Federalism and peace from an Islamic perspective
Emphase is mine.
29 April 2013
By Ibrahim Saleh
In the name of God
Your Excellency Arnold Koller, ladies & gentlemen, peace be upon you. The Fribourg peace forum has asked me to deliver a speech about federalism and peace from the Islamic perspective.
However, in order to cover this subject objectively, we must consider the religious, social, and political systems existing at that time especially the question of the relation between men and others – those who are different in color, language and religion. At the emergence of Islam, the two major powers – Persia and Rome – were frequently engaged in wars which took place in the Middle East. The Romans were known for their brutality and the persecution of the Christians. They also used to enslave the defeated and those who were different in color and language. The Arab Peninsula consisted of tribes fighting against each other, they were ignorant, used to burry alive their new born baby girls. The religions prevailing were pagan, with some Jews and Christians.
Before Islam could establish a viable political system, it had to totally uproot the existing pagan, social and political order in the Middle East by taking the following steps:
1. To abolish racism and the rejection of others because of their religion, race and color. For this Islam promoted peace and brotherhood. The Quran says in Surat Al-Hugarat: nr 49, verse 13: Oh people we created all of you from man and woman, made tribes and folks, to cooperate with you …”
Islam stressed that the creation of mankind in different colors, faiths and languages is God’s divine will to make us different surat al rum 30/22 .
And if He wished He could make all of us Jews, Christians, Buddhists or Muslims, this is His will, and for this He created us Hood 11/118
2. Islam declared freedom of religion. It was the first in the history of mankind. Whereas people were usually forced to adopt the religion of their rulers, the Quran states in al kahf 18/29 say the truth from God and al baqqara 2/256- no compulsion in religion al kafiroon 109 last ayat…
3. Also to his credit, Islam banned and dismantled the ugly establishment of priesthood which decided over life and death, misery and happiness of the people. The Quran says anyone could interrelate with God without a broker to ask for forgiveness – and God would accept his prayer…hood nr.11 /3 and ghafer 40/60 pray me and I shall accept your prayer.
4. The Swiss professor Hans Küng once said that there could be no peace between nations before we make peace between people; and there could be no peace between people before we make peace between religions. That is precisely what Islam did when it declared acceptance, respect and peace with and for all previous religions; especially with Judaism and Christianity…sura Imran 3/84… and in al baqqara 2 verse 285 … The Quran also stressed the strong belief and respect of Islam towards Judaism and Christianity. God speaks about the Torah and the Bible as having light and guidance Al Maida 5/44 and 46. It is worth to mention that the Quran is the only book which honored Maria with a complete Sura of 95 verses (Surat Maryam 19). It also honors Jesus and describes him uniquely as being the “soul” and the “word” of God. No other prophet has been described by these characteristics. The Quran also confirms all of Jesus’ miracles such as he was born without a father, that he resurrected the dead, healed the ill and returned vision to the blind.
From this special relationship with the people of the book, the Muslims were allowed to marry their women and to eat their food. From the Muslims belief in the two religions, Jews and Christians enjoyed peace and protection in the Muslim countries facing neither prosecution nor extermination. To date both minorities live in peace and tranquility in Muslim countries. The Jews themselves admit as stated by Professor Israel Shahak in his book “Jewish religion and Jewish history”, that the Muslim always protected the Jews and that those expelled from Spain during the Inquisition were granted asylum in Muslim countries, especially in Turkey.
By this we see that Islam really has eradicated racism and the rejection of others, made peace between the major world religions and their worshippers. Another example of acceptance of the others were the Prophet Mohammed’s companions: Bilal – a freed black slave, Salman – a Persian advisor and Suhaib – a white Roman counselor. In Islam there was no “Clash of Civilizations” as described by Huntington, nor such thing as described in “The End of History” by Fukuyama; and no there was no Holocaust under Islam. There was no such call “as Germany over all”.
5. After Islam uprooted racism, he turned to handle the question of women: the mother, the wife, the daughter. The woman was accused by all the religions to have been responsible about Adam being expelled out of Paradise; hence she is responsible for the suffering of all human beings. She was also accused to be a low, satanic creature who seduced man. It was even questioned whether she had a soul or not. She was persecuted and even buried alive at birth by the Arab tribes.
The Holy Quran reinstated the woman and restored her honor and her esteem. It was Adam who followed Satan and disobeyed God as described in sura Taha 20/120-122. Islam elevated the woman to be equal to man as mentioned in Sura Al Imran 3/ 95. Islam even gave her financial independence: her husband has no right over her fortune and belongings; these rights were granted to European women just a few decades ago.
6. In Islam, life is sacred. Killing a man is considered as killing all mankind. Surra al maida 5/30. War therefore was only allowed in case of self defense or to stop aggression al baqqara 2/90 and by no means to start war or aggress others. The retaliation should be equal and not exceed the damage suffered Al baqqara 2/194.
7. In Islam cooperation between individuals or states is allowed provided they are dedicated to the good. They are forbidden if it is for the evil Al maida 5/2
After all these reforms have been implemented, Islam by then has laid down the foundations of a healthy society and a viable state. Under Islam, the first federation with the Jews was concluded in what was considered or known to be the “Al–Madina-document” which foresees:
"In the name of God. The Jews in Madina are a nation and a community; they have their own religion, rules and customs; and the Muslims are a nation and a community. The Jews are our neighbors and partners with equal rights and obligations. Both parties agree to cooperate against any aggression committed by a foreign power against the other community; they have to work together in good faith and promote trade.”
This treaty or agreement was extended to cover the Christians of Nagran. When they visited the Prophet in Madina, he allowed them to enter his mosque with crosses so as to perform their prayers and ceremonies. Further the Prophet asked the Muslims to allocate money for the repair of the churches and to build new ones. This money was donated by the treasury as a gift and was not to be returned. The Prophet committed himself and the Muslims to defend the Christians against any aggression as if defending their own wife and children. This was the first federation or confederation in the history of Islam.
The same principle of confederation was applied in the Muslim Empire which one day extended from China to Spain. In this confederation each country had its own religion, laws, and languages with open borders and free trade. Their cooperation was in Finance and Defense against any foreign force. They lived in peace and prospered. There was no massacre against any minority. Till now Jewish and Christian minorities in Muslim countries have their own courts to judge upon their own religious and personal affairs.
As an example of such a system we could mention Muslim Spain where Christians, Jews and Arabs lived together in peace and harmony and established a great civilization which greatly influenced the European Renaissance.
However, after the downfall of the Ottoman Empire the remaining countries of this federation were divided on national basis and Turkey became an independent. This arbitrary division of nations caused numerous conflicts, such as the Kurdish question in Iran, Iraq and Turkey; the Arabs in Iran, the Berber in North Africa to mention but a few.
Europe has learned a lot from its bloody and painful history and finally established the European confederation of states. Now we ask ourselves this question: could the Muslims establish the Great Muslim Confederation which could solve all existing problems? We are still waiting for the answer.
Ibrahim Salah, 17 September 2010
Showing posts with label federation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label federation. Show all posts
Tuesday, February 6, 2018
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
To salvage its democracy, Israel must be divided into cantons - Strenger than Fiction
An proposal close to ours by Carlos Strenger
To salvage its democracy, Israel must be divided into cantons

Israel's new government prepares to pose for a portrait at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem, May 19, 2015. Photo by Marc Israel Sellem
For a number of years I have argued that Israel’s internal differences — not only between Jews and Arabs, but among Jews — are so large that the country should be divided into cantons linked in a federative structure. Last year, with Haaretz’s Judd Yadid, I presented a detailed proposal on how such a cantonal structure could look.
The first weeks of Benjamin Netanyahu’s new government show that such a proposal is timelier than ever. Barely sworn in, its statements, policy proposals and steps show that it might use its tenure, brief as it may be, to irreparably damage Israel’s democracy.
I’d like to present an unorthodox explanation for why Netanyahu’s team is doing this, and why a federative structure might salvage Israel’s democracy.
Deputy Defense Minister Eli Ben-Dahan has taken the Knesset podium to defend his ministry’s decision to provide separate buses for Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank. But the government halted this plan because it realized the catastrophic international repercussions of a step reeking of apartheid — even when rationalized by security measures — not because it considers the move grievously wrong. (Incidentally, the army was strictly against the separate bus policy.)
Likud’s Tzipi Hotovely is deputy foreign minister, which, given that there is no foreign minister, means she is acting foreign minister. Hotovely has told the Foreign Ministry staff that Israeli ambassadors should tell foreign governments the truth — that God gave all of Israel to the Jewish people and therefore it is simply ours by right.
The new culture minister, Miri Regev, has said she does not intend to allow art that harms Israel’s image. “If I need to censor something, I will,” she said.
And the new justice, minister, Ayelet Shaked, has declared that governance must return to the people’s control by working toward the abolition of the Supreme Court’s ability to block legislation.
Add to this that Netanyahu, who has kept the Communications Ministry under his personal command, has already taken steps to interfere with the press. For example, he is putting pressure on Channel 10, which he has tried to close down for a while now.
Let me add the cherry from outside the coalition on the icing of this lovely cake: Yisrael Beiteinu leader Avigdor Lieberman, who single-handedly forced Netanyahu to form a coalition based on 61 MKs by not joining.
He now attacks his former boss for having scheduled a meeting with Ayman Odeh, the leader of the United Arab List — a meeting required by democratic etiquette. Lieberman called on Netanyahu to cancel the meeting because it “legitimizes the fifth column operating in the Knesset.”
Nothing in this potpourri of events should be surprising. The lamentations by Israeli liberals that the right has become racist and is trying to undermine democracy have been voiced for a long time — and for good reason.
But lamentations won’t help; we need to look at the facts without blinking. Hotovely genuinely believes that God gave all of Israel to the Jews. Regev deeply believes that Israeli liberals harm Israel. And Ben-Dahan has explained his hierarchy of human beings from Jewish men to Jewish women and Jewish gays — all superior to gentiles.
As for Lieberman, I’m less sure, as he’s more of a consummate manipulator than an ideologue. But his rabid attacks questioning Israeli Arabs as legitimate citizens certainly reflect a strong current in Israeli society, which is why he keeps voicing them.
The right vs. ‘the white tribe’
As a liberal I am entitled to despise the views of Ben-Dahan, Hotovely, Lieberman and Regev, but I am committed to safeguarding their right to hold them. Incidentally, I assume they despise my views, but they in turn are required to respect my freedom of thought and expression.
Still, differences in core values even among Israel’s Jews have become so vast as to make it nearly impossible to live in the same polity. To safeguard Israel’s democracy, we need to get a deeper understanding for the reasons the right attacks democratic institutions.
The right feels that these institutions have been used to impose the views of secular liberals, who judging from the composition of the Knesset, are a minority of about one-third of the country as reflected by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni’s Zionist Union, Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid and Meretz.
The mainstream press, the judiciary and academia are overwhelmingly liberal, so they are perceived as representing what is called “the white tribe.” They therefore no longer see liberal democracy’s values and institutions as impartial tools, but as the tools of the liberal Ashkenazi elites to impose their views on the majority.
They do not realize that the liberal tradition since Thomas Hobbes has been devised as a structure that can enable groups with different beliefs to live in coexistence instead of perpetually threatening or fighting one another.
But it turns out that liberal democracy has its limits; it can’t bridge yawning gaps between totally different cultures — and Israel seems to have arrived at such a stage. All groups feel that their way of life is threatened; we liberals have felt since Netanyahu’s first government in the 1990s that we must fight for the survival of our core principles. And much has been made of the fact that many young Israeli liberals prefer to live in Berlin because they can’t take it here anymore.
But let’s not forget that the Hasidic Belz community last year threatened to leave Israel if its youngsters were forced to serve in the army, because this community genuinely feel that its way of life is threatened by military service.
Traditionalist Mizrahim represented by Shas feel that a secular Ashkenazi elite tramples on their culture, beliefs and values. And Israeli Arabs, for very understandable reasons, feel that the country does not accord them a life of dignity and equality.
What then can we do? We can continue Israel’s culture wars, wearing us all down and making us miserable. Or we can say it’s time to give some breathing space to one another.
A federative structure of provinces that roughly reflects Israel’s core groups might do exactly that. The cantons should reflect existing cultural groups as well as possible, while as much power and financial resources as possible should be devolved to the regional governments. As in Switzerland, the United States and Germany, the federal government should only be entrusted with what the regional ones can’t possibly do on their own.
Such a partition is less outlandish than it sounds. When it comes to education, Israel long ago acknowledged de facto that there is no sufficient common ground for coexistence. Four distinct education systems coexist in Israel: the secular, the religious-Zionist, the ultra-Orthodox (actually two ultra-Orthodox, one Ashkenazi and one Sephardi), and the Arab.
In such a federative structure, Regev could fund whatever she wants in her own canton. Liberal artists could move a few kilometers away into the Aviv or Carmel provinces, where they could express themselves freely. Vice versa the many members of Naftali Bennett’s Habayit Hayehudi who are offended by homosexuality; they could easily move a few kilometers into Yehuda Province, where there would probably be no gay parties or parades.

We could finally stop bickering about which rabbis can conduct weddings legally, whether you need a rabbi at all, whether pigs can be raised and pork sold, and whether you can sell leavened bread during Passover. The provinces would determine these issues based on their majorities; the federation would not be involved.
I know that this proposal has scant chance of being implemented, and I have no illusion that it will solve all of Israel’s vast problems. But I mean it very seriously.
Israelis are wary. Not only does Israel face genuine external threats in an environment that becomes more chaotic by the year, but Israelis feel that instead of finding a safe haven in their own country, they need to fight for their identities and way of life. While we can’t make the external threats go away, we might at least live and let each other live.
To salvage its democracy, Israel must be divided into cantons

Israel's new government prepares to pose for a portrait at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem, May 19, 2015. Photo by Marc Israel Sellem
For a number of years I have argued that Israel’s internal differences — not only between Jews and Arabs, but among Jews — are so large that the country should be divided into cantons linked in a federative structure. Last year, with Haaretz’s Judd Yadid, I presented a detailed proposal on how such a cantonal structure could look.
The first weeks of Benjamin Netanyahu’s new government show that such a proposal is timelier than ever. Barely sworn in, its statements, policy proposals and steps show that it might use its tenure, brief as it may be, to irreparably damage Israel’s democracy.
I’d like to present an unorthodox explanation for why Netanyahu’s team is doing this, and why a federative structure might salvage Israel’s democracy.
Deputy Defense Minister Eli Ben-Dahan has taken the Knesset podium to defend his ministry’s decision to provide separate buses for Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank. But the government halted this plan because it realized the catastrophic international repercussions of a step reeking of apartheid — even when rationalized by security measures — not because it considers the move grievously wrong. (Incidentally, the army was strictly against the separate bus policy.)
Likud’s Tzipi Hotovely is deputy foreign minister, which, given that there is no foreign minister, means she is acting foreign minister. Hotovely has told the Foreign Ministry staff that Israeli ambassadors should tell foreign governments the truth — that God gave all of Israel to the Jewish people and therefore it is simply ours by right.
The new culture minister, Miri Regev, has said she does not intend to allow art that harms Israel’s image. “If I need to censor something, I will,” she said.
And the new justice, minister, Ayelet Shaked, has declared that governance must return to the people’s control by working toward the abolition of the Supreme Court’s ability to block legislation.
Add to this that Netanyahu, who has kept the Communications Ministry under his personal command, has already taken steps to interfere with the press. For example, he is putting pressure on Channel 10, which he has tried to close down for a while now.
Let me add the cherry from outside the coalition on the icing of this lovely cake: Yisrael Beiteinu leader Avigdor Lieberman, who single-handedly forced Netanyahu to form a coalition based on 61 MKs by not joining.
He now attacks his former boss for having scheduled a meeting with Ayman Odeh, the leader of the United Arab List — a meeting required by democratic etiquette. Lieberman called on Netanyahu to cancel the meeting because it “legitimizes the fifth column operating in the Knesset.”
Nothing in this potpourri of events should be surprising. The lamentations by Israeli liberals that the right has become racist and is trying to undermine democracy have been voiced for a long time — and for good reason.
But lamentations won’t help; we need to look at the facts without blinking. Hotovely genuinely believes that God gave all of Israel to the Jews. Regev deeply believes that Israeli liberals harm Israel. And Ben-Dahan has explained his hierarchy of human beings from Jewish men to Jewish women and Jewish gays — all superior to gentiles.
As for Lieberman, I’m less sure, as he’s more of a consummate manipulator than an ideologue. But his rabid attacks questioning Israeli Arabs as legitimate citizens certainly reflect a strong current in Israeli society, which is why he keeps voicing them.
The right vs. ‘the white tribe’
As a liberal I am entitled to despise the views of Ben-Dahan, Hotovely, Lieberman and Regev, but I am committed to safeguarding their right to hold them. Incidentally, I assume they despise my views, but they in turn are required to respect my freedom of thought and expression.
Still, differences in core values even among Israel’s Jews have become so vast as to make it nearly impossible to live in the same polity. To safeguard Israel’s democracy, we need to get a deeper understanding for the reasons the right attacks democratic institutions.
The right feels that these institutions have been used to impose the views of secular liberals, who judging from the composition of the Knesset, are a minority of about one-third of the country as reflected by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni’s Zionist Union, Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid and Meretz.
The mainstream press, the judiciary and academia are overwhelmingly liberal, so they are perceived as representing what is called “the white tribe.” They therefore no longer see liberal democracy’s values and institutions as impartial tools, but as the tools of the liberal Ashkenazi elites to impose their views on the majority.
They do not realize that the liberal tradition since Thomas Hobbes has been devised as a structure that can enable groups with different beliefs to live in coexistence instead of perpetually threatening or fighting one another.
But it turns out that liberal democracy has its limits; it can’t bridge yawning gaps between totally different cultures — and Israel seems to have arrived at such a stage. All groups feel that their way of life is threatened; we liberals have felt since Netanyahu’s first government in the 1990s that we must fight for the survival of our core principles. And much has been made of the fact that many young Israeli liberals prefer to live in Berlin because they can’t take it here anymore.
But let’s not forget that the Hasidic Belz community last year threatened to leave Israel if its youngsters were forced to serve in the army, because this community genuinely feel that its way of life is threatened by military service.
Traditionalist Mizrahim represented by Shas feel that a secular Ashkenazi elite tramples on their culture, beliefs and values. And Israeli Arabs, for very understandable reasons, feel that the country does not accord them a life of dignity and equality.
What then can we do? We can continue Israel’s culture wars, wearing us all down and making us miserable. Or we can say it’s time to give some breathing space to one another.
A federative structure of provinces that roughly reflects Israel’s core groups might do exactly that. The cantons should reflect existing cultural groups as well as possible, while as much power and financial resources as possible should be devolved to the regional governments. As in Switzerland, the United States and Germany, the federal government should only be entrusted with what the regional ones can’t possibly do on their own.
Such a partition is less outlandish than it sounds. When it comes to education, Israel long ago acknowledged de facto that there is no sufficient common ground for coexistence. Four distinct education systems coexist in Israel: the secular, the religious-Zionist, the ultra-Orthodox (actually two ultra-Orthodox, one Ashkenazi and one Sephardi), and the Arab.
In such a federative structure, Regev could fund whatever she wants in her own canton. Liberal artists could move a few kilometers away into the Aviv or Carmel provinces, where they could express themselves freely. Vice versa the many members of Naftali Bennett’s Habayit Hayehudi who are offended by homosexuality; they could easily move a few kilometers into Yehuda Province, where there would probably be no gay parties or parades.

We could finally stop bickering about which rabbis can conduct weddings legally, whether you need a rabbi at all, whether pigs can be raised and pork sold, and whether you can sell leavened bread during Passover. The provinces would determine these issues based on their majorities; the federation would not be involved.
I know that this proposal has scant chance of being implemented, and I have no illusion that it will solve all of Israel’s vast problems. But I mean it very seriously.
Israelis are wary. Not only does Israel face genuine external threats in an environment that becomes more chaotic by the year, but Israelis feel that instead of finding a safe haven in their own country, they need to fight for their identities and way of life. While we can’t make the external threats go away, we might at least live and let each other live.
Sunday, March 23, 2014
The ‘Day After’ the Palestinian Authority collapses
It could happen soon if the present negotiations end in a clear failure.
Chaos, anarchy, even terror or take over by Hamas and their repression could help Israel by pushing more Palestinians to emigrate. Annexation of the West Bank in a Greater Israel would turn then to be easier. No doubt this is a good scenario for some rightists..
Photo: Photo Essay
It is time - more than ever - to prepare a peaceful alternative: recognition of the independent State of Palestine by Israel, followed by an union agreement between the two states.
The PA would turn into a transitional Palestinian government, part of the Israel-Palestine Federation...
Emphasizes mine:
The Palestinian Authority is on the brink of collapse, study says
Only achieving statehood could save the West Bank from an impending wave of violence, crime, chaos, disease, says major Palestinian report.
By Amira Hass | Mar. 21, 2014
The breakdown of the Palestinian Authority would turn the West Bank into a violent, criminal, chaotic, disease-ridden place. But even though most Palestinians want the PA to survive, either for the sake of basic social order or personal interest, and although Israel dreads having to resume responsibility for 3 million West Bankers, President Mahmoud Abbas’ regime will collapse before too long if Israel continues to thwart Palestinian aspirations for independence.
This is the conclusion of a massive six-month study by the highly-regarded Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, directed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki.
A great many Palestinians have a deeply vested interest in the PA’s continued existence, Shikaki notes. Connections with the PA bring “financial well being, social and political status in society, and there are circles that depend on their relation to PA. Anything that happens to the PA will take all of that away from them. These could be organizations, business interests or individuals who have positions of power that allow them to reward sympathizers.
“If they could call the shots, they would do their best to prevent [the PA’s collapse],” Shikaki said, “But even those who have a vested interest in satisfying Israel, for the sake of preserving the PA, cannot do it for too long.”
If ordinary Palestinians still support the existence of the PA, it’s because they have a need for some kind of order, he adds. “People do not want to see themselves without a central authority that prevents chaos and anarchy in the streets, even if they have a lot of criticism of the PA and its functioning. But the Palestinians are willing to risk it collapsing completely, if it happens in the midst of a struggle for a change in the status quo. If there is a good reason for it to collapse, then [the attitude is] let it be.”
The PA is 20 years old, but voices questioning its efficacy were already being heard at the start of the second intifada in 2000. They’ve returned and intensified over the past two or three years, as it has become clear that the PA is not delivering on either of the two goals it was established to achieve: statehood and the provision of public services. Add to this the increasing economic difficulties and the rupture with the Gaza Strip, and the picture of failure is complete.
Unprecedented report
“The ‘Day After’ Final Report: The Likelihood, Consequences and Policy Implications of a PA Collapse or Dissolution” is unprecedented in its scope and willingness to grapple with this issue. More than 200 Palestinian professionals participated in the discussions that led to the 250-page report.
The PA could break up in one of three ways, the study concluded. One, the least likely scenario, is a voluntary decision by the Palestinian leadership to dissolve it. The second is collapse as the result of Israel’s punishing economic, military and political power, and political and economic pressure, mostly American, in response to Palestinian steps that violate the status quo, such as petitioning the International Criminal Court or leading a non-militarized uprising. The third possibility is a breakup that results from internal Palestinian unrest and rebellion.
Among participants, there are those who view the disintegration of the PA as a near certainty, given Israel’s refusal to reach a two-state solution in line with international principles and decisions. According to Shikaki, those who see the collapse of the PA as a positive thing are in the minority for now, and tend to be those who support a single, binational state. But it’s clear that the three main players – the PA itself, Israel, and the international community – are not interested in the PA’s disappearance.
Shikaki said he asked the Israelis “under what circumstances Israel might lose interest in preservation of the PA, and their assumption was that Palestinians are not stupid and don’t want to go too far so that we [Israel] would change our priorities.” This Israeli perspective seems to reinforce the position of Palestinian critics who claim that the PA serves Israel’s interests. Indeed, Shikaki says, “All Palestinians who participated in the discussion shared the view that Israel and the PA have a common interest in keeping the PA functioning. Palestinian society in general understands that the PA is able to exist as long as Israel is happy with it, and as long as Palestinians find it useful to them.”
Did the Israeli interviewees understand that Israeli policies were liable to topple the PA? Yes, Shikaki said. “They think that [Israeli policy] could worsen conditions significantly, but that Israel will step in at the last minute and prevent a collapse.”
Shikaki noted that all the participants assumed that “at all levels there will be an attempt to prevent a collapse.” Paradoxically, he said, “This gives each of the actors the comfort to believe that they can do a lot of harm to the other party without risking that other party’s collapse.” Thus, the Israeli-PA relationship becomes like a game of chicken, an analogy used in the discussions which focused on ways the Palestinians could force the Israelis to blink first.
If there is a voluntary decision to dismantle the PA, “Palestinians might seek to force Israel to either deepen its occupation, reverting to the situation that prevailed before 1994, or change its policies by seriously negotiating the end of its occupation, or unilaterally withdraw from most of the West Bank,” according to the center’s final document. Alternatively, in the event of a collapse resulting from external or internal pressures, “This expected [security] instability might force Israel to re-examine its options.”
The report concludes that the results of a PA shutdown would depend largely on whether the various components of the Palestinian leadership break long-time habits of poor planning, lack of transparency, excessive centralization, lack of consulting bodies and the immediate gratification of personal and sectarian interests. Preferably, the Palestinian leadership would decide to restore the status of the PLO and include Islamic movements in its ranks; decentralize planning and management and transfer those responsibilities to civil organizations and institutions; build an alternative management mechanism; or establish a government in exile.
Hamas would be big winner
These are some of the preliminary steps that participants in the study recommended to mitigate the severe repercussions of the PA’s collapse. These include economic damage to the public and private sector; widespread poverty; social and political disintegration; the spread of disease, with particular harm to children’s health; looting of infrastructure facilities; strengthening of tribes and clans; deepening of the rift between the Gaza Strip and West Bank; rise of armed gangs and security chaos; and a return to violence as the primary avenue of the struggle. One certain result is that Hamas, and in particular the Hamas government in Gaza, would be strengthened.
Participants in the study included university professors, current and former government ministers, legislators from all the factions, business people and executives of nongovernmental organizations. The looked at the effect of a PA shutdown on security, economy, Fatah-Hamas relations and political life, health, education, infrastructure, telephony and communications, local government, the judiciary, and the future of the struggle for independence.
The center also conducted interviews with 180 Palestinians to gain a deeper understanding of prevalent attitudes. In addition, Shikaki interviewed 12 Israelis from the military, Civil Administration, various political factions (though not from the extreme right) and research institutes, though Shikaki declined to name them.
Chaos, anarchy, even terror or take over by Hamas and their repression could help Israel by pushing more Palestinians to emigrate. Annexation of the West Bank in a Greater Israel would turn then to be easier. No doubt this is a good scenario for some rightists..Photo: Photo Essay
It is time - more than ever - to prepare a peaceful alternative: recognition of the independent State of Palestine by Israel, followed by an union agreement between the two states.
The PA would turn into a transitional Palestinian government, part of the Israel-Palestine Federation...
Emphasizes mine:
The Palestinian Authority is on the brink of collapse, study says
The Palestinian Authority is on the brink of collapse, study says
Only achieving statehood could save the West Bank from an impending wave of violence, crime, chaos, disease, says major Palestinian report.
By Amira Hass | Mar. 21, 2014
The breakdown of the Palestinian Authority would turn the West Bank into a violent, criminal, chaotic, disease-ridden place. But even though most Palestinians want the PA to survive, either for the sake of basic social order or personal interest, and although Israel dreads having to resume responsibility for 3 million West Bankers, President Mahmoud Abbas’ regime will collapse before too long if Israel continues to thwart Palestinian aspirations for independence.
This is the conclusion of a massive six-month study by the highly-regarded Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, directed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki.
A great many Palestinians have a deeply vested interest in the PA’s continued existence, Shikaki notes. Connections with the PA bring “financial well being, social and political status in society, and there are circles that depend on their relation to PA. Anything that happens to the PA will take all of that away from them. These could be organizations, business interests or individuals who have positions of power that allow them to reward sympathizers.
“If they could call the shots, they would do their best to prevent [the PA’s collapse],” Shikaki said, “But even those who have a vested interest in satisfying Israel, for the sake of preserving the PA, cannot do it for too long.”
If ordinary Palestinians still support the existence of the PA, it’s because they have a need for some kind of order, he adds. “People do not want to see themselves without a central authority that prevents chaos and anarchy in the streets, even if they have a lot of criticism of the PA and its functioning. But the Palestinians are willing to risk it collapsing completely, if it happens in the midst of a struggle for a change in the status quo. If there is a good reason for it to collapse, then [the attitude is] let it be.”
The PA is 20 years old, but voices questioning its efficacy were already being heard at the start of the second intifada in 2000. They’ve returned and intensified over the past two or three years, as it has become clear that the PA is not delivering on either of the two goals it was established to achieve: statehood and the provision of public services. Add to this the increasing economic difficulties and the rupture with the Gaza Strip, and the picture of failure is complete.
Unprecedented report
“The ‘Day After’ Final Report: The Likelihood, Consequences and Policy Implications of a PA Collapse or Dissolution” is unprecedented in its scope and willingness to grapple with this issue. More than 200 Palestinian professionals participated in the discussions that led to the 250-page report.
The PA could break up in one of three ways, the study concluded. One, the least likely scenario, is a voluntary decision by the Palestinian leadership to dissolve it. The second is collapse as the result of Israel’s punishing economic, military and political power, and political and economic pressure, mostly American, in response to Palestinian steps that violate the status quo, such as petitioning the International Criminal Court or leading a non-militarized uprising. The third possibility is a breakup that results from internal Palestinian unrest and rebellion.
Among participants, there are those who view the disintegration of the PA as a near certainty, given Israel’s refusal to reach a two-state solution in line with international principles and decisions. According to Shikaki, those who see the collapse of the PA as a positive thing are in the minority for now, and tend to be those who support a single, binational state. But it’s clear that the three main players – the PA itself, Israel, and the international community – are not interested in the PA’s disappearance.
Shikaki said he asked the Israelis “under what circumstances Israel might lose interest in preservation of the PA, and their assumption was that Palestinians are not stupid and don’t want to go too far so that we [Israel] would change our priorities.” This Israeli perspective seems to reinforce the position of Palestinian critics who claim that the PA serves Israel’s interests. Indeed, Shikaki says, “All Palestinians who participated in the discussion shared the view that Israel and the PA have a common interest in keeping the PA functioning. Palestinian society in general understands that the PA is able to exist as long as Israel is happy with it, and as long as Palestinians find it useful to them.”
Did the Israeli interviewees understand that Israeli policies were liable to topple the PA? Yes, Shikaki said. “They think that [Israeli policy] could worsen conditions significantly, but that Israel will step in at the last minute and prevent a collapse.”
Shikaki noted that all the participants assumed that “at all levels there will be an attempt to prevent a collapse.” Paradoxically, he said, “This gives each of the actors the comfort to believe that they can do a lot of harm to the other party without risking that other party’s collapse.” Thus, the Israeli-PA relationship becomes like a game of chicken, an analogy used in the discussions which focused on ways the Palestinians could force the Israelis to blink first.
If there is a voluntary decision to dismantle the PA, “Palestinians might seek to force Israel to either deepen its occupation, reverting to the situation that prevailed before 1994, or change its policies by seriously negotiating the end of its occupation, or unilaterally withdraw from most of the West Bank,” according to the center’s final document. Alternatively, in the event of a collapse resulting from external or internal pressures, “This expected [security] instability might force Israel to re-examine its options.”
The report concludes that the results of a PA shutdown would depend largely on whether the various components of the Palestinian leadership break long-time habits of poor planning, lack of transparency, excessive centralization, lack of consulting bodies and the immediate gratification of personal and sectarian interests. Preferably, the Palestinian leadership would decide to restore the status of the PLO and include Islamic movements in its ranks; decentralize planning and management and transfer those responsibilities to civil organizations and institutions; build an alternative management mechanism; or establish a government in exile.
Hamas would be big winner
These are some of the preliminary steps that participants in the study recommended to mitigate the severe repercussions of the PA’s collapse. These include economic damage to the public and private sector; widespread poverty; social and political disintegration; the spread of disease, with particular harm to children’s health; looting of infrastructure facilities; strengthening of tribes and clans; deepening of the rift between the Gaza Strip and West Bank; rise of armed gangs and security chaos; and a return to violence as the primary avenue of the struggle. One certain result is that Hamas, and in particular the Hamas government in Gaza, would be strengthened.
Participants in the study included university professors, current and former government ministers, legislators from all the factions, business people and executives of nongovernmental organizations. The looked at the effect of a PA shutdown on security, economy, Fatah-Hamas relations and political life, health, education, infrastructure, telephony and communications, local government, the judiciary, and the future of the struggle for independence.
The center also conducted interviews with 180 Palestinians to gain a deeper understanding of prevalent attitudes. In addition, Shikaki interviewed 12 Israelis from the military, Civil Administration, various political factions (though not from the extreme right) and research institutes, though Shikaki declined to name them.
Saturday, December 8, 2012
Hannah Arendt's federation of councils "שיטת המועצות" של חנה ארנדט
Israel as the state of all its citizens in the light of the "method of councils" of Hannah Arendt
Avner DinurSummary
(Translation is mine)I do not know if Arendt was right when she suggested, shortly before the establishment of the state, that a federation of councils is the only way to save the Jewish homeland from the threatening clutches of the Jewish nation-state.
From the perspective of the passed 50 years, it is clear that the Israeli - Palestinian conflict is fueled by fiery nationalist ideas, Zionist and Palestinian as well, and it is hard to imagine a substantial federation between Jews and Arabs.
But you can also see the bloody conflict as a kind of historic opportunity.
In the State of Israel, in this era between the second and third Intifada, both Israeli and Palestinian publics are aware that a nation-state following the classical model will never exist here. It might be precisely because of the continuing impasse in the conflict that the Israeli public will not have any choice but to look elsewhere for a solution.
I want to learn from the method of Arendt's councils that the war against the nation-state and the atrocities and distortions that it produces on the ground does not have to be realized through a generalized anarchist revolution, nor through the establishment of a Palestinian nation-state, nor even through the establishment of the State of all its citizens.
The struggle against the nation-state can bear the character of a voluntary association, coming from the bottom, and of free connections among individuals, between Jews and Arabs, among Arabs themselves and even, as hard to imagine, among Jews themselves.
Arendt's conceptual framework can improve the contemporary Israeli discourse in its struggle for the definition of a Jewish nation-state
Here is the full article in Hebrew:
ישראל כ"מדינת כל אזרחיה" לאור "שיטת המועצות" של חנה ארנדט
ישראל כ"מדינת כל אזרחיה"
לאור "שיטת המועצות" של חנה ארנדט
אבנר דינור
מבוא
________________________________________
חנה ארנדט (1906 – 1975) נחשבת בעיני רבים ל"הוגה הפוליטית"[1] המשפיעה ביותר במאה העשרים ובתור שכזו לכאורה אין חשיבות ליהדותה ולכתחילה נקראו כתביה מבלי להדגיש את "האספקט היהודי”, אולם בשנות התשעים כשהחל גל גדול של מחקר סביב הגותה החלו קריאות של ארנדט הטוענות שהפילוסופיה שלה נועדה בראש ובראשונה להתמודד עם המצב הפוליטי שבו שרויים היהודים בעידן המודרני[2]. הדברים שלהלן מצטרפים במידה רבה לזיהוי הזה של ארנדט, לא רק כ"הוגה פוליטית" כפי שנהגה לכנות את עצמה, אלא כ"הוגה פוליטית יהודית" ובתור שכזו, לנצל את הדיון שלה על מדינת הלאום בכדי לבחון את המחלוקת על "מדינת כל אזרחיה" בפוליטיקה הישראלית. בכוונתי להציע שיש במסגרת המחשבתית של ארנדט בכדי לקדם את השיח הישראלי העכשווי הנאבק על הגדרתה של מדינת הלאום היהודית. בכדי לעשות זאת אבחן תחילה את גישתה של ארנדט למדינת הלאום ולציונות, לאחר מכן אציג בקצרה את הויכוח על מדינת-כל-אזרחיה, ולבסוף אציע את "שיטת המועצות" של ארנדט כדגם שיש בו להועיל לבחינתה של הפוליטיקה הישראלית הנמתחת על הדיכוטומיה בין שני קטבים מנוגדים.
ארנדט טענה שבמדינת הלאום טמון פרדוקס: מצד אחד מדינה השולטת על שטח מסוים, שואפת כל העת להרחיב את גבולותיה ולהתפשט על פני שטחים נוספים שבעזרתם תוכל להגדיל את המשאבים העומדים לראשותה. מצד שני כל ניסיון להתפשט אל מעבר לגבולות המדינה הקיימת, כולל בהכרח סיפוח של בני לאומים אחרים ומערער על הגדרתה כמדינת לאום:
“Of all forms of government and organizations of people, the nation-state is least suited for unlimited growth because the genuine consent at its base cannot be stretched indefinitely, and is only rarely, and with difficulty, won from conquered people. No nation-state could with clear conscience ever try to conquer foreign people...”[1]מבוא
________________________________________
חנה ארנדט (1906 – 1975) נחשבת בעיני רבים ל"הוגה הפוליטית"[1] המשפיעה ביותר במאה העשרים ובתור שכזו לכאורה אין חשיבות ליהדותה ולכתחילה נקראו כתביה מבלי להדגיש את "האספקט היהודי”, אולם בשנות התשעים כשהחל גל גדול של מחקר סביב הגותה החלו קריאות של ארנדט הטוענות שהפילוסופיה שלה נועדה בראש ובראשונה להתמודד עם המצב הפוליטי שבו שרויים היהודים בעידן המודרני[2]. הדברים שלהלן מצטרפים במידה רבה לזיהוי הזה של ארנדט, לא רק כ"הוגה פוליטית" כפי שנהגה לכנות את עצמה, אלא כ"הוגה פוליטית יהודית" ובתור שכזו, לנצל את הדיון שלה על מדינת הלאום בכדי לבחון את המחלוקת על "מדינת כל אזרחיה" בפוליטיקה הישראלית. בכוונתי להציע שיש במסגרת המחשבתית של ארנדט בכדי לקדם את השיח הישראלי העכשווי הנאבק על הגדרתה של מדינת הלאום היהודית. בכדי לעשות זאת אבחן תחילה את גישתה של ארנדט למדינת הלאום ולציונות, לאחר מכן אציג בקצרה את הויכוח על מדינת-כל-אזרחיה, ולבסוף אציע את "שיטת המועצות" של ארנדט כדגם שיש בו להועיל לבחינתה של הפוליטיקה הישראלית הנמתחת על הדיכוטומיה בין שני קטבים מנוגדים.
ארנדט טענה שבמדינת הלאום טמון פרדוקס: מצד אחד מדינה השולטת על שטח מסוים, שואפת כל העת להרחיב את גבולותיה ולהתפשט על פני שטחים נוספים שבעזרתם תוכל להגדיל את המשאבים העומדים לראשותה. מצד שני כל ניסיון להתפשט אל מעבר לגבולות המדינה הקיימת, כולל בהכרח סיפוח של בני לאומים אחרים ומערער על הגדרתה כמדינת לאום:
פרדוקס נוסף הנובע ממדינת לאום מתרחבת הוא שכיבושיה מפתחים תמיד תודעה לאומית אצל הנכבשים הגורמת להם להתקומם כנגדה ולבסוף גם לנצח אותה[2]. הלאומיות אחראית לדעתה לכמה מהטרגדיות הגדולות והעקובות מדם ביותר של העת החדשה. במדינות הלאום השתלט הלאום על המדינה ותבע להעניק זכויות רק לבני הלאום[3]. הענקת זכויות זו לא היתה בעייתית אילולא היתה המדינה הכוח היחידי המעניק זכויות בעולם המודרני. ארנדט הדגישה שזכויות אינן טבעיות אלא הן תמיד פוליטיות, כלומר הן נובעות מהכוחות המרכזיים המופעלים בחברה, וכוחות אלה, במאה העשרים הם בראש ובראשונה לאומיים. כיוון שלדעת ארנדט אין בעולם המודרני זכויות מלבד זכויות במסגרת המדינה, הרי שהענקת זכויות על בסיס לאומי-פרטיקולרי יוצרת בהכרח עיוות מוסרי. לדעת ארנדט יש ללאומיות אפקט מונוכרומטי הצובע גיוון תרבותי ומחשבתי בגוון אחד וכך יוצר זהות מיותרת וכוחנית בין שונים[4]. כל התשובות לבעיה הלאומית הן רעות לדעתה כיוון שהן תוצר של חיבור כפוי בין אינדיבידואלים. למרות ששפיכויות הדמים הקשות של המאה העשרים נעשו על ידי, ובשמן של מדינות, "ארנדט מציעה לראות את הרע בלאומיות, לא במדינה"[5]. הלאומיות היא פרוורסיה של המדינה, והיא נסמכת לדעתה על שילוש קדוש: עם, שטח ומדינה[6].
ארנדט גיבשה את עמדותיה על הלאומיות המודרנית בעיקר לנוכח "הבעיה היהודית". היא חשבה שיש למצוא פתרון פוליטי לבעיה היהודית אולם בניגוד לציונות המדינית, היא חשבה שהיהודים הם הנפגעים העיקריים של מדינת הלאום במאה העשרים ולכן יהיה זה אבסורד שהיהודים עצמם ירצו להקים מדינת לאום. היהודים לדעתה הם מאז ראשית העת החדשה הפרדיגמה הברורה ביותר של חסרי-מדינה ולכן הרעיונות הלאומיים מהווים כמעט תמיד בעיה עבור יהודים. ארנדט סווגה לא פעם כיהודיה שונאת עצמה (self hating Jew)[7] המכתב של גרשום שלום אליה, בו הוא טוען שאין בה שמץ של "אהבת ישראל"[8] הוא אולי המפורסם ביותר לעניין זה, והסיבה המרכזית לטענה זו היא שרבים הבינו את התנגדותה למדינת הלאום המודרנית כהתנגדות ללאומיות יהודית באשר היא. אולם ארנדט לא היתה אנטי-ציונית. עוד לפני קום המדינה היא טענה שהציונות השיגה תמיכה רחבה כל כך בעם היהודי עד שרק בודדים, שאף אחד לא מתייחס אליהם ברצינות, נשארו אנטי-ציונים[9]. ארנדט העריכה מאוד את המפעל הציוני וראתה בו את הניסיון הרציני היחיד בעת המודרנית להחזיר את היהודים למצב פוליטי, מצב שממנו לא יכלו עוד להתחמק לאחר האמנסיפציה. הציונות שלה היא במידה רבה ציונות תרבותית בסגנון אחד-העם[10] והפתרון הפוליטי לבעיה היהודית שעמד לנגד עיניה הוא הקמתה של ארץ-מולדת (homeland) עבור היהודים, ולא הקמת מדינת לאום (nation state)[11]. הישוב היהודי בפלשתינה, לפני קום המדינה היווה לדעת ארנדט צורה מסויימת של ארץ מולדת יהודית, כלומר החלוצים לדעתה הגשימו במידה רבה אידיאל פוליטי יהודי. הישוב היה טריטוריה פוליטית שמאפשרת לתרבות היהודית להתקיים ולפרוח מבלי להזדקק לריבונות לאומית.
דאגתה לקיום היהודי אחרי השואה הביאה את ארנדט לבקר את הציונות על אדישותה כלפי הקיום היהודי בגולה. הציונות לדעתה היא הדרך שבאמצעותה מתייחס רוב מוחלט של יהודי העולם לזהותו היהודית אולם דווקא משום כך מהווה לדעתה הציונות איום על עצם הקיום היהודי. הציונות המדינית היתה מודעת לעובדה שבמדינת ישראל אין מקום מספיק כדי להכיל את כל יהודי העולם. התשובה הציונית לבעיה זו לבשה לדעת ארנדט שתי פנים, מצד אחד היו אלה שטענו שרק החלק הטוב של היהודים יעלה לארץ ואילו היתר ילכו ויתבוללו אל תוך העמים שמסביבם. תשובה מעיין זו מדגישה את אדישותם, אולם למעשה היא לא התקבלה. התשובה השניה, שבתחילה היתה עמדתם של הרביזיוניסטים בלבד, היתה בדומה לכל הלאומנים הקיצוניים של אירופה: "פאן-שמיות כתגובה לאנטי-שמיות”[12], כלומר הציונים הפנימו את שאיפות ההתרחבות הלאומניות שהיו נחלתן של התנועות הפאן-סלאביות והפאן-גרמניות ובכך נכנסה הציונות למילכוד שטמון לכל לאומיות המעוניינת להתרחב.
[1] ארנדט, OT, מהד' שלישית עמ' 126.
[2] ארנדט, OT, מהד' שלישית, עמ' 134.
[3] ארנדט, OT, מהד' שלישית, עמ' 230, ראו גם: ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 51.
[4] קוקס, על לאומיות, עמ' 223. אולם קוקס לא הבחינה שהמניע לעמדה זו של ארנדט הוא בדיוק מחוייבותה ליהדות ולשמירה על פרטיקולריות יהודית בתוך מדינת הלאום הלא-יהודית.
[5] לאור, אף מילה על ציונות, עמ' 18.
[6] ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 51.
[7] קוקס, על לאומיות, עמ' 225.
[8] שלום, דברים בגו, עמ' 92.
[9] ארנדט, להציל את המולדת, עמ' 180.
[10] פלדמן, היהודי כפריה, עמ' 35.
[11] ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 49.
[12] ארנדט, הציונות בראיה מחדש, עמ' 151.
מדינת כל אזרחיה ומדינת לאום בישראל
________________________________________
הפרדוקס של מדינת-לאום-מתרחבת, ממש כפי שתיארה אותו ארנדט, עומד במרכז הדיון הציבורי בישראל בשנים האחרונות. המודעות לדרך שבה מסכנת מדינת הלאום את עצמה בכיבושיה, הביאה רוב מוחלט של הישראלים להסכים לשלם מחיר טריטוריאלי בכדי לשמור על הגדרתה של המדינה כמדינת לאום יהודית ודמוקרטית. יותר מ70% מהציבור הישראלי תומך בעשור האחרון בתוכניות נסיגה שונות, אך גם מעבר לרוב מוצק זה נראה שיש הסכמה ברורה גם של המפלגות שימינה מהליכוד, שהשאיפה למדינת לאום יהודית חשובה מהשאיפה לארץ ישראל השלמה (אגב, ביטוי שכיום נעלם כמעט לגמרי מהשיח הפוליטי הישראלי). הויכוח בין ימין לשמאל איננו על הגדרתה של המדינה כמדינת לאום. אם יש בכלל ויכוח מדיני בין המפלגות הרי שהוא עוסק במחיר שהן מוכנות לשלם על מנת לשמור את המדינה כמדינה יהודית. לעומת הסכמה רחבה זו, מיעוט קטן בפוליטיקה הישראלית, מציע להפוך את המדינה ל"מדינת כל אזרחיה"[1]. לשם הצגה ברורה, גם אם מעט פשטנית של רעיון זה, אני נעזר בדבריו של ישעיהו לייבוביץ:
“המדינה אין לה אלא משמעות שימושית בלבד, באשר היא אינה אלא מנגנון (כלי, מכשיר, אינסטרומנט) לפעולה, ומהות פעולתה – הכפיה. המדינה אינה "עוסקת בהבהרת יחסים וכו'” [...] אלא כופה יחסים ... במובן זה אמרתי שהמדינה (כל מדינה) היא אויב האדם. [...] אולם בעקבות ההתפתחות ההיסטורית (מדור הפלגה ואילך) היתה המדינה לרע הכרחי של המין האנושי ואין לאדם היום מפלט ממנה..."[2]
ברור שעבור ליבוביץ "מדינת לאום יהודית" איננה רק "רע הכרחי", כדבריו, בדומה לכל מדינה אחרת, "מדינת לאום יהודית" הינה פשוט צירוף מילים חסר פשר. אין מדינה יהודית ולא יכולה להיות מדינה כזו. יהדות היא דבר אחד ומדינה היא דבר אחר בתכלית. לא כאן המקום להרחיב על עמדותיו המורכבות והסותרות של לייבוביץ' בשאלה הציונית, אולם לעניינינו די אם נראה כי לדעתו מדינה לא אמורה להשפיע על זהותו, תרבותו ובוודאי לא על דתו של אדם. מדינה הינה מכשיר טכני שעניינו הפעלת כפיה על הפרט. נידמה לי שגם אם רוב התומכים ב"מדינת כל אזרחיה" לא קראו את לייבוביץ ממש, יסכימו רובם שהמדינה אמורה להוות מנגנון מעשי בלבד.
בויכוח שבין מדינת-כל-אזרחיה לבין מדינת לאום, אפשר לצפות למצוא את ארנדט כתומכת של מדינת-כל-אזרחיה. אולם החשיבות שארנדט מקנה לכניסת היהודים למצב הפוליטי, הצורך בארץ מולדת ליהודים, ההערכה הרבה שרכשה למפעל הציוני, גם כאשר הסתייגה ממנו, והכוח שהיא זיהתה במדינות הלאום, כל אלה מלמדים שהדגם הפוליטי שעמד לנגד עיניה הוא דגם שלישי, שכמובן איננו מדינת-לאום (שאת ההתנגדות אליה ניסחה ארנדט במפורש כפי שראינו) אך הוא גם שונה ממדינת-כל-אזרחיה בכך שיש לו יומרות ברורות להשפיע על זהות האזרחים וכן בכך שהוא נמנע מחלק ניכר של אותה כפיה המהווה את הבסיס לכל מדינה לדעתו של לייבוביץ. את הדגם הזה שרמזים לזהותו פיזרה ארנדט בין כתבים שונים, היא מכנה "שיטת המועצות", "Council System", וברצוני לטעון שיש בו בכדי לקדם את השיח הפוליטי בישראל התקוע, זה כמה עשורים על הדיכוטומיה הבלתי מתפשרת בין מדינת-לאום למדינת-כל-אזרחיה.
[1] בעוד שמדינת הלאום זכתה לדיון נרחב למדי בהגות הפוליטית בחצי השני של המאה העשרים, הרי שהמושג "מדינת כל אזרחיה" אינו מופיע בדיון התיאורטי ולמעשה, למיטב ידיעתי, הוא תוצר של הדיון הציבורי הישראלי. בדיון התיאורטי מופיעה הבחנה בין מדינת-לאום-אתנית (שמקבילה פחות או יותר לרעיונות שראינו אצל ארנדט), לבין מדינת-לאום-אזרחית (ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 50). מדינת הלאום האזרחית בנויה על ההנחה שכל אזרח במדינה שותף במידה שווה ביצירת הזהות הקולקטיבית של המדינה. נידמה לי שאלה בישראל הדוגלים ב"מדינת כל אזרחיה" מציעים רעיון מעט שונה, על פיו למדינה אין כל יומרה להשפיע על זהותם של אזרחיה. המדינה לדידם היא רק מכשיר טכני שנועד להסדיר את היחסים בין האזרחים.
[2] מכתב לצוריאל אדמנית ודב רפל, מאי 1970, מתוך: ליבוביץ', רציתי לשאול, עמ' 371 – 372.
שיטת המועצות
________________________________________
במאמר ממאי 1948 שנקרא "להציל את המולדת היהודית”, מציעה ארנדט, בעקבות יהודה לייב מאגנס להקים בפלשתינה מדינה פדרטיבית יהודית-ערבית[1]. כמה חוקרים כבר הצביעו על הקשר שבין דעותיה של ארנדט על מדינת הלאום היהודית לבין העמדה הדו-לאומית של אנשי קבוצת ברית-שלום, בעיקר לפני קום המדינה[2] אולם עיון מעמיק ברעיון הפדרציה בכתבים אחרים של ארנדט מגלה שיש בשיטה גישה מהפכנית בהרבה מהתביעה של אנשי ברית-שלום לכך ששני העמים יחיו במדינה מאוחדת. לטענתי אי אפשר להבין את קריאתה של ארנדט לפדרציה יהודית-ערבית מבלי להידרש לדיון נרחב יותר של ארנדט על פדרציה של מועצות, דיון שהיא עורכת במהדורה השניה של ספרה הנרחב על מקורות הטוטליטריות[3] ובספרה על המהפיכה[4]. אמנם במאמר ממאי ארבעים ושמונה אין היא מפרטת את השיטה, וב"מקורות הטוטליטריות" ו"על המהפיכה" היא אינה מזכירה את ההקשר הישראלי-פלסטיני אולם אם נחבר בין השניים (חיבור בשיטה שהרמב"ם מכנה "השב פרקיו זה על זה"[5]) יתברר שהרעיונות האוטופיים של ארנדט בסוף ספרה על הטוטליטריות אינם אלא פתרון לבעיית היהודים ולהתגלמותה במדינת ישראל.
שיטת המועצות היא מצב של השתייכות פוליטית וולנטרית עם רמת מחוייבות הולכת ופוחתת שבה אדם מחוייב באופן עמוק לקהילה מקומית (למשל שכונה, ועד עובדים, ועד הורי בית ספר וכולי), וקהילה זו מחוייבת לקהילה רחבה יותר (למשל עיר) שבעצמה מחוברת לקהילה רחבה יותר (מחוז, מדינה) וכן הלאה. רמת המחוייבות של האינדיבידואל לקהילות הרחבות תהייה אם כן קטנה, אך בכל זאת לא מבוטלת. אולי מוטב להדגים את עקרונות השיטה באמצעות התנועה הקיבוצית[6]. כל קיבוץ בפני עצמו הוא התארגנות וולנטרית של בודדים המעוניינים להתאגד, לוקחים חלק פעיל בפוליטיקה הפנימית של הארגון ומעוניינים להשפיע גם על העולם שמחוץ לארגונם הקטן. התנועה הקיבוצית גם היא התארגנות וולונטרית של מספר מועצות מקומיות כאלו שהתאגדו לשם קידום ענייניהן. מחוייבותו של חבר קיבוץ לקיבוצו גדולה מאוד ואילו לתנועה הקיבוצית המחוייבות קטנה בהרבה ובכל זאת, חבר קיבוץ מזוהה מיד כחבר בתנועה (על פי לבושו בדרך כלל). נידמה לי שמה שעמד לנגד עיניה במועצות הוולנטריות שלה, לא היתה כל כך התנועה הקיבוצית (שלה רכשה ארנדט הערכה רבה) אלא דווקא הקהילה היהודית המסורתית שבה כל קהילה היא התארגנות וולנטרית ויש קשר בין קהילות שונות בעולם כולו. ניתן לטעון כמובן שהקהילה היהודית אינה נקיה מיחסים של כוח וכפיה ושהיא מפעילה על חבריה כפיה רבה בדרכים מגוונות – גם אם לא דרכים של חוק ריבוני. כפי שהראה פוקו, אין במציאות אירגון חברתי כלשהו שאינו מפעיל מנגנונים סמויים וגלויים של כפיה וכוח, ובכל זאת נזקם של מנגנוני הכוח והכפייה של הקהילות קטנים בהרבה מנזקה של קולקטיביות פוליטית בסגנון מדינת הלאום. הכוח הפנימי של הקהילה לפחות לא מביא ברוב המקרים לשפיכות דמים.
ארנדט איננה מציינת במפורש בשיטת המועצות שלה, לא את התנועה הקיבוצית ולא את הקהילה היהודית משום שעיקר עניינה בדיון על המועצות הוא בדרך שבה משמרות המועצות את הרוח המהפכנית לאחר סיומה של המהפיכה. התקדים ההיסטורי שהיא מוצאת לשיטה הוא בהפיכה ההונגרית ב-1956. ארנדט טענה שמועצות דומות לאלה שקמו בהונגריה הופיעו עם כל התקוממות עממית מאז אמצע המאה ה-19, אך כולן דוכאו ונעלמו תחת מכבש הטוטליטריות שאפיין את המשטר שבא בעקבות המהפיכה[7]. ארנדט רואה במועצות אלה מצב פוליטי אידיאלי שבו מתקיימות כפיה וריבונות ברמה המינימלית ההכרחית לשם קיום חברתי. המועצות הן "מרחבים של חופש"[8] שנועדו למסד את הרוח המהפכנית ולשמר אותה לאחר המהפיכה מפני כוחה של הרפובליקה. כישלונם של המהפכנים לראות את החידוש שטמון בשיטת המהפיכות[9] הוא שהוביל לדריסת הרוח המהפכנית ושקיעתה אל תוך משטרים טוטליטריים חשוכים.
המועצות הוולנטריות עומדת כמובן בניגוד גמור להגדרתה של המדינה שראינו אצל לייבוביץ. לייבוביץ טען שכל מהותה של המדינה היא כפיה. ארנדט שואלת האם ניתן לדמיין מצב פוליטי שאינו מבוסס על כפיה, או לכל הפחות מנסה לצמצם את מימד הכפיה לרמה המינימלית. "מדינת כל אזרחיה", שאיננה אלא מכשיר שלטוני שמאגד קבוצת אזרחים שאין ביניהם כל קשר בסגנון לייבוביץ איננה ברת מימוש לדעת ארנדט וגם איננה רצויה. היא איננה ברת מימוש מכיוון שגם לו "רצתה" המדינה להיות רק עניין טכני היתה מייצרת זהות קולקטיבית ברמה מסויימת, והיא אינה רצויה משום שבכל מדינה נדרשת מידה של אמון ודבק חברתי מינימלי בכדי לקיים את מוסדות השלטון. מעצם היותה וולנטרית, מחייבת פדרציית המועצות של ארנדט הזדהות לא מעטה של האזרחים עם המסגרת הגדולה ולכן צריכה הפדרציה להשפיע ולעצב את זהותו של האינדיבידואל. היא אינה יכולה להוות מכשיר שלטוני בלבד.
שיטת המועצות נראית אוטופיסטית לגמרי. קשה היום לדמיין מדינה שתיבנה כך לאורך זמן, וגם אם מציאות כזו תיתכן, הרי שמדינה וולנטרית שכזו תעמוד בפני איום משמעותי ממדינות לאומיות שמסביבה ומי יודע אם כוחה יוכל לעמוד לה. אולם ארנדט רחוקה מלהיות הוגה אוטופיסטית. כהיסטוריונית וכהוגה פוליטית (לא "פילוסופית", כדבריה) היא הקפידה לבסס את ביקורת הלאומיות שלה על מקרה היסטורי ולכן היא מזכירה את רעיון הפדרציה בקונטקסט של המהפיכה ההונגרית, אולם היא לא עשתה זאת משום שחשבה כי רק בזמן המוגבל שלאחר המהפיכה יכולים האזרחים ליצור לעצמם "מרחבים של חופש", אלא משום שמהפיכה היא הביטוי המובהק ביותר לביקורת הנובעת מלמטה, מהאזרחים עצמם, על השלטון. ביקורת מהפכנית בדרך כלל מציעה אלטרנטיבה מדויקת של המצב הרצוי לאחר המהפיכה. ביקורת פוליטית יכולה, ולדעתי גם חייבת, לסמן כיוון שלאורו יהיה עלינו לשפוט את המציאות המשתנה.
אולי מדינה של מועצות מקומיות איננה מן האפשר, אולם אני מבקש ללמוד מארנדט שפוליטיקה הדלה ביחסי כפיה וריבונות היא כיוון ראוי שההתקדמות אליו איננה עניין של אוטופיה אלא של מגמה מתמשכת בהווה. יתכן שפתרונות פוליטיים אמיתיים אינם מסוג הדברים המגיע במהפכות ולכן עלינו לשאוף ולהגשימם צעד אחר צעד, ביצירת צעדים בוני אמון בין יהודים לערבים, ביצירת חיבורים על בסיס מקומי ועל רקע אינטרס משותף צר, חיבורים וולנטריים שייצרו קהילות קטנות המתחברות לקהילות גדולות יותר, המתחברות לקהילת-על בסדר גודל של המדינה המודרנית.
מדינת כל אזרחיה ומדינת לאום בישראל סיכום
[1] ארנדט, להציל את המולדת, עמ' 191.
[2] רז קרקוצקין, דו-לאומיות; אדון, שולם ארנדט והפרדוקס.
[3] מעניין לציין אולי שהדיון על שיטת המועצות במהפיכה ההונגרית היא תוספת שהוסיפה ארנדט למהדורה השניה של הספר והשמיטה מהמהדורה השלישית, כיוון שהיתה "מיושנת" לדבריה.
[4] ארנדט, על המהפיכה.
[5] הרמב"ם, מורה נבוכים, חלק א, צוואת ספר זה. שוורץ מתרגם מעט אחרת: פרש את פרקיו זה לפי זה" (עמ' 19).
[6] במקומות אחרים ארנדט ביטאה התלהבות לנוכח הרעיון והביצוע של תפיסת הקיבוצים.
[7] ארנדט, OT מהדורה שניה, עמ' 500.
[8] ארנדט, על המהפיכה, עמ' 268.
[9] ארנדט, על המהפיכה, עמ' 284.
סיכום
אינני יודע אם צדקה ארנדט כשהציעה, זמן קצר לפני הקמת המדינה, שפדרציה של מועצות היא הדרך היחידה להציל את המולדת היהודית מציפורניה המאיימות של מדינת הלאום היהודית. בפרספקטיבה של חמישים שנה שעברו מאז, ברור שהסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני מלובה על ידי רעיונות לאומיים עזים, ציוניים ופלסטינים כאחד, וקשה לדמיין פדרציה משמעותית בין יהודים לערבים. אולם אפשר גם לראות בסכסוך העקוב מדם סוג של הזדמנות היסטורית. במדינת ישראל, בעידן שבין האינתיפאדה השניה לשלישית מודעים הציבור הישראלי והפלסטיני כאחד, שמדינת-לאום במודל הקלאסי לעולם לא תתקיים כאן. יתכן שדווקא בשל המבוי הסתום המתמשך בסכסוך לא תהייה לציבור הישראלי כל ברירה אלא לחפש את הפתרון במקום אחר. אני מבקש ללמוד משיטת המועצות של ארנדט שהמלחמה במדינת הלאום ובזוועות והעיוותים שהיא מחוללת במציאות לא חייבת להתממש, לא במהפכה אנרכיסטית כוללת, לא בכינונה של מדינת לאום פלשתינית ואפילו לא בכינונה של מדינת-כל-אזרחיה. המאבק במדינת הלאום יכול לשאת אופי של התאגדות וולנטרית, מלמטה, ושל חיבורים חופשיים בין אינדיבידואלים, בין יהודים וערבים, וגם בין ערבים לבין עצמם ואפילו, עד כמה שקשה לדמיין זאת, בין יהודים לבין עצמם.
יש במסגרת המחשבתית של ארנדט בכדי לקדם את השיח הישראלי העכשווי הנאבק על הגדרתה של מדינת הלאום היהודית.
ארנדט גיבשה את עמדותיה על הלאומיות המודרנית בעיקר לנוכח "הבעיה היהודית". היא חשבה שיש למצוא פתרון פוליטי לבעיה היהודית אולם בניגוד לציונות המדינית, היא חשבה שהיהודים הם הנפגעים העיקריים של מדינת הלאום במאה העשרים ולכן יהיה זה אבסורד שהיהודים עצמם ירצו להקים מדינת לאום. היהודים לדעתה הם מאז ראשית העת החדשה הפרדיגמה הברורה ביותר של חסרי-מדינה ולכן הרעיונות הלאומיים מהווים כמעט תמיד בעיה עבור יהודים. ארנדט סווגה לא פעם כיהודיה שונאת עצמה (self hating Jew)[7] המכתב של גרשום שלום אליה, בו הוא טוען שאין בה שמץ של "אהבת ישראל"[8] הוא אולי המפורסם ביותר לעניין זה, והסיבה המרכזית לטענה זו היא שרבים הבינו את התנגדותה למדינת הלאום המודרנית כהתנגדות ללאומיות יהודית באשר היא. אולם ארנדט לא היתה אנטי-ציונית. עוד לפני קום המדינה היא טענה שהציונות השיגה תמיכה רחבה כל כך בעם היהודי עד שרק בודדים, שאף אחד לא מתייחס אליהם ברצינות, נשארו אנטי-ציונים[9]. ארנדט העריכה מאוד את המפעל הציוני וראתה בו את הניסיון הרציני היחיד בעת המודרנית להחזיר את היהודים למצב פוליטי, מצב שממנו לא יכלו עוד להתחמק לאחר האמנסיפציה. הציונות שלה היא במידה רבה ציונות תרבותית בסגנון אחד-העם[10] והפתרון הפוליטי לבעיה היהודית שעמד לנגד עיניה הוא הקמתה של ארץ-מולדת (homeland) עבור היהודים, ולא הקמת מדינת לאום (nation state)[11]. הישוב היהודי בפלשתינה, לפני קום המדינה היווה לדעת ארנדט צורה מסויימת של ארץ מולדת יהודית, כלומר החלוצים לדעתה הגשימו במידה רבה אידיאל פוליטי יהודי. הישוב היה טריטוריה פוליטית שמאפשרת לתרבות היהודית להתקיים ולפרוח מבלי להזדקק לריבונות לאומית.
דאגתה לקיום היהודי אחרי השואה הביאה את ארנדט לבקר את הציונות על אדישותה כלפי הקיום היהודי בגולה. הציונות לדעתה היא הדרך שבאמצעותה מתייחס רוב מוחלט של יהודי העולם לזהותו היהודית אולם דווקא משום כך מהווה לדעתה הציונות איום על עצם הקיום היהודי. הציונות המדינית היתה מודעת לעובדה שבמדינת ישראל אין מקום מספיק כדי להכיל את כל יהודי העולם. התשובה הציונית לבעיה זו לבשה לדעת ארנדט שתי פנים, מצד אחד היו אלה שטענו שרק החלק הטוב של היהודים יעלה לארץ ואילו היתר ילכו ויתבוללו אל תוך העמים שמסביבם. תשובה מעיין זו מדגישה את אדישותם, אולם למעשה היא לא התקבלה. התשובה השניה, שבתחילה היתה עמדתם של הרביזיוניסטים בלבד, היתה בדומה לכל הלאומנים הקיצוניים של אירופה: "פאן-שמיות כתגובה לאנטי-שמיות”[12], כלומר הציונים הפנימו את שאיפות ההתרחבות הלאומניות שהיו נחלתן של התנועות הפאן-סלאביות והפאן-גרמניות ובכך נכנסה הציונות למילכוד שטמון לכל לאומיות המעוניינת להתרחב.
[1] ארנדט, OT, מהד' שלישית עמ' 126.
[2] ארנדט, OT, מהד' שלישית, עמ' 134.
[3] ארנדט, OT, מהד' שלישית, עמ' 230, ראו גם: ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 51.
[4] קוקס, על לאומיות, עמ' 223. אולם קוקס לא הבחינה שהמניע לעמדה זו של ארנדט הוא בדיוק מחוייבותה ליהדות ולשמירה על פרטיקולריות יהודית בתוך מדינת הלאום הלא-יהודית.
[5] לאור, אף מילה על ציונות, עמ' 18.
[6] ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 51.
[7] קוקס, על לאומיות, עמ' 225.
[8] שלום, דברים בגו, עמ' 92.
[9] ארנדט, להציל את המולדת, עמ' 180.
[10] פלדמן, היהודי כפריה, עמ' 35.
[11] ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 49.
[12] ארנדט, הציונות בראיה מחדש, עמ' 151.
מדינת כל אזרחיה ומדינת לאום בישראל
________________________________________
הפרדוקס של מדינת-לאום-מתרחבת, ממש כפי שתיארה אותו ארנדט, עומד במרכז הדיון הציבורי בישראל בשנים האחרונות. המודעות לדרך שבה מסכנת מדינת הלאום את עצמה בכיבושיה, הביאה רוב מוחלט של הישראלים להסכים לשלם מחיר טריטוריאלי בכדי לשמור על הגדרתה של המדינה כמדינת לאום יהודית ודמוקרטית. יותר מ70% מהציבור הישראלי תומך בעשור האחרון בתוכניות נסיגה שונות, אך גם מעבר לרוב מוצק זה נראה שיש הסכמה ברורה גם של המפלגות שימינה מהליכוד, שהשאיפה למדינת לאום יהודית חשובה מהשאיפה לארץ ישראל השלמה (אגב, ביטוי שכיום נעלם כמעט לגמרי מהשיח הפוליטי הישראלי). הויכוח בין ימין לשמאל איננו על הגדרתה של המדינה כמדינת לאום. אם יש בכלל ויכוח מדיני בין המפלגות הרי שהוא עוסק במחיר שהן מוכנות לשלם על מנת לשמור את המדינה כמדינה יהודית. לעומת הסכמה רחבה זו, מיעוט קטן בפוליטיקה הישראלית, מציע להפוך את המדינה ל"מדינת כל אזרחיה"[1]. לשם הצגה ברורה, גם אם מעט פשטנית של רעיון זה, אני נעזר בדבריו של ישעיהו לייבוביץ:
“המדינה אין לה אלא משמעות שימושית בלבד, באשר היא אינה אלא מנגנון (כלי, מכשיר, אינסטרומנט) לפעולה, ומהות פעולתה – הכפיה. המדינה אינה "עוסקת בהבהרת יחסים וכו'” [...] אלא כופה יחסים ... במובן זה אמרתי שהמדינה (כל מדינה) היא אויב האדם. [...] אולם בעקבות ההתפתחות ההיסטורית (מדור הפלגה ואילך) היתה המדינה לרע הכרחי של המין האנושי ואין לאדם היום מפלט ממנה..."[2]
ברור שעבור ליבוביץ "מדינת לאום יהודית" איננה רק "רע הכרחי", כדבריו, בדומה לכל מדינה אחרת, "מדינת לאום יהודית" הינה פשוט צירוף מילים חסר פשר. אין מדינה יהודית ולא יכולה להיות מדינה כזו. יהדות היא דבר אחד ומדינה היא דבר אחר בתכלית. לא כאן המקום להרחיב על עמדותיו המורכבות והסותרות של לייבוביץ' בשאלה הציונית, אולם לעניינינו די אם נראה כי לדעתו מדינה לא אמורה להשפיע על זהותו, תרבותו ובוודאי לא על דתו של אדם. מדינה הינה מכשיר טכני שעניינו הפעלת כפיה על הפרט. נידמה לי שגם אם רוב התומכים ב"מדינת כל אזרחיה" לא קראו את לייבוביץ ממש, יסכימו רובם שהמדינה אמורה להוות מנגנון מעשי בלבד.
בויכוח שבין מדינת-כל-אזרחיה לבין מדינת לאום, אפשר לצפות למצוא את ארנדט כתומכת של מדינת-כל-אזרחיה. אולם החשיבות שארנדט מקנה לכניסת היהודים למצב הפוליטי, הצורך בארץ מולדת ליהודים, ההערכה הרבה שרכשה למפעל הציוני, גם כאשר הסתייגה ממנו, והכוח שהיא זיהתה במדינות הלאום, כל אלה מלמדים שהדגם הפוליטי שעמד לנגד עיניה הוא דגם שלישי, שכמובן איננו מדינת-לאום (שאת ההתנגדות אליה ניסחה ארנדט במפורש כפי שראינו) אך הוא גם שונה ממדינת-כל-אזרחיה בכך שיש לו יומרות ברורות להשפיע על זהות האזרחים וכן בכך שהוא נמנע מחלק ניכר של אותה כפיה המהווה את הבסיס לכל מדינה לדעתו של לייבוביץ. את הדגם הזה שרמזים לזהותו פיזרה ארנדט בין כתבים שונים, היא מכנה "שיטת המועצות", "Council System", וברצוני לטעון שיש בו בכדי לקדם את השיח הפוליטי בישראל התקוע, זה כמה עשורים על הדיכוטומיה הבלתי מתפשרת בין מדינת-לאום למדינת-כל-אזרחיה.
[1] בעוד שמדינת הלאום זכתה לדיון נרחב למדי בהגות הפוליטית בחצי השני של המאה העשרים, הרי שהמושג "מדינת כל אזרחיה" אינו מופיע בדיון התיאורטי ולמעשה, למיטב ידיעתי, הוא תוצר של הדיון הציבורי הישראלי. בדיון התיאורטי מופיעה הבחנה בין מדינת-לאום-אתנית (שמקבילה פחות או יותר לרעיונות שראינו אצל ארנדט), לבין מדינת-לאום-אזרחית (ביינר, ארנדט ולאומיות, עמ' 50). מדינת הלאום האזרחית בנויה על ההנחה שכל אזרח במדינה שותף במידה שווה ביצירת הזהות הקולקטיבית של המדינה. נידמה לי שאלה בישראל הדוגלים ב"מדינת כל אזרחיה" מציעים רעיון מעט שונה, על פיו למדינה אין כל יומרה להשפיע על זהותם של אזרחיה. המדינה לדידם היא רק מכשיר טכני שנועד להסדיר את היחסים בין האזרחים.
[2] מכתב לצוריאל אדמנית ודב רפל, מאי 1970, מתוך: ליבוביץ', רציתי לשאול, עמ' 371 – 372.
שיטת המועצות
________________________________________
במאמר ממאי 1948 שנקרא "להציל את המולדת היהודית”, מציעה ארנדט, בעקבות יהודה לייב מאגנס להקים בפלשתינה מדינה פדרטיבית יהודית-ערבית[1]. כמה חוקרים כבר הצביעו על הקשר שבין דעותיה של ארנדט על מדינת הלאום היהודית לבין העמדה הדו-לאומית של אנשי קבוצת ברית-שלום, בעיקר לפני קום המדינה[2] אולם עיון מעמיק ברעיון הפדרציה בכתבים אחרים של ארנדט מגלה שיש בשיטה גישה מהפכנית בהרבה מהתביעה של אנשי ברית-שלום לכך ששני העמים יחיו במדינה מאוחדת. לטענתי אי אפשר להבין את קריאתה של ארנדט לפדרציה יהודית-ערבית מבלי להידרש לדיון נרחב יותר של ארנדט על פדרציה של מועצות, דיון שהיא עורכת במהדורה השניה של ספרה הנרחב על מקורות הטוטליטריות[3] ובספרה על המהפיכה[4]. אמנם במאמר ממאי ארבעים ושמונה אין היא מפרטת את השיטה, וב"מקורות הטוטליטריות" ו"על המהפיכה" היא אינה מזכירה את ההקשר הישראלי-פלסטיני אולם אם נחבר בין השניים (חיבור בשיטה שהרמב"ם מכנה "השב פרקיו זה על זה"[5]) יתברר שהרעיונות האוטופיים של ארנדט בסוף ספרה על הטוטליטריות אינם אלא פתרון לבעיית היהודים ולהתגלמותה במדינת ישראל.
שיטת המועצות היא מצב של השתייכות פוליטית וולנטרית עם רמת מחוייבות הולכת ופוחתת שבה אדם מחוייב באופן עמוק לקהילה מקומית (למשל שכונה, ועד עובדים, ועד הורי בית ספר וכולי), וקהילה זו מחוייבת לקהילה רחבה יותר (למשל עיר) שבעצמה מחוברת לקהילה רחבה יותר (מחוז, מדינה) וכן הלאה. רמת המחוייבות של האינדיבידואל לקהילות הרחבות תהייה אם כן קטנה, אך בכל זאת לא מבוטלת. אולי מוטב להדגים את עקרונות השיטה באמצעות התנועה הקיבוצית[6]. כל קיבוץ בפני עצמו הוא התארגנות וולנטרית של בודדים המעוניינים להתאגד, לוקחים חלק פעיל בפוליטיקה הפנימית של הארגון ומעוניינים להשפיע גם על העולם שמחוץ לארגונם הקטן. התנועה הקיבוצית גם היא התארגנות וולונטרית של מספר מועצות מקומיות כאלו שהתאגדו לשם קידום ענייניהן. מחוייבותו של חבר קיבוץ לקיבוצו גדולה מאוד ואילו לתנועה הקיבוצית המחוייבות קטנה בהרבה ובכל זאת, חבר קיבוץ מזוהה מיד כחבר בתנועה (על פי לבושו בדרך כלל). נידמה לי שמה שעמד לנגד עיניה במועצות הוולנטריות שלה, לא היתה כל כך התנועה הקיבוצית (שלה רכשה ארנדט הערכה רבה) אלא דווקא הקהילה היהודית המסורתית שבה כל קהילה היא התארגנות וולנטרית ויש קשר בין קהילות שונות בעולם כולו. ניתן לטעון כמובן שהקהילה היהודית אינה נקיה מיחסים של כוח וכפיה ושהיא מפעילה על חבריה כפיה רבה בדרכים מגוונות – גם אם לא דרכים של חוק ריבוני. כפי שהראה פוקו, אין במציאות אירגון חברתי כלשהו שאינו מפעיל מנגנונים סמויים וגלויים של כפיה וכוח, ובכל זאת נזקם של מנגנוני הכוח והכפייה של הקהילות קטנים בהרבה מנזקה של קולקטיביות פוליטית בסגנון מדינת הלאום. הכוח הפנימי של הקהילה לפחות לא מביא ברוב המקרים לשפיכות דמים.
ארנדט איננה מציינת במפורש בשיטת המועצות שלה, לא את התנועה הקיבוצית ולא את הקהילה היהודית משום שעיקר עניינה בדיון על המועצות הוא בדרך שבה משמרות המועצות את הרוח המהפכנית לאחר סיומה של המהפיכה. התקדים ההיסטורי שהיא מוצאת לשיטה הוא בהפיכה ההונגרית ב-1956. ארנדט טענה שמועצות דומות לאלה שקמו בהונגריה הופיעו עם כל התקוממות עממית מאז אמצע המאה ה-19, אך כולן דוכאו ונעלמו תחת מכבש הטוטליטריות שאפיין את המשטר שבא בעקבות המהפיכה[7]. ארנדט רואה במועצות אלה מצב פוליטי אידיאלי שבו מתקיימות כפיה וריבונות ברמה המינימלית ההכרחית לשם קיום חברתי. המועצות הן "מרחבים של חופש"[8] שנועדו למסד את הרוח המהפכנית ולשמר אותה לאחר המהפיכה מפני כוחה של הרפובליקה. כישלונם של המהפכנים לראות את החידוש שטמון בשיטת המהפיכות[9] הוא שהוביל לדריסת הרוח המהפכנית ושקיעתה אל תוך משטרים טוטליטריים חשוכים.
המועצות הוולנטריות עומדת כמובן בניגוד גמור להגדרתה של המדינה שראינו אצל לייבוביץ. לייבוביץ טען שכל מהותה של המדינה היא כפיה. ארנדט שואלת האם ניתן לדמיין מצב פוליטי שאינו מבוסס על כפיה, או לכל הפחות מנסה לצמצם את מימד הכפיה לרמה המינימלית. "מדינת כל אזרחיה", שאיננה אלא מכשיר שלטוני שמאגד קבוצת אזרחים שאין ביניהם כל קשר בסגנון לייבוביץ איננה ברת מימוש לדעת ארנדט וגם איננה רצויה. היא איננה ברת מימוש מכיוון שגם לו "רצתה" המדינה להיות רק עניין טכני היתה מייצרת זהות קולקטיבית ברמה מסויימת, והיא אינה רצויה משום שבכל מדינה נדרשת מידה של אמון ודבק חברתי מינימלי בכדי לקיים את מוסדות השלטון. מעצם היותה וולנטרית, מחייבת פדרציית המועצות של ארנדט הזדהות לא מעטה של האזרחים עם המסגרת הגדולה ולכן צריכה הפדרציה להשפיע ולעצב את זהותו של האינדיבידואל. היא אינה יכולה להוות מכשיר שלטוני בלבד.
שיטת המועצות נראית אוטופיסטית לגמרי. קשה היום לדמיין מדינה שתיבנה כך לאורך זמן, וגם אם מציאות כזו תיתכן, הרי שמדינה וולנטרית שכזו תעמוד בפני איום משמעותי ממדינות לאומיות שמסביבה ומי יודע אם כוחה יוכל לעמוד לה. אולם ארנדט רחוקה מלהיות הוגה אוטופיסטית. כהיסטוריונית וכהוגה פוליטית (לא "פילוסופית", כדבריה) היא הקפידה לבסס את ביקורת הלאומיות שלה על מקרה היסטורי ולכן היא מזכירה את רעיון הפדרציה בקונטקסט של המהפיכה ההונגרית, אולם היא לא עשתה זאת משום שחשבה כי רק בזמן המוגבל שלאחר המהפיכה יכולים האזרחים ליצור לעצמם "מרחבים של חופש", אלא משום שמהפיכה היא הביטוי המובהק ביותר לביקורת הנובעת מלמטה, מהאזרחים עצמם, על השלטון. ביקורת מהפכנית בדרך כלל מציעה אלטרנטיבה מדויקת של המצב הרצוי לאחר המהפיכה. ביקורת פוליטית יכולה, ולדעתי גם חייבת, לסמן כיוון שלאורו יהיה עלינו לשפוט את המציאות המשתנה.
אולי מדינה של מועצות מקומיות איננה מן האפשר, אולם אני מבקש ללמוד מארנדט שפוליטיקה הדלה ביחסי כפיה וריבונות היא כיוון ראוי שההתקדמות אליו איננה עניין של אוטופיה אלא של מגמה מתמשכת בהווה. יתכן שפתרונות פוליטיים אמיתיים אינם מסוג הדברים המגיע במהפכות ולכן עלינו לשאוף ולהגשימם צעד אחר צעד, ביצירת צעדים בוני אמון בין יהודים לערבים, ביצירת חיבורים על בסיס מקומי ועל רקע אינטרס משותף צר, חיבורים וולנטריים שייצרו קהילות קטנות המתחברות לקהילות גדולות יותר, המתחברות לקהילת-על בסדר גודל של המדינה המודרנית.
מדינת כל אזרחיה ומדינת לאום בישראל סיכום
[1] ארנדט, להציל את המולדת, עמ' 191.
[2] רז קרקוצקין, דו-לאומיות; אדון, שולם ארנדט והפרדוקס.
[3] מעניין לציין אולי שהדיון על שיטת המועצות במהפיכה ההונגרית היא תוספת שהוסיפה ארנדט למהדורה השניה של הספר והשמיטה מהמהדורה השלישית, כיוון שהיתה "מיושנת" לדבריה.
[4] ארנדט, על המהפיכה.
[5] הרמב"ם, מורה נבוכים, חלק א, צוואת ספר זה. שוורץ מתרגם מעט אחרת: פרש את פרקיו זה לפי זה" (עמ' 19).
[6] במקומות אחרים ארנדט ביטאה התלהבות לנוכח הרעיון והביצוע של תפיסת הקיבוצים.
[7] ארנדט, OT מהדורה שניה, עמ' 500.
[8] ארנדט, על המהפיכה, עמ' 268.
[9] ארנדט, על המהפיכה, עמ' 284.
סיכום
אינני יודע אם צדקה ארנדט כשהציעה, זמן קצר לפני הקמת המדינה, שפדרציה של מועצות היא הדרך היחידה להציל את המולדת היהודית מציפורניה המאיימות של מדינת הלאום היהודית. בפרספקטיבה של חמישים שנה שעברו מאז, ברור שהסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני מלובה על ידי רעיונות לאומיים עזים, ציוניים ופלסטינים כאחד, וקשה לדמיין פדרציה משמעותית בין יהודים לערבים. אולם אפשר גם לראות בסכסוך העקוב מדם סוג של הזדמנות היסטורית. במדינת ישראל, בעידן שבין האינתיפאדה השניה לשלישית מודעים הציבור הישראלי והפלסטיני כאחד, שמדינת-לאום במודל הקלאסי לעולם לא תתקיים כאן. יתכן שדווקא בשל המבוי הסתום המתמשך בסכסוך לא תהייה לציבור הישראלי כל ברירה אלא לחפש את הפתרון במקום אחר. אני מבקש ללמוד משיטת המועצות של ארנדט שהמלחמה במדינת הלאום ובזוועות והעיוותים שהיא מחוללת במציאות לא חייבת להתממש, לא במהפכה אנרכיסטית כוללת, לא בכינונה של מדינת לאום פלשתינית ואפילו לא בכינונה של מדינת-כל-אזרחיה. המאבק במדינת הלאום יכול לשאת אופי של התאגדות וולנטרית, מלמטה, ושל חיבורים חופשיים בין אינדיבידואלים, בין יהודים וערבים, וגם בין ערבים לבין עצמם ואפילו, עד כמה שקשה לדמיין זאת, בין יהודים לבין עצמם.
יש במסגרת המחשבתית של ארנדט בכדי לקדם את השיח הישראלי העכשווי הנאבק על הגדרתה של מדינת הלאום היהודית.
Tuesday, May 15, 2012
One state, two state, three state, four
BY Michael Omer-Man, a journalist based in Jaffa, Israel, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a particular interest in grassroots initiatives on both sides. He has an academic background in conflict resolution.
http://www.facebook.com/omerman
This is a very interesting and comprehensive article exploring alternatives to the two-state solution.
However it is unclear on the distinction between federation and confederation. This results in confusions between internal state borders and mere limits of national districts, for example.
Omer-Man discusses too the parallel states model, although it seems unrealistic: what happens to the sovereignty of two overlapping states having the same territory?
The interesting point in this model is the decoupling of sovereignty from territory, which nullify the demographic threat.
At the light of those descriptions, my model can be defined as a mix of federation, one-state and " parallel states ": it decouples the nation-states from territory, as the whole territory is under exclusive federal sovereignty; the nation-states rule on their respective citizens, and geographic demography gives their autonomy a territorial basis: regionally in administrative districts where the population is nationally homogeneous, locally in interspersed areas.
There are three level of administration with different competences: local, national and federal. Laws are the same for all at the local and federal levels; they keep a different national or religious coloration at the national level.
Emphasis is mine
The conference was derided by all colors of Israelis and American Zionists as “delegitimizing” Israel. Discussing a one-state solution, some said, “is a euphemism for ending the existence of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.”
The likes of World Jewish Congress Secretary-General Dan Diker, along with various Israeli and world Jewish leaders, dismissed the conference as "anti-Semitic theater." Jerusalem Post columnist Martin Sherman, though decrying the two-state principle as "the source of [Israel’s] de-legitimization," wrote that allowing others - presumably non-Israelis - to lead the discussion about a one-state solution would "invite a new Pearl Harbor."
But while the international mainstream discourse discounts the legitimacy of anything other than the two-state solution, many within Israeli society are pushing back against that notion and openly discussing alternatives. Almost two years before the conference at Harvard, a member of Knesset from the Israeli government’s ruling party lamented: "The taboo that forbids talk about any option other than the two-state solution is almost anti-democratic. It's like brain-gagging."
Accusing both the Right and Left of disillusionment, or at best of having disconnected views of the land they live in, Likud MK Tzipi Hotovely told Haaretz that unlike others, she "do[es] not ignore the fact that there are Palestinians here. Both the Left and the Right choose to shut their eyes to the fact that there are human beings here."
However, Hotovely and a small but growing number of right-wing Israelis who advocate a one-state solution do not share the same vision of the future as those who gathered in Cambridge this month. Unlike the Israeli far-right, the one-state solution advocated by left-leaning Palestinians, Israelis and others is a vision based on the liberal concept of a state of all its citizens.
Hotovely and others, including former Yesha Council head and Netanyahu bureau chief Uri Elitzur, do recognize a moral and political imperative to grant full inclusion in the Jewish state to (most) Palestinians currently residing west of the Jordan River. The main difference between them and views aired at the Harvard conference is that they stop short of giving Palestinians any ownership in that state.
"I want it to be clear that I do not recognize national rights of Palestinians in the Land of Israel. I recognize their human rights and their individual rights, and also their individual political rights - but between the sea and the Jordan there is room for one state, a Jewish state," Hotovely told Haaretz.
While the left-wing, liberal one-state camp may actually stand closer to the more mainstream two-state camp in its recognition of Palestinian national-political rights, right-wingers like Hotovely, Elitzur and even Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin all have a vision that is closer functionally to that expressed by hundreds at the Harvard conference - one state for both Jews and Palestinians.
But those differences are large enough to keep the two discussions separate for the time being.
Although Israeli politicians like Hotovely and Rivlin would not likely be welcomed at the Harvard conference, perhaps it is time Israelis start listening to them -- if for no other reason than to begin openly discussing alternatives to the long-stalled two-state solution. If no fresh and creative thinking is introduced into the long-stalled peace process, the conflict risks true intractability or a solution imposed by one side that secures its goals and needs while abandoning the other’s.
Many supporters of the two-state solution are apprehensive that its failure would eventually lead to one state, bringing to an end its Jewish character. However, there are several well-articulated alternatives that should be examined.
The two-state solution has faced a number of problems that appear to be becoming more and more insurmountable. The question of territory and geographic boundaries lies at the heart of many of those concerns. Israel’s continued settlement enterprise eats away at the territory slated for a future Palestinian state. Furthermore, much of mainstream Israeli thought says that withdrawing to the 1949 Armistice Lines (the Green Line) would leave Israel with “indefensible borders.”
Equally important is the question of whether an independent Palestinian state within the Green Line would actually be viable. The lack of territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is highly problematic. While the most commonly accepted solution to territorial contiguity is an under- or above-ground safe passage between the two territories, that too is far from ideal and in many ways falls short of truly linking the two regions of a future Palestinian state.
For these and a number of other reasons, no matter what the territorial arrangements reached in negotiations resulting in a two-state solution, the borders will likely result in a situation where one party sacrifices far more than the other. In the modern nation-state model (based on Westphalian sovereignty), those boundaries define what a government controls, and are therefore of great importance.
One of the options being discussed as an alternative to the one-state and two-state solutions is confederation.
A federal model can mitigate much of the win-lose nature of sacrificing territory in order to reach the end goal of a resolution to the conflict, or as Israelis refer to it, the land-for-peace model.
In his paper on a federal option, Daniel J. Elazar writes:
“Although borders would be expected to remain open under a federal arrangement, they still must be agreed upon. In drawing the borders, someone wins and someone loses. Yet under a federal arrangement rights beyond the borders are designed to compensate for actual territorial loss.”
Most models for federation between Israel and Palestine acknowledge the intimate and geographically small nature of the land, while addressing the desire or need for national self-determination or self-rule for the different communities and ethnic groups.
Most viable models envision a number of administrative regions – cantons or larger units ranging in number from 3 to 12 – which are given a large measure of local rule while but are subordinate to a federal government whose jurisprudence is limited in scope to those areas of shared concern. The sovereign concept of territorial control is maintained, while removing the limitations of two separate states. Furthermore, the federal model addresses the interspersed Palestinian and Israeli populations and would obviate the need for further transfers or one becoming a demographic threat to the other.
Some examples of various types of federations are the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom.
The federal model also offers an interesting solution to the question of Jerusalem. Just as Washington DC is the seat of the American federal government and essentially an administrative district beyond state control of any of the states, so Jerusalem could serve such a function. If the holy city is put under the control of a joint Israeli-Palestinian federal government, it would inclusively satisfy both nations’ demands that it be their capital.
In the model propagated by the 1947 UN Partition plan and rehashed ever since, Jerusalem was slated to fall under the control of a third party. In the federal model, it would be jointly controlled by Palestinians and Israelis.
The federal model has many problems, perhaps the largest of which is that mutual consent and trust must precede its implementation. Another issue is the great disparity in economic might between Israeli and Palestinian populations as they are constituted today. A third question is who controls the military, its role and what restrictions are placed on it.
But while these unanswered questions can be used to discredit the viability of a federal solution to the conflict, it is important to note that any model, including the two-state solution, is burdened with hurdles that must be overcome.
Prospects for a two-state resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have dimmed in recent months and years. Over 60 percent of both Palestinians and Israelis think it is unlikely a Palestinian state will be created in the coming years, according to a recent poll. An equally large majority on both sides opposes accepting the other’s conditions for returning to negotiations toward that goal. Frustrated that interim stages have become a permanent status quo and lamenting the lack of any process, Oslo peace process architects Yossi Beilin and Ahmed Qurei, have both recently called for the dismantling of their design.
Meanwhile, the one-state solution is cast as the only alternative, one that negates both current Zionist political thought and the goals of the Palestinian national movement. Other alternatives are rarely discussed, even as the conflict appears increasingly intractable.
Alternatives to the two-state solution, like the Oslo process itself and any other model for conflict resolution, need not be accepted as absolute prescriptions. Although not necessarily viable, the model outlined below, “parallel states,” offers new ideas for resolving the conflict that can be mined and applied in other ways to advance the all-but-dead peace process. Its radical and creative approach can be valuable in helping to reimagine certain fundamentaly flawed approaches of the two-state solution that have contributed to and perpetuated its failure.
As described by the Parallel States Project:
Can one imagine a scenario with a two state solution, one Israeli state and one Palestinian state in parallel, each for the whole area and with civil rights to all, Israelis and Palestinians, built upon existing political, economic and physical structures? Such a scenario would mean a decoupling of the exclusive link between state and territory, and the notion of two state structures parallel with each other, or “superimposed” upon each other. Both state structures would cover the whole area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River.
The people in the whole area would be able to choose freely which state to belong to and at the same time have the right – at least in principle – to settle in the whole territory. Citizenship would be the result of the individual’s free choice and thus follow the citizen, not the territory.
The concept addresses some of the deepest pitfalls of the Oslo-conceptualization of a two-state solution: Both Israelis and Palestinians claim and want more territory than can be divided in such a small land, and; both demand the right to live in territories that would fall on the other side of the border in a two-state solution.
By removing the traditional territorial boundaries encompassed in the modern concept of state sovereignty, those issues become much smaller, all the while satisfying both Israelis’ and Palestinians’ deeply invested desire in the quest for national self-determination, albeit in an alternative and less exclusive manifestation.
Citizens can choose to be citizens in the state they feel most associated with and represented by, which would carry separate national symbols and identities. Reality on the ground would be much closer to a one-state solution.
Palestinians could live in Israel proper and Jews would be allowed to live in the West Bank. As citizenship is decoupled from territory, the idea of demographics threats to a state whose character is defined by the religion and ethnicity of the majority of its population can be cast aside: The increasingly difficult prospect in Israel of balancing “Jewish and democratic” would become irrelevant.
Some areas of governance not necessarily linked to geographic control could be placed under the separate jurisdictions of respective Palestinian and Israeli states, including overseas diplomatic representation and some areas of civil and family law. Other areas of governance, such as security, infrastructure, policing and taxation would be conducted jointly.
Admittedly, the idea is far fetched and has more problems than can be touched upon in such a topical examination. But by reimagining the model for post-conflict coexistence, new ideas for resolving the conflict can be gleaned.
After nearly 20 years of failed attempts at finding and implementing various models for a two-state solution, there can be no harm in examining other, new and even admittedly unviable alternatives. Although its advocates will continue pushing to advance the two-state solution with hopeful stubbornness, one must also recall a quote often attributed to Albert Einstein: "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again but expecting different results."
Follow Michael Omer-Man on Twitter: @ConflictedLand
http://www.facebook.com/omerman
This is a very interesting and comprehensive article exploring alternatives to the two-state solution.
However it is unclear on the distinction between federation and confederation. This results in confusions between internal state borders and mere limits of national districts, for example.
Omer-Man discusses too the parallel states model, although it seems unrealistic: what happens to the sovereignty of two overlapping states having the same territory?
The interesting point in this model is the decoupling of sovereignty from territory, which nullify the demographic threat.
At the light of those descriptions, my model can be defined as a mix of federation, one-state and " parallel states ": it decouples the nation-states from territory, as the whole territory is under exclusive federal sovereignty; the nation-states rule on their respective citizens, and geographic demography gives their autonomy a territorial basis: regionally in administrative districts where the population is nationally homogeneous, locally in interspersed areas.
There are three level of administration with different competences: local, national and federal. Laws are the same for all at the local and federal levels; they keep a different national or religious coloration at the national level.
Emphasis is mine
One state, two state, three state, four – Part I
More than two decades since the start of the peace process, the two-state solution has become the only acceptable path for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in contemporary discourse. But while the two-state solution may be the only one currently sitting on the table, many others continue to linger around it, waiting for someone to pick them up. The most recent such attempt was the One State Conference held at Harvard University earlier this month, promoting the idea of one liberal state for both Israelis and Palestinians.The conference was derided by all colors of Israelis and American Zionists as “delegitimizing” Israel. Discussing a one-state solution, some said, “is a euphemism for ending the existence of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.”
The likes of World Jewish Congress Secretary-General Dan Diker, along with various Israeli and world Jewish leaders, dismissed the conference as "anti-Semitic theater." Jerusalem Post columnist Martin Sherman, though decrying the two-state principle as "the source of [Israel’s] de-legitimization," wrote that allowing others - presumably non-Israelis - to lead the discussion about a one-state solution would "invite a new Pearl Harbor."
But while the international mainstream discourse discounts the legitimacy of anything other than the two-state solution, many within Israeli society are pushing back against that notion and openly discussing alternatives. Almost two years before the conference at Harvard, a member of Knesset from the Israeli government’s ruling party lamented: "The taboo that forbids talk about any option other than the two-state solution is almost anti-democratic. It's like brain-gagging."
Accusing both the Right and Left of disillusionment, or at best of having disconnected views of the land they live in, Likud MK Tzipi Hotovely told Haaretz that unlike others, she "do[es] not ignore the fact that there are Palestinians here. Both the Left and the Right choose to shut their eyes to the fact that there are human beings here."
However, Hotovely and a small but growing number of right-wing Israelis who advocate a one-state solution do not share the same vision of the future as those who gathered in Cambridge this month. Unlike the Israeli far-right, the one-state solution advocated by left-leaning Palestinians, Israelis and others is a vision based on the liberal concept of a state of all its citizens.
Hotovely and others, including former Yesha Council head and Netanyahu bureau chief Uri Elitzur, do recognize a moral and political imperative to grant full inclusion in the Jewish state to (most) Palestinians currently residing west of the Jordan River. The main difference between them and views aired at the Harvard conference is that they stop short of giving Palestinians any ownership in that state.
"I want it to be clear that I do not recognize national rights of Palestinians in the Land of Israel. I recognize their human rights and their individual rights, and also their individual political rights - but between the sea and the Jordan there is room for one state, a Jewish state," Hotovely told Haaretz.
While the left-wing, liberal one-state camp may actually stand closer to the more mainstream two-state camp in its recognition of Palestinian national-political rights, right-wingers like Hotovely, Elitzur and even Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin all have a vision that is closer functionally to that expressed by hundreds at the Harvard conference - one state for both Jews and Palestinians.
But those differences are large enough to keep the two discussions separate for the time being.
Although Israeli politicians like Hotovely and Rivlin would not likely be welcomed at the Harvard conference, perhaps it is time Israelis start listening to them -- if for no other reason than to begin openly discussing alternatives to the long-stalled two-state solution. If no fresh and creative thinking is introduced into the long-stalled peace process, the conflict risks true intractability or a solution imposed by one side that secures its goals and needs while abandoning the other’s.
One state, two state, three state, four – Part II
Many supporters of the two-state solution are apprehensive that its failure would eventually lead to one state, bringing to an end its Jewish character. However, there are several well-articulated alternatives that should be examined.
The two-state solution has faced a number of problems that appear to be becoming more and more insurmountable. The question of territory and geographic boundaries lies at the heart of many of those concerns. Israel’s continued settlement enterprise eats away at the territory slated for a future Palestinian state. Furthermore, much of mainstream Israeli thought says that withdrawing to the 1949 Armistice Lines (the Green Line) would leave Israel with “indefensible borders.”
Equally important is the question of whether an independent Palestinian state within the Green Line would actually be viable. The lack of territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is highly problematic. While the most commonly accepted solution to territorial contiguity is an under- or above-ground safe passage between the two territories, that too is far from ideal and in many ways falls short of truly linking the two regions of a future Palestinian state.
For these and a number of other reasons, no matter what the territorial arrangements reached in negotiations resulting in a two-state solution, the borders will likely result in a situation where one party sacrifices far more than the other. In the modern nation-state model (based on Westphalian sovereignty), those boundaries define what a government controls, and are therefore of great importance.
One of the options being discussed as an alternative to the one-state and two-state solutions is confederation.
A federal model can mitigate much of the win-lose nature of sacrificing territory in order to reach the end goal of a resolution to the conflict, or as Israelis refer to it, the land-for-peace model.
In his paper on a federal option, Daniel J. Elazar writes:
“Although borders would be expected to remain open under a federal arrangement, they still must be agreed upon. In drawing the borders, someone wins and someone loses. Yet under a federal arrangement rights beyond the borders are designed to compensate for actual territorial loss.”
Most models for federation between Israel and Palestine acknowledge the intimate and geographically small nature of the land, while addressing the desire or need for national self-determination or self-rule for the different communities and ethnic groups.
Most viable models envision a number of administrative regions – cantons or larger units ranging in number from 3 to 12 – which are given a large measure of local rule while but are subordinate to a federal government whose jurisprudence is limited in scope to those areas of shared concern. The sovereign concept of territorial control is maintained, while removing the limitations of two separate states. Furthermore, the federal model addresses the interspersed Palestinian and Israeli populations and would obviate the need for further transfers or one becoming a demographic threat to the other.
Some examples of various types of federations are the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom.
The federal model also offers an interesting solution to the question of Jerusalem. Just as Washington DC is the seat of the American federal government and essentially an administrative district beyond state control of any of the states, so Jerusalem could serve such a function. If the holy city is put under the control of a joint Israeli-Palestinian federal government, it would inclusively satisfy both nations’ demands that it be their capital.
In the model propagated by the 1947 UN Partition plan and rehashed ever since, Jerusalem was slated to fall under the control of a third party. In the federal model, it would be jointly controlled by Palestinians and Israelis.
The federal model has many problems, perhaps the largest of which is that mutual consent and trust must precede its implementation. Another issue is the great disparity in economic might between Israeli and Palestinian populations as they are constituted today. A third question is who controls the military, its role and what restrictions are placed on it.
But while these unanswered questions can be used to discredit the viability of a federal solution to the conflict, it is important to note that any model, including the two-state solution, is burdened with hurdles that must be overcome.
One state, two state, three state, four – Part III
his is the third and final part of a three-part series exploring alternatives to the two-state solution in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Part one examined attitudes and approaches to the one-state solution. Part two looked at the option of an Israeli-Palestinian federation.Prospects for a two-state resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have dimmed in recent months and years. Over 60 percent of both Palestinians and Israelis think it is unlikely a Palestinian state will be created in the coming years, according to a recent poll. An equally large majority on both sides opposes accepting the other’s conditions for returning to negotiations toward that goal. Frustrated that interim stages have become a permanent status quo and lamenting the lack of any process, Oslo peace process architects Yossi Beilin and Ahmed Qurei, have both recently called for the dismantling of their design.
Meanwhile, the one-state solution is cast as the only alternative, one that negates both current Zionist political thought and the goals of the Palestinian national movement. Other alternatives are rarely discussed, even as the conflict appears increasingly intractable.
Alternatives to the two-state solution, like the Oslo process itself and any other model for conflict resolution, need not be accepted as absolute prescriptions. Although not necessarily viable, the model outlined below, “parallel states,” offers new ideas for resolving the conflict that can be mined and applied in other ways to advance the all-but-dead peace process. Its radical and creative approach can be valuable in helping to reimagine certain fundamentaly flawed approaches of the two-state solution that have contributed to and perpetuated its failure.
Parallel states
The parallel states model is actually easier conceptualized as overlapping or superimposed states. Its basic idea is that two states, Israel and Palestine, can exist not side-by-side with territorial and demographic boundaries between them, but rather in the same land.As described by the Parallel States Project:
Can one imagine a scenario with a two state solution, one Israeli state and one Palestinian state in parallel, each for the whole area and with civil rights to all, Israelis and Palestinians, built upon existing political, economic and physical structures? Such a scenario would mean a decoupling of the exclusive link between state and territory, and the notion of two state structures parallel with each other, or “superimposed” upon each other. Both state structures would cover the whole area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River.
The people in the whole area would be able to choose freely which state to belong to and at the same time have the right – at least in principle – to settle in the whole territory. Citizenship would be the result of the individual’s free choice and thus follow the citizen, not the territory.
The concept addresses some of the deepest pitfalls of the Oslo-conceptualization of a two-state solution: Both Israelis and Palestinians claim and want more territory than can be divided in such a small land, and; both demand the right to live in territories that would fall on the other side of the border in a two-state solution.
By removing the traditional territorial boundaries encompassed in the modern concept of state sovereignty, those issues become much smaller, all the while satisfying both Israelis’ and Palestinians’ deeply invested desire in the quest for national self-determination, albeit in an alternative and less exclusive manifestation.
Citizens can choose to be citizens in the state they feel most associated with and represented by, which would carry separate national symbols and identities. Reality on the ground would be much closer to a one-state solution.
Palestinians could live in Israel proper and Jews would be allowed to live in the West Bank. As citizenship is decoupled from territory, the idea of demographics threats to a state whose character is defined by the religion and ethnicity of the majority of its population can be cast aside: The increasingly difficult prospect in Israel of balancing “Jewish and democratic” would become irrelevant.
Some areas of governance not necessarily linked to geographic control could be placed under the separate jurisdictions of respective Palestinian and Israeli states, including overseas diplomatic representation and some areas of civil and family law. Other areas of governance, such as security, infrastructure, policing and taxation would be conducted jointly.
Admittedly, the idea is far fetched and has more problems than can be touched upon in such a topical examination. But by reimagining the model for post-conflict coexistence, new ideas for resolving the conflict can be gleaned.
After nearly 20 years of failed attempts at finding and implementing various models for a two-state solution, there can be no harm in examining other, new and even admittedly unviable alternatives. Although its advocates will continue pushing to advance the two-state solution with hopeful stubbornness, one must also recall a quote often attributed to Albert Einstein: "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again but expecting different results."
Follow Michael Omer-Man on Twitter: @ConflictedLand
Wednesday, May 9, 2012
Toward confederation
Interesting article by a Professor of Political Science.
In his confederation, Palestine is supposedly sovereign but have no army.
No solution for borders and sharing of Jerusalem...
He does not explain either why "A federation called The United States of Israel and Palestine is not much better" than a unitary state.
A confederal treaty not mentioning Jerusalem, borders and refugees could be a first step, but it will have to evolve into a true supranational federation: like Europe, made too of different nation-states.
Emphasis is mine.
Toward confederation
By RONALD TIERSKY
08/05/2012
Palestinians know approximately what they will have to accept. Finding the least bad solution consonant with defeat is their unenviable task.
Israel’s strategic problem in historical terms is, ultimately, how to win a war well. The Palestinian problem is to avoid losing this war in the most drawn-out, worst possible way.
Palestinians (including any realistic Hamas leaders), know approximately what they will have to accept. Finding the least bad solution consonant with defeat is their unenviable task. Yet neither is Israel completely free, because victory can be dangerous. Israel needs a strategy that isn’t in the end self-defeating.
Realistically, the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma is this: In what circumstances could the strong safely show magnanimity and the weak believe they are getting an acceptable result? Intractable conflicts can sometimes be unblocked by enlarging the problem, by increasing the number of players, stakes and potential rewards.
All the “one-state” solutions – whether bi-national or a federation – are non-starters because Israeli Jews rightly refuse to sacrifice their own interest in a grand gesture of philanthropy.
Majorities in Israeli and Palestinian public opinion would doubtless accept a simple two-state solution if leaders agreed on it. Israel’s current government, however, seems not really interested whatever lip-service it is given from time to time. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s “economic peace” formula in effect replaces the creation of a Palestinian state with Israeli-sponsored economic development in the West Bank combined with an oppressive, volatile political status quo.
A way forward is to find a larger formula that increases the rewards and reduces costs for Israelis and Palestinians, and involves outside states as guarantors. Complexity and flexibility in this case are advantages. What is necessary is an institutional structure that limits to a minimum the binding links for Israel and at the same time provides time and space for Palestinian self-government and proof of competence to evolve, including stopping the violence on both sides.
A minimal, complex and flexible Israeli-Palestinian confederation, here meaning a two-state solution within the confines of a larger confederation, is a promising alternative.
Two sovereign states wrapped in a semi-state, a less-than-a-state.
Confederation – political and economic – could provide what Israelis and Palestinians, and outside powers, want most: guaranteed mutual security of the two states, reliable peace in the region, diminished capacity for Islamist terrorist groups to use the conflict as a pretext, and economic and social progress.
What is a confederation, how does it differ from a one-state solution, and what would be its international legal basis? A confederation differs from a binational single state and also from a federation of two states.
Some states are unitary, ruled entirely from the national capital (France). Others are federations in which power is shared in some balance between a national government and the states that compose it (the US, Germany). A few are confederations (Switzerland is a modern example).
Unique in world political development, the European Union is extremely complex: a hybrid combination of historical nation-states and national capitals with European-level institutions located in Brussels and elsewhere.
EU institutions are in part confederal (EU summit meetings in various cities), part federal (the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, the European Central Bank in Frankfurt) and part strict national sovereignty (major foreign policy decisions, above all decisions for war or peace in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya).
In the EU, complexity is often a curse but it does provide benefits as well, for example deflecting conflict into ambiguity and permitting the whole to survive even as one part falls into crisis (cf. the current Eurozone debt mess).
The EU is of particular relevance here because, although not wellknown, in international legal terms the entire EU is still a treaty organization (Maastricht) because a proposed constitution for it didn’t achieve ratification in 2005.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because it is also unique, requires a particularly imaginative legal and institutional structure.
Why not one state or two states? In the Holy Land a unitary state called Israel-Palestine makes no historical or political sense. A federation called The United States of Israel and Palestine is not much better.
What of a confederation? Normally a confederation means a constitution, weak but nonetheless more than a treaty. Sovereignty rests with the composing states.
(The American Articles of Confederation before 1789 are an example.) But if a Holy Land confederation is based on a treaty rather than a constitution, Israel’s national constitution and sovereignty are always superior (as would be true also for a Palestinian state). A treaty in this case would be more durable than a constitution.
A treaty is usually made for a specified period of years and renewed (NATO is an example). A constitution, however, is implicitly permanent.
If the situation on the ground goes sufficiently bad, a treaty can perfectly well be renounced (cf. current concerns about Egyptian repudiation of the peace treaty with Israel.) What would happen in practice as politics in the confederation? For example, there would be no common elections or governments.
Israeli and Palestinian parliaments might meet jointly once or twice a year for a few days, to get to know each other and create common culture more than to legislate. Existing Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation could be given formal legal status in the treaty. Once or twice yearly summit meetings of top national leaders could be mandated along with more frequent councils of ministers in a particular policy area, say agriculture (as in the EU).
In short, a treaty-based confederation sidesteps the entire zero-sum one-state two-state drama.
For Israel, in particular, confederation deals with intractable issues of Palestinian political sovereignty.
Creating a Palestinian state within a confederation would not increase but actually diminish threats to Israel’s security. Having their own state, Palestinian obsession with Israel, the ideological passion about sovereignty, borders and revenge, would shift to ambitions for more prosperous lives with individual dignity. Gaza, now such a special case, could join the Palestinian state immediately combined with the West Bank. If, however, Palestinian unity were impossible, Gaza could evolve over time one way or another.
For Palestinians, entrepreneurial energy and private sector business development would stimulate the growth of a more complex civil society connected to the wider world. A Palestinian state that issues internationally recognized passports permitting its citizens to freely visit the world would change the mind-set of young and old generations alike.
Speculating even further ahead, the confederation could encompass not just Israel and Palestine but, sooner or later, Jordan as well. Stimulating Jordanian economic and social development is a good in itself. Security across the entire confederation could be guaranteed by a combination of sovereign Israeli military and police forces, a Palestinian internal police force, a Jordanian participation, and overlapping security guarantees in the form of international boots on the ground: the US, UN and NATO (including Turkey). Jordanian domestic political reform would be de-dramatized.
A more cosmopolitan Israel can afford to deal differently with the Palestinians, who have by now suffered and been punished enough for disastrous policies of the past.
Israel would win its war well if a Palestinian state were created not against Israel’s will but sponsored and even mentored by Israel.
Inevitably, new international esteem would follow. The high cards are in Israeli hands.
The writer is the Eastman Professor of Political Science at Amherst College.
In his confederation, Palestine is supposedly sovereign but have no army.
No solution for borders and sharing of Jerusalem...
He does not explain either why "A federation called The United States of Israel and Palestine is not much better" than a unitary state.
A confederal treaty not mentioning Jerusalem, borders and refugees could be a first step, but it will have to evolve into a true supranational federation: like Europe, made too of different nation-states.
Emphasis is mine.
Toward confederation
By RONALD TIERSKY
08/05/2012
Palestinians know approximately what they will have to accept. Finding the least bad solution consonant with defeat is their unenviable task.
Israel’s strategic problem in historical terms is, ultimately, how to win a war well. The Palestinian problem is to avoid losing this war in the most drawn-out, worst possible way.
Palestinians (including any realistic Hamas leaders), know approximately what they will have to accept. Finding the least bad solution consonant with defeat is their unenviable task. Yet neither is Israel completely free, because victory can be dangerous. Israel needs a strategy that isn’t in the end self-defeating.
Realistically, the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma is this: In what circumstances could the strong safely show magnanimity and the weak believe they are getting an acceptable result? Intractable conflicts can sometimes be unblocked by enlarging the problem, by increasing the number of players, stakes and potential rewards.
All the “one-state” solutions – whether bi-national or a federation – are non-starters because Israeli Jews rightly refuse to sacrifice their own interest in a grand gesture of philanthropy.
Majorities in Israeli and Palestinian public opinion would doubtless accept a simple two-state solution if leaders agreed on it. Israel’s current government, however, seems not really interested whatever lip-service it is given from time to time. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s “economic peace” formula in effect replaces the creation of a Palestinian state with Israeli-sponsored economic development in the West Bank combined with an oppressive, volatile political status quo.
A way forward is to find a larger formula that increases the rewards and reduces costs for Israelis and Palestinians, and involves outside states as guarantors. Complexity and flexibility in this case are advantages. What is necessary is an institutional structure that limits to a minimum the binding links for Israel and at the same time provides time and space for Palestinian self-government and proof of competence to evolve, including stopping the violence on both sides.
A minimal, complex and flexible Israeli-Palestinian confederation, here meaning a two-state solution within the confines of a larger confederation, is a promising alternative.
Two sovereign states wrapped in a semi-state, a less-than-a-state.
Confederation – political and economic – could provide what Israelis and Palestinians, and outside powers, want most: guaranteed mutual security of the two states, reliable peace in the region, diminished capacity for Islamist terrorist groups to use the conflict as a pretext, and economic and social progress.
What is a confederation, how does it differ from a one-state solution, and what would be its international legal basis? A confederation differs from a binational single state and also from a federation of two states.
Some states are unitary, ruled entirely from the national capital (France). Others are federations in which power is shared in some balance between a national government and the states that compose it (the US, Germany). A few are confederations (Switzerland is a modern example).
Unique in world political development, the European Union is extremely complex: a hybrid combination of historical nation-states and national capitals with European-level institutions located in Brussels and elsewhere.
EU institutions are in part confederal (EU summit meetings in various cities), part federal (the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, the European Central Bank in Frankfurt) and part strict national sovereignty (major foreign policy decisions, above all decisions for war or peace in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya).
In the EU, complexity is often a curse but it does provide benefits as well, for example deflecting conflict into ambiguity and permitting the whole to survive even as one part falls into crisis (cf. the current Eurozone debt mess).
The EU is of particular relevance here because, although not wellknown, in international legal terms the entire EU is still a treaty organization (Maastricht) because a proposed constitution for it didn’t achieve ratification in 2005.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because it is also unique, requires a particularly imaginative legal and institutional structure.
Why not one state or two states? In the Holy Land a unitary state called Israel-Palestine makes no historical or political sense. A federation called The United States of Israel and Palestine is not much better.
What of a confederation? Normally a confederation means a constitution, weak but nonetheless more than a treaty. Sovereignty rests with the composing states.
(The American Articles of Confederation before 1789 are an example.) But if a Holy Land confederation is based on a treaty rather than a constitution, Israel’s national constitution and sovereignty are always superior (as would be true also for a Palestinian state). A treaty in this case would be more durable than a constitution.
A treaty is usually made for a specified period of years and renewed (NATO is an example). A constitution, however, is implicitly permanent.
If the situation on the ground goes sufficiently bad, a treaty can perfectly well be renounced (cf. current concerns about Egyptian repudiation of the peace treaty with Israel.) What would happen in practice as politics in the confederation? For example, there would be no common elections or governments.
Israeli and Palestinian parliaments might meet jointly once or twice a year for a few days, to get to know each other and create common culture more than to legislate. Existing Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation could be given formal legal status in the treaty. Once or twice yearly summit meetings of top national leaders could be mandated along with more frequent councils of ministers in a particular policy area, say agriculture (as in the EU).
In short, a treaty-based confederation sidesteps the entire zero-sum one-state two-state drama.
For Israel, in particular, confederation deals with intractable issues of Palestinian political sovereignty.
Creating a Palestinian state within a confederation would not increase but actually diminish threats to Israel’s security. Having their own state, Palestinian obsession with Israel, the ideological passion about sovereignty, borders and revenge, would shift to ambitions for more prosperous lives with individual dignity. Gaza, now such a special case, could join the Palestinian state immediately combined with the West Bank. If, however, Palestinian unity were impossible, Gaza could evolve over time one way or another.
For Palestinians, entrepreneurial energy and private sector business development would stimulate the growth of a more complex civil society connected to the wider world. A Palestinian state that issues internationally recognized passports permitting its citizens to freely visit the world would change the mind-set of young and old generations alike.
Speculating even further ahead, the confederation could encompass not just Israel and Palestine but, sooner or later, Jordan as well. Stimulating Jordanian economic and social development is a good in itself. Security across the entire confederation could be guaranteed by a combination of sovereign Israeli military and police forces, a Palestinian internal police force, a Jordanian participation, and overlapping security guarantees in the form of international boots on the ground: the US, UN and NATO (including Turkey). Jordanian domestic political reform would be de-dramatized.
A more cosmopolitan Israel can afford to deal differently with the Palestinians, who have by now suffered and been punished enough for disastrous policies of the past.
Israel would win its war well if a Palestinian state were created not against Israel’s will but sponsored and even mentored by Israel.
Inevitably, new international esteem would follow. The high cards are in Israeli hands.
The writer is the Eastman Professor of Political Science at Amherst College.
A federated state for Israelis and Palestinians
Source: A federated state for Israelis and Palestinians
By JAY BUSHINSKY
03/05/2012
Emphasis is mine.
Source:
[...] If Netanyahu manages to forge a new coalition that would have the middle-of-the-road Kadima party as a major component and leaves the Jewish religious and nationalist extremists on the parliamentary sidelines, he may escape the pressure constantly bearing down on him from the West Bank settlers who constantly seek territorial acquisitions.
Theoretically, he could then launch a process that would require the dismantling of a substantial number of settlements and the removal of unauthorized outposts further to the east.
A proposed exchange of territory that might enable many of the settlements to remain intact already has public support from Kadima. Its newly elected leader, Shaul Mofaz, is on the record as favoring a deal of this kind. But the transfer of thousands of hard-line settlers from the West Bank to ante bellum Israel would be a daunting if not politically impossible task.
This apparent fact of life bears out the contention that the permission given by the incumbent government and several of its predecessors for 350,000 to 500,000 Jewish settlers to move into the West Bank was a major mistake.
The financial cost of relocating them would be prohibitive, not to mention the fury of the inevitable social backlash in ante bellum Israel that would be a by-product.
All of these considerations suggest that it would be wise for Netanyahu, his party and the electorate as a whole to consider seriously whether there indeed are alternatives to the seemingly inoperable two-state solution.
One of them may be the hitherto unthinkable one-state solution: Annexation of the West Bank and extension of Israeli citizenship to its Palestinian inhabitants on the basis of total equality and political freedom.
This notion has been resisted in the past by Orthodox religious politicians who fear that it would set the stage for intermarriages between Jews and Arabs. But where and when did such an esoteric issue like intermarriage form the basis of any country’s political program? That has not been the case in Ireland, Ceylon or Nigeria where rival ethnic or religious groups also are required to live under one political roof.
In the local case, the one-state solution would take the form of a federation made up of two entities – one primarily Jewish and the other primarily Arab (in demographic terms).
Each entity could have its own parliament and governmental administration.
The state as a whole could have a federal government which would be responsible primarily for national security (for the entire territory of the federated state) – foreign policy and economic affairs including a common currency for both entities (as already exists in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). The federal government’s personnel and leadership would be drawn from the two entitities.
Ironically, annexation was originally proposed by the late Chaim Herzog when he served as the first military governor of the West Bank immediately after the Six Day War.
He was opposed then by the National Religious Party which was destined to spawn the ideological core of Gush Emunim and other Jewish settlement movements.
Its rationale then too was that annexation would foster intermarriage.
It all boils down to the likelihood that the prospective election will give Netanyahu a chance to implement domestic reforms, especially in the economic and social spheres.
These should include a more equitable distribution of private income so as to reduce or (preferably) eliminate the phenomenon of so-called “tycoons” lording it over the rest of the economy, and reduction of the cost of new or suitable housing so that young couples will be able to afford it and the deterioration of overcrowded neighborhoods can be stopped.
The winner (presumably Netanyahu) also might be in a better position to rehabilitate the tens of thousands of Africans who entered Israel illegally in the past five years, by integrating as many of them as possible and facilitating the emigration or deportation of those who cannot adjust to Israeli society to alternative destinations elsewhere in the world. These steps certainly are preferable to letting them converge on neglected urban areas, especially south Tel Aviv, and turning them into crime-infested slums.
The writer is a veteran foreign correspondent.
By JAY BUSHINSKY
03/05/2012
Emphasis is mine.
Source:
[...] If Netanyahu manages to forge a new coalition that would have the middle-of-the-road Kadima party as a major component and leaves the Jewish religious and nationalist extremists on the parliamentary sidelines, he may escape the pressure constantly bearing down on him from the West Bank settlers who constantly seek territorial acquisitions.
Theoretically, he could then launch a process that would require the dismantling of a substantial number of settlements and the removal of unauthorized outposts further to the east.
A proposed exchange of territory that might enable many of the settlements to remain intact already has public support from Kadima. Its newly elected leader, Shaul Mofaz, is on the record as favoring a deal of this kind. But the transfer of thousands of hard-line settlers from the West Bank to ante bellum Israel would be a daunting if not politically impossible task.
This apparent fact of life bears out the contention that the permission given by the incumbent government and several of its predecessors for 350,000 to 500,000 Jewish settlers to move into the West Bank was a major mistake.
The financial cost of relocating them would be prohibitive, not to mention the fury of the inevitable social backlash in ante bellum Israel that would be a by-product.
All of these considerations suggest that it would be wise for Netanyahu, his party and the electorate as a whole to consider seriously whether there indeed are alternatives to the seemingly inoperable two-state solution.
One of them may be the hitherto unthinkable one-state solution: Annexation of the West Bank and extension of Israeli citizenship to its Palestinian inhabitants on the basis of total equality and political freedom.
This notion has been resisted in the past by Orthodox religious politicians who fear that it would set the stage for intermarriages between Jews and Arabs. But where and when did such an esoteric issue like intermarriage form the basis of any country’s political program? That has not been the case in Ireland, Ceylon or Nigeria where rival ethnic or religious groups also are required to live under one political roof.
In the local case, the one-state solution would take the form of a federation made up of two entities – one primarily Jewish and the other primarily Arab (in demographic terms).
Each entity could have its own parliament and governmental administration.
The state as a whole could have a federal government which would be responsible primarily for national security (for the entire territory of the federated state) – foreign policy and economic affairs including a common currency for both entities (as already exists in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). The federal government’s personnel and leadership would be drawn from the two entitities.
Ironically, annexation was originally proposed by the late Chaim Herzog when he served as the first military governor of the West Bank immediately after the Six Day War.
He was opposed then by the National Religious Party which was destined to spawn the ideological core of Gush Emunim and other Jewish settlement movements.
Its rationale then too was that annexation would foster intermarriage.
It all boils down to the likelihood that the prospective election will give Netanyahu a chance to implement domestic reforms, especially in the economic and social spheres.
These should include a more equitable distribution of private income so as to reduce or (preferably) eliminate the phenomenon of so-called “tycoons” lording it over the rest of the economy, and reduction of the cost of new or suitable housing so that young couples will be able to afford it and the deterioration of overcrowded neighborhoods can be stopped.
The winner (presumably Netanyahu) also might be in a better position to rehabilitate the tens of thousands of Africans who entered Israel illegally in the past five years, by integrating as many of them as possible and facilitating the emigration or deportation of those who cannot adjust to Israeli society to alternative destinations elsewhere in the world. These steps certainly are preferable to letting them converge on neglected urban areas, especially south Tel Aviv, and turning them into crime-infested slums.
The writer is a veteran foreign correspondent.
Thursday, December 8, 2011
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN UNION: THE “1–2–7 STATES” VISION OF THE FUTURE
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN UNION: THE “1–2–7 STATES” VISION OF THE FUTURE
Israeli scholar Lev Grinberg starts from a critique of the one- and two-state solutions to suggest an alternative vision including elements of both. The proposed formula is an Israeli-Palestinian Union with different layers of state institutions: a shared administration based on parity representation located in the unified capital of Jerusalem, two separate democratic nation-states, and seven provinces (or federal states) belonging to one of the two nation-states. The author sees this “1–2–7 states” vision of the future as a way of containing the conflict in the absence of an ideal solution.
The Israeli-Palestinian Union: The "1-2-7 States" Vision of the Future, by Lev Grinberg
Thinking outside the box: Alternatives to the one- and two-state solutions
LEV GRINBERG
Emphasis is mine.
IMAGINATION IS A NECESSARY but insufficient precondition for political change. Equally crucial are the political capacity to negotiate and compromise, a relatively even balance of power, and the authority (and popular support) to implement agreements. In addition to a lack of any shared vision, all these elements were absent in the Israeli-Palestinian “peace process” of 1993–2000. Two charismatic leaders allegedly committed to the two-state solution, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat, failed to agree on borders, postponed negotiations, and neglected to take steps to start decolonization. Their failure, compounded by subsequent developments on the ground, critically jeopardized the two-state solution’s future chances of success. The one-state scenario on the other hand has not even reached the table. In light of the obstacles in the way of these two most commonly mentioned solutions, this essay suggests an alternative vision of how to contain the conflict in the absence of reaching a “solution.”
DEMOCRATIZATION, DECOLONIZATION, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Democratic political institutions are not designed to solve conflicts but to contain them through negotiations and legitimize the compromises made by the elites representing dominant and dominated groups. In the absence of agreed political institutions, violence becomes the basic expression of the conflict and a means to achieve goals. Dominant groups use state institutions to rule unilaterally, including by stepping up military repression, and dominated groups react by using violence aimed at achieving recognition of their leadership and claims.
Democracy is a specific set of institutions that developed in Europe in the nineteenth century as a result of increasing class conflict and the formation of nation-states. The two structural preconditions of democratization were a balance of power between dominant and dominated classes and a clear demarcation of borders (physical and symbolic) defining the potential citizenry. Without these preconditions, it is difficult to establish democratic institutions capable of containing conflicts, and without such institutions conflicts easily deteriorate into violence: civil wars, authoritarian regimes, or both. But while European states tended toward internal democracy, their expansion was at the same time based on disproportionate economic and military power relative to other regions of the world, and they used this power to impose nondemocratic institutions on these regions to rule them unilaterally. The struggle of the peoples dominated by Europe to gain recognition and inclusion in the polity could not be contained by these state institutions because they were imposed unilaterally by external colonial and imperial power.
With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the basic factors preventing its success were the power imbalance between the two parties and the inability to determine borders between the mutually influenced and penetrated Israeli and Palestinian political arenas. With regard to the latter, Israel’s own contradiction between democracy and colonialism—which it attempted to mask by way of a “dual democratic-military regime”—stands as a major obstacle. This dual regime, comprising a formal democracy within the 1949–67 borders and a military regime in the West Bank and Gaza, involves two separate struggles: a democratic struggle for equal rights within the sovereign and recognized borders of Israel and a struggle to end the occupation in the Palestinian territories.
In addition to the Israeli and Palestinian political arenas, there is also a third arena of interrelations—an Israeli-Palestinian political arena—that includes individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions of both communities. Indeed, the peace process itself was really an attempt to coordinate and synchronize the opening of these three political spaces. A key impediment to achieving this goal was the agreement under Oslo to start democratization (via Palestinian elections) combined with the decision to postpone the decolonization of the occupied territories (i.e., dismantle Jewish settlements, grant economic sovereignty to the Palestinians, and end military rule). A broader reason for the failure to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, then, was the complex interaction among the three political arenas, and this complexity will continue to be a crucial factor in the future. Two conclusions flow from this: Israeli power needs to be balanced by international intervention, and political institutions should be put in place that are able to contain conflicts by opening space for representation and mediation in these three political arenas.
To design the institutions necessary to contain the conflicts in the Israeli-Palestinian matrix, it is necessary to understand the specific tensions involved. This is a matter of institutional design requiring a new vision of the future. Whether or not the agreed institutions can be installed and consolidated depends on the political will of the elites and the popular support they can mobilize. It is true that the one- and two-state solutions are also visions of the future, but they do not sufficiently address the complexities of history and the Israeli/Palestinian societies’ present situation, nor do they account for the need to contain conflicts through facilitating institutions. In other words, neither provides for institutions that can work as containers of expected social conflicts.
THE TWO-STATE AND ONE-STATE SOLUTIONS
Until October 2000, the most popular vision for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was two separate nation-states. Since then, however, the one-state solution, understood as the promotion of one binational state, has been gaining popularity among Palestinian intellectuals due to the failure of the Oslo process. Neither of these solutions, in my view, is viable in the present reality, necessitating a search for a new formula, possibly one that combines elements of both.
The two-state solution is based on the European model of nation-states, whereas the one-state solution is based on the European model of liberal democracy. But as mentioned above, neither model reflects the current economic, political, cultural, and military realities in Israel/Palestine or offers any plausible transition from the current dual military-democratic regime. Moving toward either scenario from the present reality would at best create tensions while being incapable of containing the tensions and conflicts inevitable after their implementation.
The two-state model involves a return to the pre-1967 borders (with minimal agreed territorial exchanges) and the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza connected by a passage that traverses Israeli territory. This solution assumes both a recognized border separating both states and military forces capable of controlling these borders and protecting their respective citizens. But the demarcation of borders and their effective defense seem almost impossible given the mutual penetration of populations in this relatively small piece of land, not to mention other particularly intractable issues such as sovereignty over Jerusalem and the holy sites.
Democracy and security represent two additional major obstacles to the two-state model. With regard to the former, this solution assumes that Israel is the state of the Jews, yet some 18 percent of Israel’s citizens are Palestinians unwilling to accept their inferior status whatever agreements the PLO might sign. This means that the two-state solution maintains the national conflict within the borders of the Jewish state, which will be unable to contain it by the democratic means of equal representation. Security, meanwhile, is the primordial problem in Israeli discourse. The idea of an eternal and ahistorical insecurity, while rooted in the traumatic past of the Jews in Europe and the Holocaust, as well as in ancient religious texts, has been the national myth since 2000. Even before, a clear Israeli precondition in all negotiations has always been disarmament of the Palestinian state so as to rule out the possibility of any Palestinian military force capable of confronting the Israeli military. Moreover, given the unlikelihood that a Palestinian state could ever be allowed to attain real independence and sovereignty or autonomy, the Palestinian opposition would have good reason to continue violence against its powerful neighbor. In such a situation, it is not unreasonable to assume that after withdrawal from the occupied territories a revisionist Israeli political movement could win elections on a platform calling for the military reoccupation of the Palestinian state.
The one-state solution is ideologically opposed by most Israelis and, more importantly, by the Jewish state, which can easily obstruct it. Moreover, both national communities still prefer to remain autonomous, independent, and undetermined by the other, their lingering attachment to the two-state solution being based on the illusion that it will allow each to be rid of the other. Indeed, Palestinian advocates of the one-state solution sometimes seem to press the issue mainly to emphasize the antidemocratic nature of the Israeli military occupation and the Jewish state rather than with the aim of designing political institutions able to contain the conflict in the future.
The idea of one democratic liberal state can be very attractive in principle, but without conditions of deep mutual recognition between the two communities, formal democratic institutions cannot guarantee political stability. Instead of opening political space to new agendas in civil society common to Jews and Palestinians, the one-state solution, if implemented, could institutionalize their national mobilization against each other and neutralize potential space for shared interests. Indeed, in the charged mutual hostility characterizing Israeli-Palestinian relations, democracy itself could be a source of conflict, exacerbating the demographic race, strengthening mutual fears, and encouraging disputes over migration (the Palestinian right of return and the Jewish Law of Return). A democratic state without additional political institutions could only enhance the politicization of religion and the polarization of extremist ethno-national trends.
THE “1–2–7 STATES” ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN UNION VISION
Looking beyond the present impasse, a major effort of institutional design is required to invent political frameworks capable of containing inevitable conflicts by agreed-upon rules that produce representation and dialogue. These institutions must embody the positive aspects of both the one- and two-state solutions and overcome their obstacles. It is not my intention to enter into details about the specific institutions, which need to be worked out by research institutions and think tanks before being negotiated and implemented, but it would seem obvious that a system responding to the above criteria would involve some creative combination of consociation, confederation, and federative institutions.
The solution I propose is an Israeli-Palestinian Union (IPU), which would include one shared administration based on parity representation located in the unified capital of Jerusalem, two separate democratic nation-states, and a minimum of seven provinces (or federal states) that would be part of either nation-state and would enjoy relative autonomy. The vision of the “1–2–7” IPU is mainly based on my interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian triple matrix of relations, but it is also informed by models of the European Union (EU) and German federal institutions.
The separate governments of the two national states would administer everything that can be separated: land, education, health, police, local government, tourism, culture, religion, sports, and so on. The IPU government would administer everything that is indivisible: infrastructure, communications, water, energy, transportation, ecology, the sacred places, and Jerusalem. In contrast to the national states, where demographic changes would be democratically represented, the IPU institutions would be founded on the principles of parity and mutual veto. One of the main tasks of the IPU shared administration would be to erase the demographic fears fanned by democracy—namely, Jewish fears of the Palestinian right of return and Palestinian fears of Jewish immigration, territorial expansion, and displacement. During the early years, the IPU government would probably require the participation of an international body to mediate disagreements and foster compromise.
Two more complex issues are security and the economy: while violence would be the most likely factor to sabotage any political agreement, the second would probably be the economic gap between Israelis and Palestinians. These two areas would require the most creative efforts, supported by international institutions. With regard to security, it is highly improbable that a peaceful solution could survive without the total disarmament of all civilians, Jews and Palestinians, and the backing of a major international peace force, which would need to have a clearly defined mission, to protect Palestinians from Israeli military forces.
If the economic institutions are improperly designed and implemented, they could easily undermine political support for the agreements and ultimately derail the process. A major Israeli and Palestinian motivation in the initial peace negotiations was economic: Israelis wanted to participate in the globalized economy and Palestinians wanted stable jobs, investments, and growth. Ultimately, Israelis achieved their goals, but the Palestinians did not. Learning from earlier mistakes, all economic agreements would have to aim at closing the economic gap through state intervention and counterbalancing the power of Israeli technology, financial institutions, and industry. The dominant economic position of Israeli elites helps them benefit from “free markets,” whether these are “free trade zones” or “custom unions.” The economic arrangements of the IPU must therefore consciously work against a direct link between identity and material welfare, or an explosive situation could arise.
The economic policy must be designed to counterbalance economic gaps, mainly between Israel and Palestine, but also within each national community. This is one of the main goals of the IPU administration and the seven regional states, which would be designed according to salient economic gaps between areas of the IPU. The central administration would collect taxes and allocate them within an equalizing logic. The model I have in mind is the German federal financial system. The principle is that the IPU administration would collect progressive taxes according to the wealth of distinct areas and would later redistribute them according to the number of citizens in each state and their needs. The social security system would follow the same logic in relation to individuals and families. All these systems would have to be very well planned at the technical, professional, and administrative levels and would need the advice of international institutions.
The division of each nation-state into three or more regional states would have not only an economic equalizing goal but also a pluralistic and representative democratic logic. The various regional states could have very different cultural and religious preferences and complex community relations. The differences between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Gaza and Ramallah, are examples of these internal national differences. The IPU’s division into regional states, the establishment of local parliaments, democratic deliberations in each state, and even local legislation, could be expected to open space to multicultural and multireligious communities, which might be ignored, repressed, or misrecognized within the two dominant identities.
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
Throughout past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Israel has been consistently determined to avoid any third-party intervention (except that of the United States), believing that such involvement would support Palestinian claims. From this, I conclude that in order to reach an agreement, third-party mediation is precisely what should be done: without international intervention consciously aimed at balancing Israel’s power and reducing U.S. and EU military, economic, and political support, no fair and durable agreement can be achieved. In direct negotiations, no substantial Israeli compromise can be expected, and if Palestinian negotiators accept Israel’s conditions out of weakness and dependency, the implementation of the agreement will fail because other Palestinian actors will reject or sabotage it.
From 1992 to 2008 various U.S. administrations have supported the position of the Israeli moderates in the best case (Bill Clinton) or even converged with the most extremist Israeli government (George W. Bush). The only times when international intervention played a positive role in Israeli peace negotiations (notably by balancing Israel’s powerful position) were related not to Palestine but to the Arab states. The first time was in the 1978 Camp David negotiations between Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat under Jimmy Carter; the second was when George H.W. Bush forced the Israeli government to participate in the 1991 Madrid Conference. In both cases, the interventions directly influenced internal Israeli politics, empowering actors supporting peace and compromise. In the Israeli-Palestinian arena, the need for intervention is even greater and obviously depends on the international context, not only local developments.
Since Barack Obama was elected president of the United States in late 2008, expectations of U.S. pressure on the Israeli government to negotiate a peaceful agreement with the PLO have mounted. International pressure on Israel is indeed a necessary precondition to balance its power vis-à-vis the Palestinians. However, if the pressure is to implement the two-state solution, it will almost certainly fail and might even enhance the Israeli tendency to impose unacceptable conditions on the Palestinians and later blame them for any failure. This has been Israel’s strategy since 1947, refined during the Oslo negotiations for the two-state solution, and most dramatically following the Camp David summit in 2000.
The general goal of negotiations must not be to establish two states or one, but to abolish Jewish supremacy over all the land and build political institutions capable of containing expected tensions in the future in the three separate political arenas of Israel, Palestine, and Israel/Palestine. Obviously, such a major step cannot be made in the present violent situation of Israeli military domination, economic strangulation, and nonrecognition of the elected government in Gaza. An interim hudna (truce) must be reached to change this situation and facilitate creative and constructive negotiations. The fundamental elements of a hudna could serve as the point of entry into the occupied territories for an international peace force, which would allow freedom of movement and economic development for Palestinians and start the dismantlement of Jewish settlements. Only after a truce is signed and the Palestinians and Israelis begin to feel some relief and trust in the possibility of reconstruction can a new future be imagined. Only then can we start thinking about how to build our shared future in Israel/Palestine.
NOTES
1. For an expanded theoretical background of my interpretation of political institutions, conflict, and violence, see Lev L. Grinberg, Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine: Democracy versus Military Rule (London: Routledge, 2009).
2. Lev L. Grinberg, “Israel’s Dual Regime Since 1967,” MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies 3 (Spring 2008), pp. 59–80.
3.Dual regime is the basic concept; however, there are several specific forms of military domination in different areas. For example, conditions in East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip are very different from those in the West Bank. Each area is dominated differently.
4. For an interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian triple matrix of relations, see Lev L. Grinberg, “A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” International Review of Sociology 1 (1994), pp. 68–89.
5. Jamil Hilal, Where Now for Palestine? The Demise of the Two-State Solution (London: Zed Books, 2007).
6. For a discussion of the reasons for the failure of the peace talks, see Grinberg, Politics and Violence.
7.Israel’s recognition as a Jewish state has already been raised in the negotiations, see Ian Lustick, “Abandoning the Iron Wall: Israel and ‘The Middle Eastern Muck’,” Middle East Policy 15, no. 3 (Fall 2008), pp. 30–56.
8.This is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s main argument against Palestinian independence: we already withdrew from Gaza and the Palestinians reacted with Qassams. This is obviously a propaganda manipulation, but it is expected to work as a mobilizing nationalist argument in the future, including against Netanyahu if he signs a withdrawal agreement as a result of international pressure.
9. The number of federal states would depend on political negotiations and the criteria used by the negotiators to determine their borders. The seven I refer to are Jerusalem, Beersheba, al-Khalil/Hebron, Gaza, Haifa, Ramallah, and Yaffa-Tel Aviv, the capitals of the federal states I envisage. There could be up to fifteen federal states if the areas were further divided according to economic gaps, demographic composition, and geographic obstacles.
10. See Grinberg, Politics and Violence.
11. See Amira Hass, Drinking the Sea at Gaza: Days and Nights in a Land under Siege (London: H. Hamilton, 1999); Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East (New York: Vintage, 1999); Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
12. See Sara Roy, “Decline and Disfigurement: The Palestinian Economy after Oslo” in Roane Carey, ed., The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid (London: Verso, 2001); and Leila Farsakh, Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel: Labour, Land and Occupation (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).
13. See Lev L. Grinberg, “Economic Strangulation Ring: Three Turning Points in Forty Years of Economic-Military Control” [in Hebrew], Theory and Criticism 30 (2008).
14.Savir, The Process.
15. Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004).
16. Yoram Meital, Peace in Tatters: Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2005).
Israeli scholar Lev Grinberg starts from a critique of the one- and two-state solutions to suggest an alternative vision including elements of both. The proposed formula is an Israeli-Palestinian Union with different layers of state institutions: a shared administration based on parity representation located in the unified capital of Jerusalem, two separate democratic nation-states, and seven provinces (or federal states) belonging to one of the two nation-states. The author sees this “1–2–7 states” vision of the future as a way of containing the conflict in the absence of an ideal solution.
The Israeli-Palestinian Union: The "1-2-7 States" Vision of the Future, by Lev Grinberg
Thinking outside the box: Alternatives to the one- and two-state solutions
LEV GRINBERG
Emphasis is mine.
IMAGINATION IS A NECESSARY but insufficient precondition for political change. Equally crucial are the political capacity to negotiate and compromise, a relatively even balance of power, and the authority (and popular support) to implement agreements. In addition to a lack of any shared vision, all these elements were absent in the Israeli-Palestinian “peace process” of 1993–2000. Two charismatic leaders allegedly committed to the two-state solution, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat, failed to agree on borders, postponed negotiations, and neglected to take steps to start decolonization. Their failure, compounded by subsequent developments on the ground, critically jeopardized the two-state solution’s future chances of success. The one-state scenario on the other hand has not even reached the table. In light of the obstacles in the way of these two most commonly mentioned solutions, this essay suggests an alternative vision of how to contain the conflict in the absence of reaching a “solution.”
DEMOCRATIZATION, DECOLONIZATION, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Democratic political institutions are not designed to solve conflicts but to contain them through negotiations and legitimize the compromises made by the elites representing dominant and dominated groups. In the absence of agreed political institutions, violence becomes the basic expression of the conflict and a means to achieve goals. Dominant groups use state institutions to rule unilaterally, including by stepping up military repression, and dominated groups react by using violence aimed at achieving recognition of their leadership and claims.
Democracy is a specific set of institutions that developed in Europe in the nineteenth century as a result of increasing class conflict and the formation of nation-states. The two structural preconditions of democratization were a balance of power between dominant and dominated classes and a clear demarcation of borders (physical and symbolic) defining the potential citizenry. Without these preconditions, it is difficult to establish democratic institutions capable of containing conflicts, and without such institutions conflicts easily deteriorate into violence: civil wars, authoritarian regimes, or both. But while European states tended toward internal democracy, their expansion was at the same time based on disproportionate economic and military power relative to other regions of the world, and they used this power to impose nondemocratic institutions on these regions to rule them unilaterally. The struggle of the peoples dominated by Europe to gain recognition and inclusion in the polity could not be contained by these state institutions because they were imposed unilaterally by external colonial and imperial power.
With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the basic factors preventing its success were the power imbalance between the two parties and the inability to determine borders between the mutually influenced and penetrated Israeli and Palestinian political arenas. With regard to the latter, Israel’s own contradiction between democracy and colonialism—which it attempted to mask by way of a “dual democratic-military regime”—stands as a major obstacle. This dual regime, comprising a formal democracy within the 1949–67 borders and a military regime in the West Bank and Gaza, involves two separate struggles: a democratic struggle for equal rights within the sovereign and recognized borders of Israel and a struggle to end the occupation in the Palestinian territories.
In addition to the Israeli and Palestinian political arenas, there is also a third arena of interrelations—an Israeli-Palestinian political arena—that includes individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions of both communities. Indeed, the peace process itself was really an attempt to coordinate and synchronize the opening of these three political spaces. A key impediment to achieving this goal was the agreement under Oslo to start democratization (via Palestinian elections) combined with the decision to postpone the decolonization of the occupied territories (i.e., dismantle Jewish settlements, grant economic sovereignty to the Palestinians, and end military rule). A broader reason for the failure to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, then, was the complex interaction among the three political arenas, and this complexity will continue to be a crucial factor in the future. Two conclusions flow from this: Israeli power needs to be balanced by international intervention, and political institutions should be put in place that are able to contain conflicts by opening space for representation and mediation in these three political arenas.
To design the institutions necessary to contain the conflicts in the Israeli-Palestinian matrix, it is necessary to understand the specific tensions involved. This is a matter of institutional design requiring a new vision of the future. Whether or not the agreed institutions can be installed and consolidated depends on the political will of the elites and the popular support they can mobilize. It is true that the one- and two-state solutions are also visions of the future, but they do not sufficiently address the complexities of history and the Israeli/Palestinian societies’ present situation, nor do they account for the need to contain conflicts through facilitating institutions. In other words, neither provides for institutions that can work as containers of expected social conflicts.
THE TWO-STATE AND ONE-STATE SOLUTIONS
Until October 2000, the most popular vision for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was two separate nation-states. Since then, however, the one-state solution, understood as the promotion of one binational state, has been gaining popularity among Palestinian intellectuals due to the failure of the Oslo process. Neither of these solutions, in my view, is viable in the present reality, necessitating a search for a new formula, possibly one that combines elements of both.
The two-state solution is based on the European model of nation-states, whereas the one-state solution is based on the European model of liberal democracy. But as mentioned above, neither model reflects the current economic, political, cultural, and military realities in Israel/Palestine or offers any plausible transition from the current dual military-democratic regime. Moving toward either scenario from the present reality would at best create tensions while being incapable of containing the tensions and conflicts inevitable after their implementation.
The two-state model involves a return to the pre-1967 borders (with minimal agreed territorial exchanges) and the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza connected by a passage that traverses Israeli territory. This solution assumes both a recognized border separating both states and military forces capable of controlling these borders and protecting their respective citizens. But the demarcation of borders and their effective defense seem almost impossible given the mutual penetration of populations in this relatively small piece of land, not to mention other particularly intractable issues such as sovereignty over Jerusalem and the holy sites.
Democracy and security represent two additional major obstacles to the two-state model. With regard to the former, this solution assumes that Israel is the state of the Jews, yet some 18 percent of Israel’s citizens are Palestinians unwilling to accept their inferior status whatever agreements the PLO might sign. This means that the two-state solution maintains the national conflict within the borders of the Jewish state, which will be unable to contain it by the democratic means of equal representation. Security, meanwhile, is the primordial problem in Israeli discourse. The idea of an eternal and ahistorical insecurity, while rooted in the traumatic past of the Jews in Europe and the Holocaust, as well as in ancient religious texts, has been the national myth since 2000. Even before, a clear Israeli precondition in all negotiations has always been disarmament of the Palestinian state so as to rule out the possibility of any Palestinian military force capable of confronting the Israeli military. Moreover, given the unlikelihood that a Palestinian state could ever be allowed to attain real independence and sovereignty or autonomy, the Palestinian opposition would have good reason to continue violence against its powerful neighbor. In such a situation, it is not unreasonable to assume that after withdrawal from the occupied territories a revisionist Israeli political movement could win elections on a platform calling for the military reoccupation of the Palestinian state.
The one-state solution is ideologically opposed by most Israelis and, more importantly, by the Jewish state, which can easily obstruct it. Moreover, both national communities still prefer to remain autonomous, independent, and undetermined by the other, their lingering attachment to the two-state solution being based on the illusion that it will allow each to be rid of the other. Indeed, Palestinian advocates of the one-state solution sometimes seem to press the issue mainly to emphasize the antidemocratic nature of the Israeli military occupation and the Jewish state rather than with the aim of designing political institutions able to contain the conflict in the future.
The idea of one democratic liberal state can be very attractive in principle, but without conditions of deep mutual recognition between the two communities, formal democratic institutions cannot guarantee political stability. Instead of opening political space to new agendas in civil society common to Jews and Palestinians, the one-state solution, if implemented, could institutionalize their national mobilization against each other and neutralize potential space for shared interests. Indeed, in the charged mutual hostility characterizing Israeli-Palestinian relations, democracy itself could be a source of conflict, exacerbating the demographic race, strengthening mutual fears, and encouraging disputes over migration (the Palestinian right of return and the Jewish Law of Return). A democratic state without additional political institutions could only enhance the politicization of religion and the polarization of extremist ethno-national trends.
THE “1–2–7 STATES” ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN UNION VISION
Looking beyond the present impasse, a major effort of institutional design is required to invent political frameworks capable of containing inevitable conflicts by agreed-upon rules that produce representation and dialogue. These institutions must embody the positive aspects of both the one- and two-state solutions and overcome their obstacles. It is not my intention to enter into details about the specific institutions, which need to be worked out by research institutions and think tanks before being negotiated and implemented, but it would seem obvious that a system responding to the above criteria would involve some creative combination of consociation, confederation, and federative institutions.
The solution I propose is an Israeli-Palestinian Union (IPU), which would include one shared administration based on parity representation located in the unified capital of Jerusalem, two separate democratic nation-states, and a minimum of seven provinces (or federal states) that would be part of either nation-state and would enjoy relative autonomy. The vision of the “1–2–7” IPU is mainly based on my interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian triple matrix of relations, but it is also informed by models of the European Union (EU) and German federal institutions.
The separate governments of the two national states would administer everything that can be separated: land, education, health, police, local government, tourism, culture, religion, sports, and so on. The IPU government would administer everything that is indivisible: infrastructure, communications, water, energy, transportation, ecology, the sacred places, and Jerusalem. In contrast to the national states, where demographic changes would be democratically represented, the IPU institutions would be founded on the principles of parity and mutual veto. One of the main tasks of the IPU shared administration would be to erase the demographic fears fanned by democracy—namely, Jewish fears of the Palestinian right of return and Palestinian fears of Jewish immigration, territorial expansion, and displacement. During the early years, the IPU government would probably require the participation of an international body to mediate disagreements and foster compromise.
Two more complex issues are security and the economy: while violence would be the most likely factor to sabotage any political agreement, the second would probably be the economic gap between Israelis and Palestinians. These two areas would require the most creative efforts, supported by international institutions. With regard to security, it is highly improbable that a peaceful solution could survive without the total disarmament of all civilians, Jews and Palestinians, and the backing of a major international peace force, which would need to have a clearly defined mission, to protect Palestinians from Israeli military forces.
If the economic institutions are improperly designed and implemented, they could easily undermine political support for the agreements and ultimately derail the process. A major Israeli and Palestinian motivation in the initial peace negotiations was economic: Israelis wanted to participate in the globalized economy and Palestinians wanted stable jobs, investments, and growth. Ultimately, Israelis achieved their goals, but the Palestinians did not. Learning from earlier mistakes, all economic agreements would have to aim at closing the economic gap through state intervention and counterbalancing the power of Israeli technology, financial institutions, and industry. The dominant economic position of Israeli elites helps them benefit from “free markets,” whether these are “free trade zones” or “custom unions.” The economic arrangements of the IPU must therefore consciously work against a direct link between identity and material welfare, or an explosive situation could arise.
The economic policy must be designed to counterbalance economic gaps, mainly between Israel and Palestine, but also within each national community. This is one of the main goals of the IPU administration and the seven regional states, which would be designed according to salient economic gaps between areas of the IPU. The central administration would collect taxes and allocate them within an equalizing logic. The model I have in mind is the German federal financial system. The principle is that the IPU administration would collect progressive taxes according to the wealth of distinct areas and would later redistribute them according to the number of citizens in each state and their needs. The social security system would follow the same logic in relation to individuals and families. All these systems would have to be very well planned at the technical, professional, and administrative levels and would need the advice of international institutions.
The division of each nation-state into three or more regional states would have not only an economic equalizing goal but also a pluralistic and representative democratic logic. The various regional states could have very different cultural and religious preferences and complex community relations. The differences between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Gaza and Ramallah, are examples of these internal national differences. The IPU’s division into regional states, the establishment of local parliaments, democratic deliberations in each state, and even local legislation, could be expected to open space to multicultural and multireligious communities, which might be ignored, repressed, or misrecognized within the two dominant identities.
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
Throughout past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Israel has been consistently determined to avoid any third-party intervention (except that of the United States), believing that such involvement would support Palestinian claims. From this, I conclude that in order to reach an agreement, third-party mediation is precisely what should be done: without international intervention consciously aimed at balancing Israel’s power and reducing U.S. and EU military, economic, and political support, no fair and durable agreement can be achieved. In direct negotiations, no substantial Israeli compromise can be expected, and if Palestinian negotiators accept Israel’s conditions out of weakness and dependency, the implementation of the agreement will fail because other Palestinian actors will reject or sabotage it.
From 1992 to 2008 various U.S. administrations have supported the position of the Israeli moderates in the best case (Bill Clinton) or even converged with the most extremist Israeli government (George W. Bush). The only times when international intervention played a positive role in Israeli peace negotiations (notably by balancing Israel’s powerful position) were related not to Palestine but to the Arab states. The first time was in the 1978 Camp David negotiations between Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat under Jimmy Carter; the second was when George H.W. Bush forced the Israeli government to participate in the 1991 Madrid Conference. In both cases, the interventions directly influenced internal Israeli politics, empowering actors supporting peace and compromise. In the Israeli-Palestinian arena, the need for intervention is even greater and obviously depends on the international context, not only local developments.
Since Barack Obama was elected president of the United States in late 2008, expectations of U.S. pressure on the Israeli government to negotiate a peaceful agreement with the PLO have mounted. International pressure on Israel is indeed a necessary precondition to balance its power vis-à-vis the Palestinians. However, if the pressure is to implement the two-state solution, it will almost certainly fail and might even enhance the Israeli tendency to impose unacceptable conditions on the Palestinians and later blame them for any failure. This has been Israel’s strategy since 1947, refined during the Oslo negotiations for the two-state solution, and most dramatically following the Camp David summit in 2000.
The general goal of negotiations must not be to establish two states or one, but to abolish Jewish supremacy over all the land and build political institutions capable of containing expected tensions in the future in the three separate political arenas of Israel, Palestine, and Israel/Palestine. Obviously, such a major step cannot be made in the present violent situation of Israeli military domination, economic strangulation, and nonrecognition of the elected government in Gaza. An interim hudna (truce) must be reached to change this situation and facilitate creative and constructive negotiations. The fundamental elements of a hudna could serve as the point of entry into the occupied territories for an international peace force, which would allow freedom of movement and economic development for Palestinians and start the dismantlement of Jewish settlements. Only after a truce is signed and the Palestinians and Israelis begin to feel some relief and trust in the possibility of reconstruction can a new future be imagined. Only then can we start thinking about how to build our shared future in Israel/Palestine.
NOTES
1. For an expanded theoretical background of my interpretation of political institutions, conflict, and violence, see Lev L. Grinberg, Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine: Democracy versus Military Rule (London: Routledge, 2009).
2. Lev L. Grinberg, “Israel’s Dual Regime Since 1967,” MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies 3 (Spring 2008), pp. 59–80.
3.Dual regime is the basic concept; however, there are several specific forms of military domination in different areas. For example, conditions in East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip are very different from those in the West Bank. Each area is dominated differently.
4. For an interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian triple matrix of relations, see Lev L. Grinberg, “A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” International Review of Sociology 1 (1994), pp. 68–89.
5. Jamil Hilal, Where Now for Palestine? The Demise of the Two-State Solution (London: Zed Books, 2007).
6. For a discussion of the reasons for the failure of the peace talks, see Grinberg, Politics and Violence.
7.Israel’s recognition as a Jewish state has already been raised in the negotiations, see Ian Lustick, “Abandoning the Iron Wall: Israel and ‘The Middle Eastern Muck’,” Middle East Policy 15, no. 3 (Fall 2008), pp. 30–56.
8.This is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s main argument against Palestinian independence: we already withdrew from Gaza and the Palestinians reacted with Qassams. This is obviously a propaganda manipulation, but it is expected to work as a mobilizing nationalist argument in the future, including against Netanyahu if he signs a withdrawal agreement as a result of international pressure.
9. The number of federal states would depend on political negotiations and the criteria used by the negotiators to determine their borders. The seven I refer to are Jerusalem, Beersheba, al-Khalil/Hebron, Gaza, Haifa, Ramallah, and Yaffa-Tel Aviv, the capitals of the federal states I envisage. There could be up to fifteen federal states if the areas were further divided according to economic gaps, demographic composition, and geographic obstacles.
10. See Grinberg, Politics and Violence.
11. See Amira Hass, Drinking the Sea at Gaza: Days and Nights in a Land under Siege (London: H. Hamilton, 1999); Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East (New York: Vintage, 1999); Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
12. See Sara Roy, “Decline and Disfigurement: The Palestinian Economy after Oslo” in Roane Carey, ed., The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid (London: Verso, 2001); and Leila Farsakh, Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel: Labour, Land and Occupation (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).
13. See Lev L. Grinberg, “Economic Strangulation Ring: Three Turning Points in Forty Years of Economic-Military Control” [in Hebrew], Theory and Criticism 30 (2008).
14.Savir, The Process.
15. Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004).
16. Yoram Meital, Peace in Tatters: Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2005).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)

