, for example deflecting conflict into ambiguity and permitting the whole to survive even as one part falls into crisis (cf. the current Eurozone debt mess).

The EU is of particular relevance here because, although not wellknown, in international legal terms the entire EU is still a treaty organization (Maastricht) because a proposed constitution for it didn’t achieve ratification in 2005.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because it is also unique, requires a particularly imaginative legal and institutional structure.

Why not one state or two states? In the Holy Land a unitary state called Israel-Palestine makes no historical or political sense. A federation called The United States of Israel and Palestine is not much better.

What of a confederation? Normally a confederation means a constitution, weak but nonetheless more than a treaty. Sovereignty rests with the composing states.

(The American Articles of Confederation before 1789 are an example.) But if a Holy Land confederation is based on a treaty rather than a constitution, Israel’s national constitution and sovereignty are always superior (as would be true also for a Palestinian state). A treaty in this case would be more durable than a constitution.

A treaty is usually made for a specified period of years and renewed (NATO is an example). A constitution, however, is implicitly permanent.

If the situation on the ground goes sufficiently bad, a treaty can perfectly well be renounced (cf. current concerns about Egyptian repudiation of the peace treaty with Israel.) What would happen in practice as politics in the confederation? For example, there would be no common elections or governments.

Israeli and Palestinian parliaments might meet jointly once or twice a year for a few days, to get to know each other and create common culture more than to legislate. Existing Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation could be given formal legal status in the treaty. Once or twice yearly summit meetings of top national leaders could be mandated along with more frequent councils of ministers in a particular policy area, say agriculture (as in the EU).

In short, a treaty-based confederation sidesteps the entire zero-sum one-state two-state drama.

For Israel, in particular, confederation deals with intractable issues of Palestinian political sovereignty.

Creating a Palestinian state within a confederation would not increase but actually diminish threats to Israel’s security. Having their own state, Palestinian obsession with Israel, the ideological passion about sovereignty, borders and revenge, would shift to ambitions for more prosperous lives with individual dignity. Gaza, now such a special case, could join the Palestinian state immediately combined with the West Bank. If, however, Palestinian unity were impossible, Gaza could evolve over time one way or another.

For Palestinians, entrepreneurial energy and private sector business development would stimulate the growth of a more complex civil society connected to the wider world. A Palestinian state that issues internationally recognized passports permitting its citizens to freely visit the world would change the mind-set of young and old generations alike.

Speculating even further ahead, the confederation could encompass not just Israel and Palestine but, sooner or later, Jordan as well. Stimulating Jordanian economic and social development is a good in itself. Security across the entire confederation could be guaranteed by a combination of sovereign Israeli military and police forces, a Palestinian internal police force, a Jordanian participation, and overlapping security guarantees in the form of international boots on the ground: the US, UN and NATO (including Turkey). Jordanian domestic political reform would be de-dramatized.

A more cosmopolitan Israel can afford to deal differently with the Palestinians, who have by now suffered and been punished enough for disastrous policies of the past.

Israel would win its war well if a Palestinian state were created not against Israel’s will but sponsored and even mentored by Israel.

Inevitably, new international esteem would follow. The high cards are in Israeli hands.

The writer is the Eastman Professor of Political Science at Amherst College.

A federated state for Israelis and Palestinians

Source: A federated state for Israelis and Palestinians
By JAY BUSHINSKY
03/05/2012

Emphasis is mine.
Source:
[...] If Netanyahu manages to forge a new coalition that would have the middle-of-the-road Kadima party as a major component and leaves the Jewish religious and nationalist extremists on the parliamentary sidelines, he may escape the pressure constantly bearing down on him from the West Bank settlers who constantly seek territorial acquisitions.

Theoretically, he could then launch a process that would require the dismantling of a substantial number of settlements and the removal of unauthorized outposts further to the east.

A proposed exchange of territory that might enable many of the settlements to remain intact already has public support from Kadima. Its newly elected leader, Shaul Mofaz, is on the record as favoring a deal of this kind. But the transfer of thousands of hard-line settlers from the West Bank to ante bellum Israel would be a daunting if not politically impossible task.

This apparent fact of life bears out the contention that the permission given by the incumbent government and several of its predecessors for 350,000 to 500,000 Jewish settlers to move into the West Bank was a major mistake.

The financial cost of relocating them would be prohibitive, not to mention the fury of the inevitable social backlash in ante bellum Israel that would be a by-product.

All of these considerations suggest that it would be wise for Netanyahu, his party and the electorate as a whole to consider seriously whether there indeed are alternatives to the seemingly inoperable two-state solution.

One of them may be the hitherto unthinkable one-state solution: Annexation of the West Bank and extension of Israeli citizenship to its Palestinian inhabitants on the basis of total equality and political freedom.

This notion has been resisted in the past by Orthodox religious politicians who fear that it would set the stage for intermarriages between Jews and Arabs. But where and when did such an esoteric issue like intermarriage form the basis of any country’s political program? That has not been the case in Ireland, Ceylon or Nigeria where rival ethnic or religious groups also are required to live under one political roof.

In the local case, the one-state solution would take the form of a federation made up of two entities – one primarily Jewish and the other primarily Arab (in demographic terms).

Each entity could have its own parliament and governmental administration.


The state as a whole could have a federal government which would be responsible primarily for national security (for the entire territory of the federated state) – foreign policy and economic affairs including a common currency for both entities (as already exists in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). The federal government’s personnel and leadership would be drawn from the two entitities.

Ironically, annexation was originally proposed by the late Chaim Herzog when he served as the first military governor of the West Bank immediately after the Six Day War.

He was opposed then by the National Religious Party which was destined to spawn the ideological core of Gush Emunim and other Jewish settlement movements.


Its rationale then too was that annexation would foster intermarriage.

It all boils down to the likelihood that the prospective election will give Netanyahu a chance to implement domestic reforms, especially in the economic and social spheres.

These should include a more equitable distribution of private income so as to reduce or (preferably) eliminate the phenomenon of so-called “tycoons” lording it over the rest of the economy, and reduction of the cost of new or suitable housing so that young couples will be able to afford it and the deterioration of overcrowded neighborhoods can be stopped.

The winner (presumably Netanyahu) also might be in a better position to rehabilitate the tens of thousands of Africans who entered Israel illegally in the past five years, by integrating as many of them as possible and facilitating the emigration or deportation of those who cannot adjust to Israeli society to alternative destinations elsewhere in the world. These steps certainly are preferable to letting them converge on neglected urban areas, especially south Tel Aviv, and turning them into crime-infested slums.

The writer is a veteran foreign correspondent.

The Federal Idea Lives On

The Federal Idea Lives On

     by Joel Pollak

Book Review

From Binational Society to Jewish State:Federal Concepts in Zionist Political Thought, 1920-1990by Yosef Gorny.

Emphasis is mine.

Yosef Gorny introduces his concise yet complex description of the history of Zionist federalism by describing his “disillusionment” about the prospects of confederation between Israel and its neighbors. Indeed, one of the most puzzling features about this otherwise informative and enjoyable book — hinting, perhaps, at a kind of agnostic post-Zionism — is its conclusion, in which Gorny claims that Zionism “is beginning its second historical journey” — back to Europe, where “a third-largest Jewish center [after the U.S. and Israel] … may well come into being.”

     Gorny, a historian who now heads the institute for the research of Jewish press and media at Tel Aviv University, is not, like former Knesset speaker Avraham Burg, giving up on Zionism and celebrating the diaspora. Rather, he is expressing a deep concern about the fate of the Jewish people if there is no resolution to the Middle East conflict.

     At the outset, Gorny defines different versions of the “federal” idea. A “federation” is “a sovereign state composed of autonomous political units that derive their power from one political center”; a “confederation” is “a regional alliance of sovereign states that maintain joint institutions in various domains.” Power devolves down in the former, and up in the latter.

     He goes on to demonstrate how different versions of the federal idea have been proposed by various Zionist leaders as a way of bridging the gap between utopian national visions and the practical obstacles to establishing and maintaining a state. Often, federation and confederation were proposed to provide an answer to the fact or potential of a Jewish minority in Palestine and to Israel’s isolation among Arab nations.

     Gorny excludes versions of the federal idea, such as certain forms of bi-nationalism, that did not uphold the general Zionist principle of a Jewish majority in the part of Palestine where Jewish self-determination would be exercised. He explores the ideas of mainstream Zionist leaders on both the left and the right, and shows how the federal idea was inspired by various precedents, including federal arrangements in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the United States. Zionist leaders who proposed federal ideas often changed their models as circumstances changed. Thus David Ben-Gurion first proposed (separate) autonomy for Jews and Arabs in Palestine in 1922; a joint federation of Jewish and Arab nations in the mid-1920s; a complex federal arrangement between Jews and Arabs in 1931; and a confederation of a Jewish state within a larger Arab formation in the mid-1930s.

     One of the most interesting subjects Gorny addresses is the federal idealism of Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky, who is considered a right-wing and militant thinker. Gorny points out that Jabotinsky was in some ways a political liberal, and that despite his view that Jews would have to resort to the use of force, he continued to believe in a federal solution that would recognize the rights of both Jews and Arabs.

     Gorny demonstrates that in their deliberations, the Zionist leaders were capable of considering a wide range of different ideas. The idea of “transfer” — which was considered impractical but not “morally illegitimate” in the 1920s, having recently been implemented in Turkey and Greece — coexisted with utopian ideas of shared states and confederations.

     Demography played a role in the formulation of the various models, just as it does today. After the Six Day War, Israeli Labor politicians Aryeh Eliav and Shimon Peres proposed different federal models as a way of resolving the moral and demographic challenges of occupation. Today, the “demographic threat” is in doubt, given the Gaza disengagement and questions about the accuracy of Palestinian population projections.

     The geopolitical environment has also changed, with Arab states now prepared — at least in theory — to accept peace with (if not the legitimacy of) Israel, in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative.

     These two factors, perhaps unforeseen by Gorny at the time of writing, have pushed the federal idea even further to the margins of Israeli discourse. However, it has not disappeared, because the fundamental conflict between Jews and Arabs remains to be resolved.

     If the next few years should indeed see some form of Palestinian state emerge, there will also be a need for institutional arrangements between the two states to govern affairs that must be dealt with in common, such as water. The economic success of the Palestinian state will also depend on its ties to the Israeli economy, which will require continued political cooperation. Therefore, Gorny’s pessimism may be premature: For practical reasons, if not for idealistic ones, the federal idea still lives.

Hannah Arendt “Non-nationalist” Nationalism

Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt and the Paradox of “Non-nationalist” Nationalism

Raluca Munteanu

Eddon Department of Political Science Yale University
Prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28 - August 31, 2003.
Copyright by the American Political Science Association
Authors: Munteanu, Raluca.

The opposition to the idea of Jewish sovereignty, which defined Scholem’s involvement in the Brit Shalom in the late 1920s and early 1930s, was a cause Arendt passionately embraced a decade later. The grounds for Arendt’s opposition can be easily gleaned from the historical analysis of the “Jewish Question” she puts forth in The Origins of Totalitarianism.

The solution this group envisioned to their paradoxical condition consisted in an attempt to redefine nationalism so as to eliminate what they considered its morally reprehensible aspects, notably the idea of sovereignty, and thus presumably deprive it of the potential to become an oppressive ideology.

The result was a “non-nationalist” conception of nationalism.

Arendt considered it ill-advised and nearly absurd for the Jews to want to create a nation state of their own, as this would recreate the very structure that, she thought, had failed, and had failed them, so dismally under the political pressures of the 20th century.

The “non-nationalist” nationalism of the Brit Shalom

The one group of German Zionists whose convictions throughout the 1920s and early 1930s mirrored Arendt’s, and for reasons very similar to hers, in 1925 formed an association known as the Brit Shalom, or Covenant for Peace. The goal of the Brit Shalom was to steer the Zionist Organization away from the imperialist interests Arendt so bitterly denounced and to foster Jewish-Arab cooperation and institution-building as an alternative.
Hannah Arendt, “Zionism Reconsidered” in JP, 153. 40 See Kedar, “Brit Shalom.”

UNSCOP minority report of 1947: a federated state

1947 Plan for a Federal State of Palestine

The likely Step 2 for the Palestinians is that they will ask the UN to re-­establish the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). It will be remembered that in April of 1947 the General Assembly created UNSCOP, asking it to formulate a detailed plan for resolving the Palestine question.

In six months time, UNSCOP galvanized public attention and produced its majority and minority reports. It traveled to the Middle East and received testimony from Ben Gurion and Chaim Weizman. It refused to let Menachem Begin testify. It visited the displaced persons camps in Europe. It heard from governments around the world and solicited Palestinian views.
Foolishly, the Palestinians boycotted UNSCOP.
UNSCOP unanimously recommended an end to the British Mandate, but divided on what should come next. The majority report called for two states, one Jewish and one Arab; it detailed the border and spelled out the structure of an international regime for Jerusalem.

The minority report called for a federated state. UNSCOP's reported back to the General Assembly, and in November 1947, the majority report was enacted as UNGA Resolution 181, the historic Partition Resolution.

UNSCOP federal minority proposal:

CHAPTER VII RECOMMENDATIONS (III)

1. In the course of the informal meetings of the Committee to explore solutions, a working group was set up to deal with the federal-State proposal.

2. The Working Group in the Federal State Solution (Sir Abdur Rahman, Mr. Emezam, Mr. Simic, and Mr. Atyeo) formulated a comprehensive proposal along these lines and it was voted upon and supported by three members (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia) at the forty-seventh meeting of the Committee on 27 August 1947.

3. The federal-State plan is herewith reproduced.

PLAN FOR A FEDERAL-STATE

Justification for the federal-State solution

1. It is incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general.

2. It is recognized that Palestine is the common country of both indigenous Arabs and Jews, that both these peoples have had an historic association with it, and that both play vital roles in the economic and cultural life of the country.

3. This being so, the objective is a dynamic solution which will ensure equal rights for both Arabs and Jews in their common State, and which will maintain that economic unity which is indispensable to the life and development of the country.

4. The basic assumption underlying the views herein expressed is that the proposal of Other members of the Committee for a union under artificial arrangements designed to achieve essential economic and social unity after first creating political and geographical disunity by partition, is impracticable, unworkable, and could not possibly provide for two reasonably viable States.

5. Two basic questions have been taken into account in appraising the feasibility of the federal-State solution, viz., (a) whether Jewish nationalism and the demand for a separate and sovereign Jewish State must be recognized at all, costs, and (b) whether a will to co-operate in a federal State could be fostered among Arabs and Jews. To the first, the answer is in the negative, since the well-being of the country and its peoples as a whole is accepted as out-weighing the aspirations of the Jews in this regard. To the second, the answer is in the affirmative, as there is a reasonable chance, given proper conditions, to achieve such co-operation.

6. It would be a tragic mistake on the part of the international community not to bend y every effort in this direction. Support for the preservation of the unity of Palestine by the United Nations would in itself be an important factor in encouraging co-operation and collaboration between the two peoples, and would contribute significantly to the creation of that atmosphere in which the will to co-operate can be cultivated. In this regard, it is realized that the moral and political prestige of the United Nations is deeply involved.

7. The objective of a federal-State solution would be to give the most feasible recognition to the nationalistic aspirations of both Arabs and Jews, and to merge them into a single loyalty and patriotism which would find expression in an independent Palestine.

8. The federal State is also in every respect the most democratic solution, both as regards the measures required for its implementation and in its operation, since it requires no undemocratic economic controls, avoids the creation of national minority groups, and affords an opportunity for full and effective participation in representative government to every citizen of the State. This solution would be most in harmony with the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

9. The federal-State solution would permit the development of patterns of government and social organization in Palestine which would be more harmonious with the governmental and social patterns in the neighbouring States.

10. Such a solution would be the one most likely to bring to an end the present economic boycotts, to the benefit of the economic life of the country.

11. Future peace and order in Palestine and the Near East generally will be vitally affected by the nature of the solution decided upon for the Palestine question. In this regard, it is important to avoid an acceleration of the separatism which now characterizes the relations of Arabs and Jews in the Near East, and to avoid laying the foundations of a dangerous irredentism there, which would be the inevitable consequences of partition in whatever form. A Federal State solution, therefore, which in the very nature of the case must emphasize unity and co-operation, will best serve the interests of peace.

12. It is a fact of great significance that very few, if any, Arabs, are in favour of partition as a solution. On the other hand, a substantial number of Jews, backed by influential Jewish leaders and organizations, are strongly opposed to partition. Partition both in principle and in substance can only be regarded as an anti-Arab solution. The Federal State, however, cannot be described as an anti-Jewish solution. To the contrary, it will best serve the interests of both Arabs and Jews.

13. A federal State would provide the greatest opportunity for ameliorating the present dangerous racial and religious divisions in the population, while permitting the development of a more normal social structure.

14. The federal State is the most constructive and dynamic solution in that it eschews an attitude of resignation towards the question of the ability of Arabs and Jews to co-operate in their common interest, in favour of a realistic and dynamic attitude, namely, that under changed conditions the will to co-operate can be cultivated.

15. A basis for the assumption that co-operation between the Arab and Jewish communities is not impossible is found in the fact that, even under the existing highly unfavourable conditions, the Committee did observe in Palestine instances of effective and fruitful co-operation between the two communities.

16. While it may be doubted whether the will to co-operate is to be found in the two groups under present conditions, it is entirely possible that if a federal solution were firmly and definitively imposed, the two groups, in their own self-interest, would gradually develop a spirit of co-operation in their common State. There is no basis for an assumption that these two peoples cannot live and work together for common purposes once they realize that there is no alternative. Since, under any solution, large groups of them would have to do so, it must either be taken for granted that co-operation between them is possible or it must be accepted that there is no workable solution at all.

17. Taking into account the limited area available and the vital importance of maintaining Palestine as an economic and social unity, the federal-State solution seems to provide the only practical and workable approach.

Recommendations

The undersigned representatives of India, Iran and Yugoslavia, not being in agreement with the recommendation for partition formulated by the other members of the Committee, and for the reasons, among others, stated above, present to the General Assembly the following recommendations which, in their view, constitute the most suitable solution to the problem of Palestine. 

I. The Independent State of Palestine 

It is recommended that

1. The peoples of Palestine are entitled to recognition of their right to independence, and an independent federal State of Palestine shall be created following a transitional period not exceeding three years.

2. With regard to the transitional period, responsibility for administering Palestine and preparing it for independence under the conditions herein prescribed shall be entrusted to such authority as may be decided upon by the General Assembly.

3. The independent Federal State of Palestine shall comprise an Arab state and a Jewish state.

4. In delimiting the boundaries of the Arab and Jewish states, respectively, consideration shall be given to anticipated population growth.

5. During the transitional period, a constituent assembly shall be elected by the population of Palestine and shall formulate the constitution of the independent Federal State of Palestine. The authority entrusted by the General Assembly with responsibility for administering Palestine during the transitional period shall convene the constituent assembly on the basis of electoral provisions which shall ensure the fullest possible representation of the population, providing that all adult persons who have acquired Palestinian citizenship as well as all Arabs and Jews who, though noncitizens, may be resident in Palestine and who shall have applied for citizenship in Palestine not less than three months before the date of the election, shall be entitled to vote therein.

6. The attainment of independence by the independent federal State of Palestine shall be declared by the General Assembly of the United Nations as soon as the authority administering the territory shall have certified to the General Assembly that the constituent assembly referred to in the preceding paragraph has adopted a constitution incorporating the provisions set forth in II immediately following.

II. Outline of the structure and required provisions in the constitution of Palestine

(The provisions set forth in this section are not designed to be the constitution of the new independent federal State of Palestine. The intent is that the constitution of the new State, as a condition for independence, shall be required to include, inter alia, the substance of these provisions.)

It is recommended that

As a condition prior to the grant of independence, the constitution of the proposed independent federal State of Palestine shall include, in substance, the following provisions:

1. The governmental structure of the independent Federal State of Palestine shall be federal and shall comprise a federal Government and the governments of the Arab and Jewish states respectively.

2. Among the organs of government there shall be a head of State and an executive body, a representative federal legislative body, a federal court and such other subsidiary bodies as may be deemed necessary.

3. The federal legislative body shall be composed of two chambers.

4. Election to one chamber of the federal legislative body shall be on the basis of proportional representation of the population as a whole.

5. Election of members to the other chamber of the federal legislative body shall be on the basis of equal-representation of the Arab and Jewish citizens of Palestine.

6. The federal legislative body shall be empowered to legislate on all matters entrusted to the federal Government.

7. Legislation shall be enacted when approved by majority votes in both chambers of the federal legislative body.

8. In the event of disagreement between the two chambers with regard to any proposed legislation, the issue shall be submitted to an arbitral body. That body shall be composed of one representative from each chamber of the federal legislative body, the head of State, and two members, other than members of the federal court, designated by that court for this purpose; these members shall be so designated by the court with regard to Arabs and Jews as to ensure that neither the Arab nor the Jewish community shall have less than two members on the arbitral body. This arbitral body shall first attempt, to resolve the disagreement by mediation, but in the event mediation fails, the arbitral body shall be empowered to make a final decision which shall have the force of law and shall be binding.

9. The head of the independent federal State of Palestine shall be elected by a majority vote of the members of both chambers of the federal legislative body sitting in a joint meeting convened for this purpose, and shall serve for such term as the constitution may determine.

10. The powers and functions of the head of the independent federal State of Palestine shall be as determined by the constitution of that State.

11. A deputy head of State shall be similarly elected, who shall be a representative of the community other than that with which the head of State provided for in paragraph 9 above is identified. The deputy head of State in his regular activities and during the absence of the head of State, for whom he shall act, shall exercise such powers as may be delegated to him by the head of State. He shall also act with full powers for the head of State in case of his incapacity, or following his death, pending the election of a new head of State.

12. The executive branch of the federal Government shall be responsible to the federal legislative body.

13. A federal court shall be established which' shall be the final court of appeal with regard to constitutional matters. 

14. The federal court shall have a minimum membership of four Arabs and three Jews.

15. The members of the federal court shall be elected at a joint session of both chambers of the federal legislative body for such terms and subject to such qualifications as the constitution may prescribe.

16. The federal court shall be empowered to decide (a) whether laws and regulations of the federal and state governments are in conformity with the constitution; (&) cases involving conflict between the laws and regulations of the federal government and laws and regulations of the state governments; (c) all other questions involving an interpretation of the constitution; and (d) such other matters as may be placed within its competence by the constitution.

17. All decisions of the federal court shall be final.

18. Full authority shall be vested in the federal government with regard to national defense, foreign relations, immigration, currency, taxation for federal purposes, foreign and interstate waterways, transport and communications, copy-rights and patents.

19. The constitution shall forbid any discriminatory legislation, whether by federal or state governments, against Arabs, Jews or other population groups, or against either of the states; and shall guarantee equal rights and privileges for all minorities, irrespective of race or religion.

20. The constitution, having regard for the customs of the people, shall be based on the principle of the full equality of all citizens of Palestine with regard to the political, civil and religious rights of the individual, and shall make specific provision for the protection of linguistic, religious, and ethnic rights of the peoples and respect for their cultures.

21. The constitution shall include specific guarantees respecting freedom of conscience, speech, press and assemblage, the rights of organized labour, freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary searches and seizures, and rights of personal property.

22. The constitution shall guarantee free access to Holy Places, protect religious interests, and ensure freedom of worship and of conscience to all, provided that the traditional customs of the several religions shall be respected.

23. Arabic and Hebrew shall be official languages in both the federal and state governments.

24. The constitution shall include provisions which shall (a) undertake to settle all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered; and (b) accept the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

25. There shall be a single Palestinian nationality and citizenship, which shall be granted to Arabs, Jews and others on the basis of such qualifications and conditions as the constitution and laws of the federal State may determine and equally apply.

26. The Arab state and the Jewish state shall enjoy full powers of local self-government, and may institute such representative forms of government, adopt such local constitutions and issue such local laws and regulations as they may deem desirable, subject only to the provisions of the federal constitution.

27. Each state government shall have authority, within its borders, over education, taxation for local purposes, the right of residence, commercial licenses, land permits, guiding rights, interstate migration, settlement, police, punishment of crime, social institutions and services, public housing, public health, local roads, agriculture and local industries, and such aspects of economic activities and such other authority as may be entrusted to the states by the constitution.

28. Each state shall be entitled to organize a police force for the maintenance of law and order.

29. The constitution shall provide for equitable participation of the representatives of both communities in delegations to international organizations and conferences, and on all boards, agencies, bureaux or ad hoc bodies established under the authority of the State.

30. The independent federal State of Palestine shall accept, as binding all international agreements and conventions, both general and specific, to which the territory of Palestine has previously become a party by action of the mandatory Power acting on its behalf. Subjectto such right of denunciation as may be provided therein, all such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the independent federal State of Palestine.

31. The constitution shall make provision for its method of amendment, provided that it shall be accepted as a solemn obligation undertaken by the independent federal State of Palestine to the United Nations not to alter the provisions of any part of the constitution or the constitution as a whole in such manner as to nullify the provisions herein stated as a prior condition to independence; except by the assent of a majority of both the Arab and Jewish members of the federal legislative body.

III. Boundaries of the Arab and Jewish states in the independent Federal State of Palestine

It is recommended that

The boundaries of the respective Arab and Jewish states in the independent federal State of Palestine shall be as indicated on the map attached to this report.168/

IV. Capitalization 

It is recommended that

The General Assembly of the United Nations shall invite all States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulations or usage in the Ottoman Empire, to renounce any right pertaining to them to the reestablishment of such privileges and immunities in the independent federal State of Palestine.

V. The Holy Places, religious interests and Jerusalem

A. Religious interests and Holy Places it is recommended that

Since the Holy Places, buildings and sites appertaining to whatever religions, and wherever located in Palestine, must be recognized as of special and unique interest and concern to the international community, the following principles and measures should be fully safeguarded as a condition for the establishment of the independent federal State of Palestine.

1. Millions of Christians, Jews and Moslems abroad, as well as the inhabitants of Palestine, have a proper and recognized interest in the preservation and care of sites and buildings associated with the origin and history of their respective faiths. The sacred character of the Holy Places shall therefore be preserved, and access to them for purposes of worship and pilgrimage shall be ensured in accordance with existing rights.

2. In the interests both of the followers of various faiths and of the maintenance of peace, existing rights in Palestine enjoyed by the several religious communities shall be neither impaired nor denied.

3. The incorporation in the constitution of the independent federal State of Palestine of provisions of the nature proposed in the preceding paragraph are designed substantially to allay the anxiety which is manifested in many quarters concerning the future status of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the preservation of the rights of the communities in Palestine following the establishment of an independent State of Palestine.

4. The establishment of an adequate and impartial system for the settlement of disputes regarding religious rights is essential to the preservation of religious peace in replacement of the Palestinian administration which exercised such authority under the mandate. Specific stipulations designed to preserve and protect the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the rights of religious communities shall be inserted in the constitution of the independent federal State of Palestine and shall be in substance as follows:

(a) Existing rights in respect of Holy Places, religious buildings and sites shall not be denied or impaired.

(b) Free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the tree exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing i rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.

(c) Holy Places, religious buildings and sites shall be preserved and no action shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character.

(d) If at any time it should appear to the Government of the independent federal State of Palestine, or representations to that effect should be made to it by any interested party, that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government shall call upon the religious community or communities concerned to carry out such repair, and in the event no action is taken within a reasonable time, the Government itself may carry out the necessary repairs.

(e) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation under the law in force on the date on which independence shall be granted to the State of Palestine.

5. In the interest of preserving, protecting and caring for Holy Places, buildings and sites in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth and elsewhere in Palestine, a permanent international body for the" supervision and protection of the Holy Places in Palestine shall be created by the appropriate organ of the United Nations. A list of such Holy Places, buildings and sites shall be prepared by that organ.

6. The membership of the permanent international body for the supervision of Holy Places in Palestine shall consist of three representatives designated by the appropriate organ of the United Nations, and one representative from each of the recognized faiths having an interest in the matter, as may be determined by the United Nations.

7. The permanent international body referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 above shall be responsible, subject to existing rights, for the supervision and protection of all such Places, building and sites in Palestine, and shall be empowered to make representations to the Government of the independent federal State of Palestine respecting any matters affecting the Holy Places, buildings and sites or the protection of religious interests in Palestine, and to report on all such matters to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

B. Jerusalem

1. Jerusalem, which shall be the capital of the independent federal State of Palestine, shall comprise, for purposes of local administration, two separate municipalities, one of which shall include the Arab sections of the city, including that part of the city within the walls, and the other the areas which are predominantly Jewish.

2. The Arab and Jewish municipalities of Jerusalem, which shall jointly comprise the City and capital of Jerusalem, shall, under the constitution and laws of the federal Government, enjoy powers of local administration within their respective areas, and shall participate in such joint local self-governing institutions as the federal Government may prescribe or permit, provided that equitable representation in such bodies is ensured to followers of such faiths as may be represented in the community.

3. The Arab and Jewish municipalities of Jerusalem shall jointly provide for, maintain and support such common public services as sewage, garbage collection and disposal, fire protection, water supply, local transport, telephones and telegraph.

C. Irrevocability of provisions

The independent federal State of Palestine, irrespective of the provision made in paragraph 31 of section II of these recommendations for amendment of the constitution, shall undertake to accept as irrevocable the above provisions affecting Holy Places, buildings and sitesand religious interests.

VI. International responsibility for Jewish displaced persons

1. The Jews in the displaced persons camps and the distressed European Jews outside them, like the other homeless persons of Europe, constitute a residue of the Second World War. As such, they are all an international responsibility. But the Jews amongst them have a direct bearing on the solution of the Palestine problem, in view of the insistent demands that they be permitted freely to enter that country, and the Arab fears that this permission will be granted.

2. Although the Committee's terms of reference would not justify it in devoting its attention to the problem of the displaced and homeless persons as a whole, it is entirely justified in recommending to the General Assembly a prompt amelioration of the plight of the Jewish segments of. these groups as a vital prerequisite to the settlement of the difficult conditions in Palestine.

3. Therefore, it is recommended that

The General Assembly undertake immediately the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews in and outside the camps for displaced persons, of whom approximately 250,000 are in assembly centers, would be accepted as a special concern of extreme urgency for the alleviation of the Palestine problem, and by means of which a number of those Members of the United Nations not already over-populated would accept within their borders a proportionate number of Jewish refugees, with Palestine accepting its share in accordance with the recommendation on Jewish immigration set forth in VII immediately below.

VII. Jewish immigration into Palestine

1. Jewish immigration into Palestine continues to be one of the central political questions of that country.

2. The solution of the problem of Palestine is rendered more difficult by the fact that large numbers of Jews, and especially the displaced and homeless Jews of Europe, insistently demand the right to settle in Palestine, on the basis of the historical association of the Jewish people with that country, and are strongly supported in this demand by all of the Jews encountered by the Committee in Palestine.

S. It is a fact, also, that many of the Jews in Palestine have relatives among the displaced Jews of Europe who are eager to emigrate to Palestine.

4. While the problem of Jewish immigration is thus closely related to the solution of the Palestine question, it cannot be contemplated that Palestine is to be considered in any sense as a means of solving the problem of world Jewry. In direct and effective opposition to any such suggestion are the twin factors of limited area and resources and vigorous and persistent opposition of the Arab people, who constitute the majority population of the country.

5. For these reasons, no claim to a right of unlimited immigration of Jews into Palestine, irrespective of time, can be entertained. It follows, therefore, that no basis could exist for any anticipation that the Jews now in Palestine might increase their numbers by means of free mass immigration to such extent that they would become the majority population in Palestine.

6. With these considerations in mind, It is recommended that

The problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine be dealt with in the following manner:

(a) For a period of three years from the effective date of the beginning of the transitional period provided for in the solution to be applied to Palestine, even it the transitional period should be less, Jewish immigration shall be permitted into the borders of the Jewish state in the proposed independent federal State of Palestine, in such numbers as not to exceed the absorptive capacity of that Jewish state, having due regard for the rights of the population then present within that state and for their anticipated natural rate of increase. The authority responsible for executing the transitional arrangements on behalf of the United Nations shall take all measures necessary to safeguard these principles.

(b) For the purpose of appraising objectively the absorptive capacity of the Jewish state in the independent State of Palestine, an international commission shall be established. Its membership shall consist of three representatives designated by the Arabs of Palestine, three representatives designated by the Jews of Palestine, and three representatives designated by the appropriate organ of the United Nations.

(c) The international commission shall be empowered to estimate the absorptive capacity of the Jewish state, and in discharging this responsibility may call upon the assistance of such experts as it may consider necessary.

(d) The estimates of the international commission, made in accordance with subparagraphs 6 (a) and 6 (c) above shall be binding on the authority entrusted with the administration of Palestine during the period referred to in sub-paragraph 6 (a).

(e) The international commission shall exist only during the period of three years provided for in sub-paragraph 6 (a); and its functions and activities, other than those relating to its liquidation, shall automatically cease at the end of that period.

(f) Responsibility for organizing and caring for Jewish immigrants during the transitional period shall be placed in such representative local organization as the Jewish community of Palestine shall decide upon.

(g) Priority in the granting of Jewish immigration certificates during the transitional period shall be accorded to orphans, survivors who are of the same family, close relatives of persons already in Palestine, and persons having useful scientific and technical qualifications.

Testimony of David Ben Gurion

CHAIRMAN: I might put some questions, and that is the same question that we put to Dr. Weizmann. What about a federal state? I do not imply by that we are specially interested in a federal State. We just want to explore the possibilities.

Mr. BEN GURION: I am ready to answer that now if you want. We will not consider any settlement which excludes complete independence and equality as a nation with Arabs in this country. If in any way a settlement is made where we are not in a nation, and which would deprive us of equality as a nation, we will have to be against it, because we consider two things as vital for our very existence and our human dignity, the belief that the Jew has self-respect as a people and as human beings, and these two vital issues are these: one, the right of the Jew who is unhappy, uncomfortable, oppressed, discriminated against-or for any other reason cannot stay where he is and there is economically a place in Palestine for him-that he should have a right to come and settle here; and the second is that the Jewish people as a whole, in their own country, should have the same status as any free people in the world. If the world will abolish separate sovereignties, we will bless it, because if the human family were to be one, even then the world cannot abolish self-government-but whatever regime there will be in the world for any other free nation, we claim for our people-not less and not more. We will be against any discrimination against the Jewish people, but if you will ensure our independence and equality as a nation, which also includes Membership of the United Nations, for the welfare of those who are in the country and for the welfare of our neighbours, it will be necessary-we believe that it will be necessary that the Jewish State, and I told you yesterday what we mean by Jewish State where Jews are in the majority and are all equal-that such a State should cooperate with the neighbouring States. We are the first to welcome it, even if that cooperation will not limit itself merely to economic, social and cultural matters.

If our neighbours are willing to cooperate politically as a regional organization, we will welcome it, and ties will be created between these and the neighbouring States, as agreed upon between them freely, and as desired by the United Nations. This may be the main consideration, but the condition is we should be an equal partner and that we should have mutual interest which should be desired by the United Nations.

So an independent Jewish State does not exclude it being part of a larger Jewry, the cooperation either of sympathetic States or Middle East States or any other foreign States. It does not exclude. It is possible that what we need is this cooperation, essential for our really endless work.

CHAIRMAN: Do you give preference to a federal State or a partition scheme?

Mr. BEN GURION: We want to have a State of our own, and that State can be federate if the other State or States is or are willing to do so in the mutual interest, on condition that our State is in its own right a Member of the United Nations.
[...]


Mr. LISICKY: (Czechoslovakia): I presume that Mr. BEN GURION has listened to the statement of Dr. Weizmann, which was acknowledged with enthusiastic applause by the public. This statement favours a partition of Palestine into two states. I should like to hear the opinion of Mr. BEN GURION on this scheme-not his personal opinion because it is more or less known, but the opinion of the Jewish Agency. I am not asking for an immediate answer. I should prefer very much a considered opinion of the Jewish Agency after deliberation. If I may ask, I should like to see included in this considered opinion the point of view of the Jewish Agency on the possible federate scheme of these two States-a Jewish State and an Arab State-in Palestine after the partition. I do not mean any rigid federation, but rather a sort of loose confederation, a sort in which the independent character of the Jewish State should be completely set forth. I put the question, but I am not asking for an immediate answer.

Mr. BEN GURION: I will make two remarks on that. One is that Dr. Weizmann is thought so well of by the Jewish people and occupies such a place in our history and among us that he is entitled to speak for himself without any public mandate. You heard his views. I also had the pleasure of listening to them. As you do not insist on my giving you the answer now about the scheme of partition. I will not do it, but I will tell you what we told the Government last year and this year while we believe and request that our right, at least to the Western part of Palestine should be granted in full and Western Palestine be made a Jewish State, we believe it is possible. We have a right to it, but we are willing to consider an offer of a Jewish State in an area which means less than the whole of Palestine. We will consider it. But I am glad you do not want me to give a complete scheme.

On the question of federation I made it clear before that it-depends really on what you mean by the word "federation." When you say "federate State," you mean that the Jewish State would be an independent State. I will give you an example, in Australia, for instance. Although Australia belongs to the Commonwealth of Nations, Australia is independent. When England makes war, Australia may remain neutral; and when Australia makes war England need not make war. It has its own representation and its own representatives, although it is tied up with a larger group in a free commonwealth.

If you mean that the Jewish State should be federated with other states while remaining an independent State with Membership, than we are perfectly willing. In fact, we would welcome it if this were for the benefit of all the peoples in this region and if this were the desire of the United Nations. But if you mean that there would be a federate State as, let us say in the United States we-here there are forty-eight states-New York is a state, but really it is one state; the United States is as much a single State as France, or as the United Kingdom, although there is Wales and Scotland and England. If you mean the Jewish State should be a part of a federate State as New York is a part of the United States, that is a denial of the Jewish State and Jewish independence. We would be against this. Such a scheme as this means not a Jewish State.

Mr. LISICKY (Czechoslovakia): I think you did not hear when I spoke about a loose confederation.

Mr. BEN GURION: I say we will be ready to enter not a loose federation, but a much closer federation with free and equal status as a free and equal people, whether confederate or federate. This does not preclude the federation of a Jewish State with some of the neighbouring States.

Back to the Future: Is There a More Equitable Palestinian-Israeli Solution in UNSCOP's "Minority Plan"?

Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January/February 1999, pages 44, 98

Beyond the Oslo Accords

Back to the Future: Is There a More Equitable Palestinian-Israeli Solution in UNSCOP's "Minority Plan"?

By Issam Nashashibi

Prof. Norman Finkelstein defines colonial conquest as implementing any of the following four strategies: Extermination, Expulsion, Encirclement and Exploitation. A colonialist would choose an alternative strategy when the preferred option could not be implemented due to improving world moral standards or logistical difficulties.

For example, in conquering North America, Extermination gave way to Expulsion and Encirclement in Indian reservations. Facing the logistical difficulty of expelling the majority black population of South Africa, the white regime resorted to Encirclement and Exploitation strategies through implementing Apartheid.

Zionism and "Manifest Destiny"

In Palestine, David Ben-Gurion's vision of Zionism, which was similar to the white man's "manifest destiny" of conquering North America, gave way to a strategy combining Extermination and Expulsion in 1947-1948. This was consistent with Zionist solutions starting with Theodor Hertzl through the numerous Zionist plans to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from Palestine—a policy that continues through such means as the confiscation of Jerusalem ID cards from Palestinians. Having failed to completely "auto-dispossess" from Palestine, non-Jewish Palestinians found themselves Encircled and Exploited, victims of Israeli Apartheid, as citizens of Israel and later as an occupied population in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza.

The current Zionist strategy of Encirclement and Exploitation has been manifest in all the Israeli agreements with the Palestinian Authority. Thus it will most likely be at the core of any future agreement, even if it leads to a Palestinian state on whatever portion of the West Bank the Israeli government agrees to evacuate. Israel's Labor Party has called for a Palestinian state in most of Gaza and 50 percent of the West Bank, while Likud is calling for reducing the West Bank area available to the Palestinians to 25 percent.

This conclusion is also confirmed by even "leftist" Zionists such as Jerome Segal, a founder of the Jewish Committee for Israeli-Palestinian Peace. In a Feb. 6, 1988 Los Angeles Times article, he wrote: "Ironically, of all the alternatives, an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is the one solution that best serves Israeli security....A Palestinian state would be the fullest possible satisfaction of the demands of Palestinian nationalism....

"It would win the support of the PLO and is the only likely basis on which the PLO would formally abandon the right to return to the land and villages lost in 1948....Only the PLO can compromise in the name of the Palestinians....

"A Palestinian state would be a demilitarized mini-state. It would be completely enclosed by Israel on one side and Jordan on the other.....The foreign policy of such a mini-state would be dominated by its links to the Israeli economy and by its national security realities. In the event of a war, its very existence would be in jeopardy.....Israel would not be seriously threatened if hostilities broke out......For Israel, a Palestinian state is not a charming prospect. It is simply better than the alternatives."

Having reaffirmed that Zionism, in any of its hues, is as compatible with the restitution of Palestinian rights as the racist KKK was with the U.S. civil rights movement of the '60s, Diaspora Palestinians like Professors Edward Said and Naseer Aruri have called for a binational state—an idea advanced by Arab member of the Israeli Knesset Dr. Azmi Bishara in his call for Israel to be a "state for all its citizens."

While a binational state (probably similar to Belgium) option has been absolutely rejected by the architect of the "peace process," Shimon Peres, and is completely ignored by the Palestinian Authority, it remains a Palestinian alternative that is gaining support amongst Palestinians and their friends. However, is that the only alternative?

Another may be available in the 1947 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) report that led to the Palestine partition plan of U.N. Resolution 181. The report's Chapter VII, known as the Minority Proposal because it was only supported by India, Iran and Yugoslavia, is the proposed plan for a Federal State.

The Federal State proposal was born of the frustration with the built-in bias in UNSCOP's constituent members as demonstrated by calls for a Jewish, instead of Zionist, state; and an Arab, instead of Palestinian, state in Palestine.

The Federal State plan called for one country whose capital is Jerusalem.

Six Palestinians, including the late Dr. Khalil Budeiri and Mr. Mufid Nashashibi of Seal Beach, CA, eager to preserve the unity of Mandatory Palestine, proposed the concept that became known as the Minority Opinion to the UNSCOP's Yugoslav alternate representative Dr. Joza Brilej, who visited Jerusalem in 1947.

If parties to the present peace process fail to agree on an equitable two-state solution, maybe it is time to revisit the Federal State plan. To summarize, the plan called for one country whose capital is Jerusalem. This country would be composed of a "Jewish" and an "Arab" state that have full self-government and limited borders that take into account respective population growths. The people would elect a transitional assembly that would declare its independence after the U.N. certified that it had formulated a constitution that met the following Federal structure:

Three governmental branches: a bi-cameral legislative, the executive and a Federal court system. The Federal authority would include defense, immigration, foreign relations, currency, taxation and interstate commerce.
The Legislative branch, empowered to legislate all Federal matters with a majority vote, would be composed of one body with members elected on the basis of proportional representation while the second body would be of equal Jewish and non-Jewish representation.
The Federal executive branch would be responsible to the Federal legislative body and would include a head of state and a deputy. The head of state, with powers determined by the constitution, would be elected by a majority of a joint meeting of the legislature. The deputy head of state would be similarly elected and would be from the community other than that of the head of state.
The Federal court, with members elected by the legislature, would be the final court of appeal with a minimum membership, reflecting the population balance at the time, of four Arabs and three non-Arabs. This court would judge on the constitutionality of all state and Federal laws as well as other matters placed within its competence by the constitution.
The constitution would forbid any discriminatory Federal or state legislation and would guarantee equal rights and privileges for all citizens irrespective of race or religion. The constitution would also include specific guarantees respecting the freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly, organized labor, freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary searches and seizures as well as rights of personal property. It would also respect custom and protect the political, civil and religious rights of the individual with specific protection provisions for linguistic, religious and ethnic rights and culture.
The constitution would guarantee access to the holy places and freedom of worship and would recognize both Hebrew and Arabic as official languages with a single nationality and citizenship.
Despite, or maybe because of, its advantages as a democratic state with equal rights for its citizens, the Federal plan was not recommended. Having witnessed the failure of the partition plan to achieve the goal of two states, it may be time to consider the Federal plan. Many of its provisions are already incorporated in Israel's basic law.

Some may argue that given the current momentum to implement the Oslo accords, a plan such as this or a binational state may not be practical. However, before venturing too far down this nay-saying path, let us recall Haim Weizmann and his drive to establish the Zionist state.

Despite the obstacles of an overwhelming non-Jewish indigenous population and a Turkish ruler who refused to sell Palestine, Weizmann was able to turn the tables. Perhaps it is time to adopt his attitude and turn the tables again.

Issam Nashashibi is a Palestinian-American activist in California.


(According to international law, a state must have four qualities: a defined territory, a defined population of similar identity, a functioning, accepted government, and the ability to enter into international agreements. The Palestinians have all four.)