Saturday, October 27, 2012

My plan at Best Plans


Federation
of Israel-Palestine
تحالف فلسطين-إسرائيل
ברית ישראל-פלסטין

The Federation of Israel-Palestine Plan published and presented at The Best Plans project, in 2011.



The 3-4-2 in 1 Federation of Israel-Palestine 

Three states for two peoples in one land




Our conflict is unique
Never in history a people claimed to return from Exile - where it lived as a stranger in autonomous communities, ruled everywhere in the world by the same rabbinic laws - to its historical land after 2000 years, while an other people claims the land as its one, because he is the native, the indigenous people born from this same land!
A unique conflict needs a unique solution: a special kind of federation

Three principles
Our conflict will be solved if we follow these three principles:
- recognition by each side of the other as an independent people, a nation which as a right of self-determination in the same Land.
- recognition by each people of the historical right of return of the other people
- recognition of one – and only one - common Sovereign on the undivided Land: the rule of Law and universal Justice


I. The model proposed

Concrete political realization
How do we achieve a concrete political realization of those principles?

We need two states because we are two peoples, we are two nations, and we don't want to loose our independence and our identity, we don't want to merge into one nation.
Jewish identity, in particular, limits absorption of others and resists to assimilation to others. This his connected to its long survival in exile as a minority among host peoples.

But we need one state because we have one only land. We can't be separated:
-          because we are geographically so mixed with each other
-          because we can't have two sovereignties and two national armies face to face in this small country

That is why we have reached the conclusion that the only solution left is nor separating nor merging, but entering a unique kind of Federal Alliance


This unique conflict needs a unique solution, with a unique structure:
The formula is: not a One State, not a Two State Solution, but a combination of both, a Three States for Two Peoples in One Land Solution. What does it mean? The three states are two states in one, two non-territorial nation-states federated in one supranational federation, which is sovereign on the Land, from River to Sea.

The specific logic for this federation is simple: if you want to have two independent nations in the same federal framework, the federation has to be supranational; if you want to eliminate the demographic problem without territorial partition, and without the risk of a future secession, you need to separate national identity from territory. This is achieved by having national laws applying only on individual citizens or communities, and not on the territory. So the national identity will be formed by Law, not by Land.
This non-territorial character of the national states will help preventing any future nationalist fight for the Land.

One supranational federation
The federal state is defined as supranational. What does it means? It means that it is sovereign and arching over several nations. It means that the territory belongs to the Federation, not to the nation-states.
Europe is a kind of supranational confederation; USSR was a supranational federation of national republics.
Why the federal state should be supranational? To prevent the two federated national states being forced to become one nation.
The federal constitution will protect the independence of each people; a just sharing of natural resources between both constituent people and the full respect of the Human Rights by the different Authorities, mutual right of Return, a joint defense of outer borders by the federal army, etc...

Abrahamic traditions
The EU and USSR have not really succeeded to become or maintain a supranational federation. How could we succeed?
Because of our common abrahamic traditions. Our federal model is a secular translation of the common Abrahamic beliefs of Judaism and Islam: the real sovereign is the Sovereign of the World, to him only the Land belongs – He gives it to who pleases Him.
The EU and USSR have not succeeded because that in their Christian cultural background those concepts were spiritualized in pure religion, while Judaism and Islam have kept alive their political meaning.

Federal institutions of government

The federal state includes a federal joint government and parliament. They are elected by all the federal citizens in order for them to be committed to the general interest of the federation.
Each nation has a right of veto. An upper chamber of lords arbitrate in case of stalemate.
Small ethnic groups or communities not affiliated with the two main Nations could send a few delegates to the Federal Parliament in order for their voice to be heard.
Ministers and deputy ministers, the Prime Minister and the President, could rotate every two years in order to allow a fair representation of Israelis and Palestinians.
Will fall under the responsibility of the federal government all domains managed as a whole, like: foreign policy, defense, environment, general means of communication, energy and information networks.
Foreign policy should have to be neutral, and both national states shall be forbidden to enter foreign alliances.

Two non-territorial national states
The two national states are non-territorial. What does it means? It means that the states of Israel and Palestine rule on their own citizens personally, not on the territory.
Every citizen enjoy personal autonomy; so one may live wherever he wants, and yet vote for his own national parliament
Why the national states should be non-territorial?
-          to allow freedom of movement and residency
-          to prevent any future risk of territorial conflict or partition
The national parliaments, governments and institutions of both people rule on their national citizens in autonomous regional districts.

National institutions of government

They include: two national parliaments, two national governments.

Regional and local councils

Each national state shall be largely decentralized, itself a federation of communities and districts which enjoy broad juridical, judicial and administrative autonomy, according to principles of communal democracy and democratic self-government.

No more demographic problem:
In a unitary state, there is a demographical problem because peoples are forced to fuse into only one nation. But here are living two nations, and we have to solve this problem.
The federal parliament, government and institutions will be paritary, 50%-50% Jewish/Arab, whatever the demography, so the demographic problem will have disappeared.

Citizenship
Each inhabitant will have a double citizenship, a national one - Palestinian or Israeli - and a federal one, common to all, like in the European model: his own national citizenship which guarantees his national identity, and a common federal citizenship which guarantees equality and on the basis of the universal principles of Law and Justice.
Every federal citizen shall swear loyalty to the constitutional State, which means that he recognizes the other people's national independence.
Mixed couples could choose to which Nation-State they want to be attached. There could be a possibility to have federal citizenship alone, to be a kind of world citizen before time.

Right of Return

The Right of Return of Palestinian refugees and the Israeli Law of Return are implemented by the respective national governments in the administrative districts under their jurisdiction. They are a fundamental part of the Constitution and shall be both fully respected.
The national governments and communal administrations absorbing their nationals and members shall apply their own selection criteria, free of any federal control, and shall be responsible for their proper integration in the regional districts under their responsibility.
Once granted national citizenship, the immigrant shall receive its federal citizenship after a ceremonial swearing of allegiance to the Covenant.

Compensations for lost of property

Palestinians and Jews who have been evicted from their land, home, or any property because of the conflict, shall be compensated and will have pre-emption rights in case their property is being sold or rented.
The refugee camps shall be dismantled or rehabilitated. UNRWA administration will be terminated.
Old destroyed Palestinian villages could be rebuilt – when possible

Settlements

Existing settlements will remain, provided suitable compensation to private owners. New Palestinian and Israeli settlements could be created in their respective districts by their own national government, without any federal control.
In open federal districts could be built new Jewish, Palestinian or mixed settlements on a fair basis by decision of the proper federal authorities.

Jerusalem/Al-Quds will remain opened and united as a distinct federal district, capital of Israel-Palestine and capital of the two nation-states. It will be placed under the Federal government exclusively.
Jews and Arabs will be free to live anywhere in the town.
The federal municipality will be decentralized; it will coordinate the activities of various sub-municipalities and will harmonize their development.
Mixed towns and lands not included in the national districts will be like Jerusalem, federal districts directly under federal jurisdiction, a cement of unity.

Security: joint federal Forces of Defense and Federal Police protect the Federation from external foes and internal extremists.
The direction of the federal Army will be transferred progressively from Israeli command to a joint paritary one, as soon as a comprehensive peace with neighboring Arab and Muslim states will be signed.

Jurisdictions

A Federal Constitutional Court would take decisions as to the conformity of the federal laws with the Constitution, and as to the constitutionality and legality of other regulations and general and self-management acts. It would also be called upon to resolve disputes between the Federation and other territorial units, in particular, conflicts of jurisdiction as between the courts and other bodies of territorial units
The nation-states and their various communities will enjoy judicial autonomy.
Rabbinic and sharia' tribunals shall have extended and recognized jurisdiction on the community who choose to abide by their legislation.

Economy

Both Israeli and Palestinian economies will be integrated and will complete each other; total freedom of movement for workers and goods shall be guarantied.
The federation shall guaranty of a decent minimum subsistence to every inhabitant. A special tax shall be consecrated to fight poverty.
The Federation shall operate one federal Central Bank and shall have a common currency.

Health and Social protection

Health, social protection, and every matter of human rights in general shall be the responsibility of the federal state.
The Federation will provide a federal health system for all.

Culture and Education

Cultural and educational independence are provided for each nation and community.
A common core program of education shall include the study of the language and culture of the other nation, English and Sciences.
Official languages:  Arabic for the Palestinian state; Hebrew for the Palestinian state, and both Arabic and Hebrew shall be the Official languages of the Federation.

II. The road map to get there

Extremists are neutralized: The Federation is the final status itself.
- no need for negotiations about dividing the land, dividing Jerusalem, refugees, security, settlements, water, etc.
- no dependence on mediation by any international facilitator.
No negotiations means that no one will have the opportunity to torpedo them.
We the people at the bottom will decide by free elections, and that is enough. Reliance upon a democratic process empowers the moderate majority; extremists were the main obstacle to the Two-State Solution, now they are out of the game.

An answer to religious fundamentalism:
The Supranational Federation will attract moderate religious of both sides, which will lead to a weakening of the extremists. Supranational Sovereignty will be understood by believers as a starting recognition of the Sovereignty of God, the Sovereign of the World,
رب العلمين, ריבונו של עולם. Federal ownership of the Land and Jerusalem will mean: the Land belongs to our common Lord.
The personal autonomy, which results from national law applying on the citizens themselves and not on territory is similar to our traditional Halacha and Sharia'. They will have the same structure – non-territoriality and an external Sovereign - but not the same content. The gap between secular law of the state and religious law will be narrowed.
Having to vote for the Federation will put believer to a test: do you really believe in the One God, or are you a Nationalist disguised in religious? We have freed Religion from Nationalism! Their connection was the main obstacle to any political solution.

Flexible implementation
The implementation of the federal structure is flexible, and can adapt itself to different scenarios in case a two-state solution or a one-state solution is first implemented, willingly or not.
The federal solution does not contradict the two-state solution: the federation would appear never the less to be necessary in order to allow the borders between the two countries to stay opened, and its ability to institutionalize cooperation would be more than welcome.
It is true whether Israel would proceed to a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank, or a negotiated solution would be implemented first -against all odds - in the narrow time window still left.
In case of a single unitary state - probably resulting from an Israeli annexation of the Occupied Territories - the federal structure will allow to solve the demographic and identity problem, while granting administrative autonomy to both peoples on an equal basis, transforming occupation in a true cooperation.

Movement of Palestinian and Israeli Activists for the Federal State
First we have to develop our movement of Activists for the Federal State of Israel-Palestine (www.pa-il.org) into a large association with several branches in Israel, Gaza, and in the West-Bank.
The movement acts according to the same constitutional principles like the Federation itself - Respect, Reciprocity and Justice. The spirit of respectful cooperation in view of the same aim that prevails in this group will be pivotal in building confidence between the two peoples.
This process can be implemented slowly, with your help, step by step: individual after individual, community after community, Israeli Arabs and Jews, Palestinians from East Jerusalem, the WB and Gaza, will sign the Federal Covenant Charter. The federal alliance will grow progressively, on a willing basis. Internationals from all over the world will join to as supporting members. They already joined our two growing Facebook groups: http://www.facebook.com/groups/federip/ and http://www.facebook.com/groups/israelpalestine/

Israeli-Palestinian Federalist Party
Then we will create a common Federalist Party, with Israeli and Palestinian branches. It will run for municipal elections for "Jerusalem our Federal capital", then for national elections in Israel and in Palestine.
As soon as there is a majority for the Party, the elections or a referendum will have performed a quiet revolution.
In case that such a Federalist Party, or free elections, will not be allowed, a popular revolution would have to do the change. It would be our Israeli-Palestinian Spring!

Like the conflict itself, this solution has no real precedent, but will become a living reality… with your help!

Thursday, October 25, 2012

איך מקימים מפלגה

הכללים להקמת מפלגה חדשה במדינת ישראל קבועים בחוק המפלגות

אנחנו מקימים מפלגה פדרלית - ברית ישראל-פלסטין - איך עושים זאת?

כדי לרוץ לכנסת, אנחנו צריכים:


 חוק המפלגות
נחקק ב- 1992 וקובע כי מפלגה הרוצה להתמודד בבחירות לכנסת צריכה להירשם כחוק אצל רשם המפלגות. כמו כן אוסר חוק המפלגות על רישום מפלגות שמטרתן, בגלוי או במשתמע, לעשות פעילויות לא חוקיות, להסית לגזענות, להטיף לשלילת קיומה של מדינת ישראל כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית או לתמוך במדינת אויב או ארגון טרור הפועל נגד מדינת ישראל., ואלה עיקרם:

 מפלגה יכולה להכיל עד מאה חברים, על כולם להיות אזרחי ישראל. חברים אלה רשאים להתאגד ולרשום בפנקס המפלגות את מפלגתם חדשה. לרוב מפלגה סובבת סביב דעה, דרך חיים או אמירה המשותפת לכל האנשים האלו.

 את הבקשה לאישור ורישום מפלגה יש להגיש לרשם המפלגות בצורה מסודרת רשמית, הכוללת את שם המפלגה, מטרותיה, ובנוסף את השם, מספר הזהות, שנת הלידה, הכתובת והעיסוק של כל אחד מחבריה.

 רישום המפלגה עולה כ-1,800 ₪ ויש לצרף לכך אישור על תשלום הוצאות פרסום בגובה כ-70 אלף ₪.

כדי להקים מפלגה אתם צריכים 100 חתימות של אזרחים, מאומתות ע"י עורך-דין. כל אימות של חתימה אצל עו"ד עולה 160 ש"ח (שכר-טרחה לעו"ד). כלומר - אתם צריכים לפחות 16000 ש"ח, אלא-אם-כן אתם מכירים עו"ד שמוכן לעשות את זה בהתנדבות...

 רשם המפלגות בודק האם ניתן לאשר את המפלגה, או שמא יש לפסול אותה. מפלגה תיפסל במקרים הבאים:
- אם במטרותיה עלולה להתפרש שלילת קיומה של ישראל כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית
- אם יש בפעולותיה הסתה  לגזענות, תמיכה במדינה אויבת או ארגון טרור
- אם יש חשש לכך שהיא משמשת באופן סמוי לפעילויות לא חוקיות

 אם אישר הרשם את המפלגה, הרי שנוצרה מפלגה חדשה וכל אזרח ישראלי מעל גיל 18 רשאי להצטרף אליה.

 כל מפלגה רשאית להגיש את מועמדותה בבחירות לכנסת, על ידי הגשה של רשימת מועמדים מטעמה לאישור ועדת הבחירות המרכזית. מפלגה לא חייבת להתמודד בבחירות, אם כי רוב המפלגות קמות על מנת לנסות להיבחר לכנסת.


Thursday, October 18, 2012

A 1931 Zionist Proposal for a Federal State in Palestine

A 1931 Zionist Proposal for a Federal State in Palestine

Rather than listen to Bibi's speech about his vision for an emasculated Palestinian quasi-"state" (maybe), I thought that I would tell my readers of a bold plan for a federal state proposed by an important Zionist leader of the Yishuv in 1931. This is dedicated to those of you who think that the Zionists believed that the Balfour Declaration guaranteed the Jews an independent state.

I. General Prologue…It is important to determine just relations between Jews and Arabs that are not dependent upon the relation of a majority and a minority. The regime in the country must in all periods ensure both to Jews and Arabs the possibility of undisturbed development and full national sovereignty, such that in no period will there arise the rule of Arabs over Jews or Jews over Arabs. The regime must also aid rapprochement, agreement, and joint action between the Jewish people and the Arabs in the Land of Israel.
[…]

V. The changes during the third period.

When the building of the National Home is complete, the Mandate will expire. A national constitution will be determined in a Founding Assembly that will be called by the High Commissioner and will be approved by the Mandate Government and the League of Nations. In place of the High Commissioner, an Emissary of England will remain in the country as an agent for the League of Nations, whose authority will be that of a General Governour in British dominions. Of the powers of the High Commissioner, the only thing that will remain will be the guardianship over the Holy Places in the country.

The municipal government will be free of all external supervision, and will possess independent authority by virtue of the constitution to be ratified. The autonomous provinces will become cantons that are entirely independent with authority granted by the constitution to be ratified.

The Land of Israel will become a Federal State whose governing bodies will consist of

1. The municipal government in the city and village which will be self-governing.

2. The cantons will constitute autonomous states in the Federal Country of the Land of Israel. Each contiguous settlement of no less than 25,000 people will be able to organize into a free canton. Each canton can arrange its own constitution. […]

3. The National Autonomy will have absolute authority in all matters of education, culture, language, in the framework of the constitution to be approved by the Founding Assembly. Religious matters will be handed over to autonomous religious communities which will be organized as voluntary associations, ratified by law.

4. The Council of the Federal Alliance, which will be composed of two houses:

    a. The House of the Peoples, in which Jews and Arabs will participate in equal numbers.

    b. The House of the Inhabitants, in which the delegates of the cantons will participate in proportion to their respective populations therein.
Every federal law and every change in the federal constitution will be ratified only with the approval of both houses.

[…] Arabic and Hebrew will be completely equal in all their rights throughout the Land of Israel and in all its institutions […] The international status of the State of the Land of Israel will be determined by a reciprocal agreement of the Council of the Federal Alliance from one side, and the Mandate government and the League of Nations on the other.

And who was this Zionist leader, who, four years after the formation of the Brit Shalom of Buber and Simon, proposed his own vision of a binational state?

None other than David Ben Gurion, writing in HaPoel haTza'ir , May 20 1931. The text is from the a Hebrew book published in 2008, entitled "Brit Shalom" and Binationalist Zionism: The Arab Question as a Jewish Question, ed. Adi Gordon (Carmel), pp. 311-12. Ben-Gurion's proposal certainly gave the Palestinian Arabs as much national rights as it did the Jews. In fact, his proposal gave much more rights to the Arabs than did the Adalah Proposal of several years ago.

Which just goes to show how easy it is to offer power-sharing when you have no power yourself; or binationalism, when you are a tiny minority.

Dan Goldenblatt - Transcend the two-state solution, create a federated state



By Dan Goldenblatt

For years now, the Israeli government has been involved in duplicity: it says it is preparing to turn over Area C to the Palestinians, as mandated by the 1993 Oslo Accords. On the other hand, Israel is making plans to expand settlements in that same area. Though a growing number of Israelis have clung to the Oslo Accords because of its promise of a sustainable Jewish demographic majority, it has become clear that Israeli government have not shared the same concern.

Though difficult, depressing and for some even tragic, the Oslo promise has been a failure. It is time to start seriously considering alternative strategies for reaching a just solution to the Jewish-Arab/Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is an urgent need for deep introspection, because in clinging to the separation paradigm of Oslo we are also maintaining the false perception of a peace process. But since that process has been failing continuously for 21 years, at this point, it mainly ensures that the occupation will not end.

The Israeli government’s strategy and actions on the ground speak louder than any of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speeches. The international community needs to come to terms with a reality of a permanent occupation regime which the Israeli government is willing to maintain indefinitely. With one path towards a peaceful resolution to this situation now all but closed, we must make room for a new one.

Those of us who believe in and care about the possibility of a just resolution of the conflict must do several things: First, we must express vocal, active and unrelenting objection to the status quo. As human beings we cannot accept a situation whereby more than two million Palestinians are permanently denied human and political rights through a military regime. Every one of our actions, activities, energies and funds must be examined through the filter of whether or not it contributes to the end of the status quo. If it does not, then such actions are acquiescing to the Israeli occupation, should be labeled as normalization and condemned as such.

Second, we need to start a deep examination of the federal or confederate solution for Eretz Israel/Falastin (I use this spelling, as a Palestinian term, in Arabic – as equivalent to “Eretz Israel” in Hebrew). By this I mean a solution that includes two political entities (two states), a Jewish one and a Palestinian one, within a single geographical space.

For true supporters and lovers of Israel, who support the right of Jews to live safely in Eretz Israel/Falastin, but who are concerned about being labeled anti-Semites, I suggest the following two fold message: the first part calls for an immediate end to the status quo/occupation; the second part involves the inalienable commitment to a safe, secure, vibrant and eternal existence of Jews in the region. The “only” thing that Israel is going to have to forgo is its exclusivity over the land. Once it does this it will have the strong commitment and backing of the international community to its safety. And Israel will not have to rely only on the international community for its safety. It is not far fetched to assume that if the Palestinians are made a just and fair offer of a federal or confederate arrangement with Israel, they would agree to Israel maintaining responsibility for external security, say for the coming century. I have even heard Palestinians saying that they would welcome the Israeli army defending their external borders as well.

With the end to the solution based on two separate states, all immediate efforts, energies and funding must be directed towards determining the best way to have two states in one geographical space. Either a federal or a confederate arrangement needs to be devised. This is no easy matter. The Israeli GDP per capita is 10 times higher than the Palestinian GDP. The two entities will have to put aside 100 years of hostilities, address the problems of resources and their division and agree on the question of Palestinian and Jewish immigration, as well as Jerusalem and other issues. However, there is also a deep mutual acquaintance of the two people and an extremely important bridging role for the Palestinian Arab Israelis.

The bottom line is that both people are too attached to the parts of the land they would have to concede in the solution based on two separate states. Jews cannot give up access to the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and other places in Judea and Samaria; Palestinians cannot give up access to the holy places in Nazareth and Jerusalem, let alone the sea. Failing to account for this is, in my opinion, the one of the main flaws of the Oslo Accords. The problem can be remedied by a federal or confederate arrangement, which would allow access of each citizen to the entire geographical space. Though anything but simple, a federal or confederate solution can transcend major problems.

In the business world, failed strategies are replaced. Two decades of a failed peace process are more than enough reason for Israelis and Palestinians to replace the solution of two separate states. The new strategy is one that enables us to share Eretz Israel/Falestin for the benefit of us all. There is so much to gain.

Dan Goldenblatt is the Israeli co-CEO of the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information.

Tuesday, May 15, 2012

One state, two state, three state, four

BY Michael Omer-Man, a journalist based in Jaffa, Israel, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a particular interest in grassroots initiatives on both sides. He has an academic background in conflict resolution.
http://www.facebook.com/omerman


This is a very interesting and comprehensive article exploring alternatives to the two-state solution.
However it is unclear on the distinction between federation and confederation. This results in confusions between internal state borders and mere limits of national districts, for example.

Omer-Man discusses too the parallel states model, although it seems unrealistic:  what happens to the sovereignty of two overlapping states having the same territory?
The interesting point in this model is the decoupling of  sovereignty  from territory, which nullify the demographic threat.

At the light of those descriptions, my model can be defined as a mix of federation, one-state and " parallel states ": it decouples the nation-states from territory, as the whole territory is under exclusive federal sovereignty; the nation-states rule on their respective citizens, and geographic demography gives their autonomy a territorial basis: regionally in administrative districts where the population is nationally homogeneous, locally in interspersed areas.
There are three level of administration with different competences: local, national and federal. Laws are the same for all at the local and federal levels; they keep a different national or religious coloration at the national level.

Emphasis is mine


One state, two state, three state, four – Part I

More than two decades since the start of the peace process, the two-state solution has become the only acceptable path for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in contemporary discourse. But while the two-state solution may be the only one currently sitting on the table, many others continue to linger around it, waiting for someone to pick them up. The most recent such attempt was the One State Conference held at Harvard University earlier this month, promoting the idea of one liberal state for both Israelis and Palestinians.

The conference was derided by all colors of Israelis and American Zionists as “delegitimizing” Israel. Discussing a one-state solution, some said, “is a euphemism for ending the existence of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.”

The likes of World Jewish Congress Secretary-General Dan Diker, along with various Israeli and world Jewish leaders, dismissed the conference as "anti-Semitic theater." Jerusalem Post columnist Martin Sherman, though decrying the two-state principle as "the source of [Israel’s] de-legitimization," wrote that allowing others - presumably non-Israelis - to lead the discussion about a one-state solution would "invite a new Pearl Harbor."

But while the international mainstream discourse discounts the legitimacy of anything other than the two-state solution, many within Israeli society are pushing back against that notion and openly discussing alternatives. Almost two years before the conference at Harvard, a member of Knesset from the Israeli government’s ruling party lamented: "The taboo that forbids talk about any option other than the two-state solution is almost anti-democratic. It's like brain-gagging."

Accusing both the Right and Left of disillusionment, or at best of having disconnected views of the land they live in, Likud MK Tzipi Hotovely told Haaretz that unlike others, she "do[es] not ignore the fact that there are Palestinians here. Both the Left and the Right choose to shut their eyes to the fact that there are human beings here."

However, Hotovely and a small but growing number of right-wing Israelis who advocate a one-state solution do not share the same vision of the future as those who gathered in Cambridge this month. Unlike the Israeli far-right, the one-state solution advocated by left-leaning Palestinians, Israelis and others is a vision based on the liberal concept of a state of all its citizens.

Hotovely and others, including former Yesha Council head and Netanyahu bureau chief Uri Elitzur, do recognize a moral and political imperative to grant full inclusion in the Jewish state to (most) Palestinians currently residing west of the Jordan River. The main difference between them and views aired at the Harvard conference is that they stop short of giving Palestinians any ownership in that state.

"I want it to be clear that I do not recognize national rights of Palestinians in the Land of Israel. I recognize their human rights and their individual rights, and also their individual political rights - but between the sea and the Jordan there is room for one state, a Jewish state," Hotovely told Haaretz.

While the left-wing, liberal one-state camp may actually stand closer to the more mainstream two-state camp in its recognition of Palestinian national-political rights, right-wingers like Hotovely, Elitzur and even Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin all have a vision that is closer functionally to that expressed by hundreds at the Harvard conference - one state for both Jews and Palestinians.

But those differences are large enough to keep the two discussions separate for the time being.

Although Israeli politicians like Hotovely and Rivlin would not likely be welcomed at the Harvard conference, perhaps it is time Israelis start listening to them -- if for no other reason than to begin openly discussing alternatives to the long-stalled two-state solution. If no fresh and creative thinking is introduced into the long-stalled peace process, the conflict risks true intractability or a solution imposed by one side that secures its goals and needs while abandoning the other’s.

One state, two state, three state, four – Part II


Many supporters of the two-state solution are apprehensive that its failure would eventually lead to one state, bringing to an end its Jewish character. However, there are several well-articulated alternatives that should be examined.

The two-state solution has faced a number of problems that appear to be becoming more and more insurmountable. The question of territory and geographic boundaries lies at the heart of many of those concerns. Israel’s continued settlement enterprise eats away at the territory slated for a future Palestinian state. Furthermore, much of mainstream Israeli thought says that withdrawing to the 1949 Armistice Lines (the Green Line) would leave Israel with “indefensible borders.”

Equally important is the question of whether an independent Palestinian state within the Green Line would actually be viable. The lack of territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is highly problematic. While the most commonly accepted solution to territorial contiguity is an under- or above-ground safe passage between the two territories, that too is far from ideal and in many ways falls short of truly linking the two regions of a future Palestinian state.

For these and a number of other reasons, no matter what the territorial arrangements reached in negotiations resulting in a two-state solution, the borders will likely result in a situation where one party sacrifices far more than the other. In the modern nation-state model (based on Westphalian sovereignty), those boundaries define what a government controls, and are therefore of great importance.

One of the options being discussed as an alternative to the one-state and two-state solutions is confederation.

A federal model can mitigate much of the win-lose nature of sacrificing territory in order to reach the end goal of a resolution to the conflict, or as Israelis refer to it, the land-for-peace model.

In his paper on a federal option, Daniel J. Elazar writes:
“Although borders would be expected to remain open under a federal arrangement, they still must be agreed upon. In drawing the borders, someone wins and someone loses. Yet under a federal arrangement rights beyond the borders are designed to compensate for actual territorial loss.”

Most models for federation between Israel and Palestine acknowledge the intimate and geographically small nature of the land, while addressing the desire or need for national self-determination or self-rule for the different communities and ethnic groups.

Most viable models envision a number of administrative regions – cantons or larger units ranging in number from 3 to 12 – which are given a large measure of local rule while but are subordinate to a federal government whose jurisprudence is limited in scope to those areas of shared concern. The sovereign concept of territorial control is maintained, while removing the limitations of two separate states. Furthermore, the federal model addresses the interspersed Palestinian and Israeli populations and would obviate the need for further transfers or one becoming a demographic threat to the other.

Some examples of various types of federations are the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom.

The federal model also offers an interesting solution to the question of Jerusalem. Just as Washington DC is the seat of the American federal government and essentially an administrative district beyond state control of any of the states, so Jerusalem could serve such a function. If the holy city is put under the control of a joint Israeli-Palestinian federal government, it would inclusively satisfy both nations’ demands that it be their capital.

In the model propagated by the 1947 UN Partition plan and rehashed ever since, Jerusalem was slated to fall under the control of a third party. In the federal model, it would be jointly controlled by Palestinians and Israelis.

The federal model has many problems, perhaps the largest of which is that mutual consent and trust must precede its implementation. Another issue is the great disparity in economic might between Israeli and Palestinian populations as they are constituted today. A third question is who controls the military, its role and what restrictions are placed on it.

But while these unanswered questions can be used to discredit the viability of a federal solution to the conflict, it is important to note that any model, including the two-state solution, is burdened with hurdles that must be overcome.

One state, two state, three state, four – Part III

his is the third and final part of a three-part series exploring alternatives to the two-state solution in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Part one examined attitudes and approaches to the one-state solution. Part two looked at the option of an Israeli-Palestinian federation.

Prospects for a two-state resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have dimmed in recent months and years. Over 60 percent of both Palestinians and Israelis think it is unlikely a Palestinian state will be created in the coming years, according to a recent poll. An equally large majority on both sides opposes accepting the other’s conditions for returning to negotiations toward that goal. Frustrated that interim stages have become a permanent status quo and lamenting the lack of any process, Oslo peace process architects Yossi Beilin and Ahmed Qurei, have both recently called for the dismantling of their design.

Meanwhile, the one-state solution is cast as the only alternative, one that negates both current Zionist political thought and the goals of the Palestinian national movement. Other alternatives are rarely discussed, even as the conflict appears increasingly intractable.

Alternatives to the two-state solution, like the Oslo process itself and any other model for conflict resolution, need not be accepted as absolute prescriptions. Although not necessarily viable, the model outlined below, “parallel states,” offers new ideas for resolving the conflict that can be mined and applied in other ways to advance the all-but-dead peace process. Its radical and creative approach can be valuable in helping to reimagine certain fundamentaly flawed approaches of the two-state solution that have contributed to and perpetuated its failure.

Parallel states

The parallel states model is actually easier conceptualized as overlapping or superimposed states. Its basic idea is that two states, Israel and Palestine, can exist not side-by-side with territorial and demographic boundaries between them, but rather in the same land.

As described by the Parallel States Project:
Can one imagine a scenario with a two state solution, one Israeli state and one Palestinian state in parallel, each for the whole area and with civil rights to all, Israelis and Palestinians, built upon existing political, economic and physical structures? Such a scenario would mean a decoupling of the exclusive link between state and territory, and the notion of two state structures parallel with each other, or “superimposed” upon each other. Both state structures would cover the whole area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River.

The people in the whole area would be able to choose freely which state to belong to and at the same time have the right – at least in principle – to settle in the whole territory. Citizenship would be the result of the individual’s free choice and thus follow the citizen, not the territory.
The concept addresses some of the deepest pitfalls of the Oslo-conceptualization of a two-state solution: Both Israelis and Palestinians claim and want more territory than can be divided in such a small land, and; both demand the right to live in territories that would fall on the other side of the border in a two-state solution.

By removing the traditional territorial boundaries encompassed in the modern concept of state sovereignty, those issues become much smaller, all the while satisfying both Israelis’ and Palestinians’ deeply invested desire in the quest for national self-determination, albeit in an alternative and less exclusive manifestation.

Citizens can choose to be citizens in the state they feel most associated with and represented by, which would carry separate national symbols and identities. Reality on the ground would be much closer to a one-state solution.

Palestinians could live in Israel proper and Jews would be allowed to live in the West Bank. As citizenship is decoupled from territory, the idea of demographics threats to a state whose character is defined by the religion and ethnicity of the majority of its population can be cast aside: The increasingly difficult prospect in Israel of balancing “Jewish and democratic” would become irrelevant.

Some areas of governance not necessarily linked to geographic control could be placed under the separate jurisdictions of respective Palestinian and Israeli states, including overseas diplomatic representation and some areas of civil and family law. Other areas of governance, such as security, infrastructure, policing and taxation would be conducted jointly.

Admittedly, the idea is far fetched and has more problems than can be touched upon in such a topical examination. But by reimagining the model for post-conflict coexistence, new ideas for resolving the conflict can be gleaned.

After nearly 20 years of failed attempts at finding and implementing various models for a two-state solution, there can be no harm in examining other, new and even admittedly unviable alternatives. Although its advocates will continue pushing to advance the two-state solution with hopeful stubbornness, one must also recall a quote often attributed to Albert Einstein: "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again but expecting different results."

Follow Michael Omer-Man on Twitter: @ConflictedLand

Wednesday, May 9, 2012

Toward confederation

Interesting article by a Professor of Political Science.

In his confederation, Palestine is supposedly sovereign but have no army.
No solution for borders and sharing of Jerusalem...
He does not explain either why "A federation called The United States of Israel and Palestine is not much better" than a unitary state.
A confederal treaty not mentioning Jerusalem, borders and refugees could be a first step, but it will have to evolve into a true supranational federation: like Europe, made too of different nation-states.

Emphasis is mine.

Toward confederation
By RONALD TIERSKY
08/05/2012

Palestinians know approximately what they will have to accept. Finding the least bad solution consonant with defeat is their unenviable task.

Israel’s strategic problem in historical terms is, ultimately, how to win a war well. The Palestinian problem is to avoid losing this war in the most drawn-out, worst possible way.

Palestinians (including any realistic Hamas leaders), know approximately what they will have to accept. Finding the least bad solution consonant with defeat is their unenviable task. Yet neither is Israel completely free, because victory can be dangerous. Israel needs a strategy that isn’t in the end self-defeating.

Realistically, the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma is this: In what circumstances could the strong safely show magnanimity and the weak believe they are getting an acceptable result? Intractable conflicts can sometimes be unblocked by enlarging the problem, by increasing the number of players, stakes and potential rewards.

All the “one-state” solutions – whether bi-national or a federation – are non-starters because Israeli Jews rightly refuse to sacrifice their own interest in a grand gesture of philanthropy.

Majorities in Israeli and Palestinian public opinion would doubtless accept a simple two-state solution if leaders agreed on it. Israel’s current government, however, seems not really interested whatever lip-service it is given from time to time. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s “economic peace” formula in effect replaces the creation of a Palestinian state with Israeli-sponsored economic development in the West Bank combined with an oppressive, volatile political status quo.

A way forward is to find a larger formula that increases the rewards and reduces costs for Israelis and Palestinians, and involves outside states as guarantors. Complexity and flexibility in this case are advantages. What is necessary is an institutional structure that limits to a minimum the binding links for Israel and at the same time provides time and space for Palestinian self-government and proof of competence to evolve, including stopping the violence on both sides.

A minimal, complex and flexible Israeli-Palestinian confederation, here meaning a two-state solution within the confines of a larger confederation, is a promising alternative.

Two sovereign states wrapped in a semi-state, a less-than-a-state.

Confederation – political and economic – could provide what Israelis and Palestinians, and outside powers, want most: guaranteed mutual security of the two states, reliable peace in the region, diminished capacity for Islamist terrorist groups to use the conflict as a pretext, and economic and social progress.

What is a confederation, how does it differ from a one-state solution, and what would be its international legal basis? A confederation differs from a binational single state and also from a federation of two states.

Some states are unitary, ruled entirely from the national capital (France). Others are federations in which power is shared in some balance between a national government and the states that compose it (the US, Germany). A few are confederations (Switzerland is a modern example).

Unique in world political development, the European Union is extremely complex: a hybrid combination of historical nation-states and national capitals with European-level institutions located in Brussels and elsewhere.

EU institutions are in part confederal (EU summit meetings in various cities), part federal (the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, the European Central Bank in Frankfurt) and part strict national sovereignty (major foreign policy decisions, above all decisions for war or peace in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya).

In the EU, complexity is often a curse but it does provide benefits as well, for example deflecting conflict into ambiguity and permitting the whole to survive even as one part falls into crisis (cf. the current Eurozone debt mess).

The EU is of particular relevance here because, although not wellknown, in international legal terms the entire EU is still a treaty organization (Maastricht) because a proposed constitution for it didn’t achieve ratification in 2005.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because it is also unique, requires a particularly imaginative legal and institutional structure.

Why not one state or two states? In the Holy Land a unitary state called Israel-Palestine makes no historical or political sense. A federation called The United States of Israel and Palestine is not much better.

What of a confederation? Normally a confederation means a constitution, weak but nonetheless more than a treaty. Sovereignty rests with the composing states.

(The American Articles of Confederation before 1789 are an example.) But if a Holy Land confederation is based on a treaty rather than a constitution, Israel’s national constitution and sovereignty are always superior (as would be true also for a Palestinian state). A treaty in this case would be more durable than a constitution.

A treaty is usually made for a specified period of years and renewed (NATO is an example). A constitution, however, is implicitly permanent.

If the situation on the ground goes sufficiently bad, a treaty can perfectly well be renounced (cf. current concerns about Egyptian repudiation of the peace treaty with Israel.) What would happen in practice as politics in the confederation? For example, there would be no common elections or governments.

Israeli and Palestinian parliaments might meet jointly once or twice a year for a few days, to get to know each other and create common culture more than to legislate. Existing Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation could be given formal legal status in the treaty. Once or twice yearly summit meetings of top national leaders could be mandated along with more frequent councils of ministers in a particular policy area, say agriculture (as in the EU).

In short, a treaty-based confederation sidesteps the entire zero-sum one-state two-state drama.

For Israel, in particular, confederation deals with intractable issues of Palestinian political sovereignty.

Creating a Palestinian state within a confederation would not increase but actually diminish threats to Israel’s security. Having their own state, Palestinian obsession with Israel, the ideological passion about sovereignty, borders and revenge, would shift to ambitions for more prosperous lives with individual dignity. Gaza, now such a special case, could join the Palestinian state immediately combined with the West Bank. If, however, Palestinian unity were impossible, Gaza could evolve over time one way or another.

For Palestinians, entrepreneurial energy and private sector business development would stimulate the growth of a more complex civil society connected to the wider world. A Palestinian state that issues internationally recognized passports permitting its citizens to freely visit the world would change the mind-set of young and old generations alike.

Speculating even further ahead, the confederation could encompass not just Israel and Palestine but, sooner or later, Jordan as well. Stimulating Jordanian economic and social development is a good in itself. Security across the entire confederation could be guaranteed by a combination of sovereign Israeli military and police forces, a Palestinian internal police force, a Jordanian participation, and overlapping security guarantees in the form of international boots on the ground: the US, UN and NATO (including Turkey). Jordanian domestic political reform would be de-dramatized.

A more cosmopolitan Israel can afford to deal differently with the Palestinians, who have by now suffered and been punished enough for disastrous policies of the past.

Israel would win its war well if a Palestinian state were created not against Israel’s will but sponsored and even mentored by Israel.

Inevitably, new international esteem would follow. The high cards are in Israeli hands.

The writer is the Eastman Professor of Political Science at Amherst College.

A federated state for Israelis and Palestinians

Source: A federated state for Israelis and Palestinians
By JAY BUSHINSKY
03/05/2012

Emphasis is mine.
Source:
[...] If Netanyahu manages to forge a new coalition that would have the middle-of-the-road Kadima party as a major component and leaves the Jewish religious and nationalist extremists on the parliamentary sidelines, he may escape the pressure constantly bearing down on him from the West Bank settlers who constantly seek territorial acquisitions.

Theoretically, he could then launch a process that would require the dismantling of a substantial number of settlements and the removal of unauthorized outposts further to the east.

A proposed exchange of territory that might enable many of the settlements to remain intact already has public support from Kadima. Its newly elected leader, Shaul Mofaz, is on the record as favoring a deal of this kind. But the transfer of thousands of hard-line settlers from the West Bank to ante bellum Israel would be a daunting if not politically impossible task.

This apparent fact of life bears out the contention that the permission given by the incumbent government and several of its predecessors for 350,000 to 500,000 Jewish settlers to move into the West Bank was a major mistake.

The financial cost of relocating them would be prohibitive, not to mention the fury of the inevitable social backlash in ante bellum Israel that would be a by-product.

All of these considerations suggest that it would be wise for Netanyahu, his party and the electorate as a whole to consider seriously whether there indeed are alternatives to the seemingly inoperable two-state solution.

One of them may be the hitherto unthinkable one-state solution: Annexation of the West Bank and extension of Israeli citizenship to its Palestinian inhabitants on the basis of total equality and political freedom.

This notion has been resisted in the past by Orthodox religious politicians who fear that it would set the stage for intermarriages between Jews and Arabs. But where and when did such an esoteric issue like intermarriage form the basis of any country’s political program? That has not been the case in Ireland, Ceylon or Nigeria where rival ethnic or religious groups also are required to live under one political roof.

In the local case, the one-state solution would take the form of a federation made up of two entities – one primarily Jewish and the other primarily Arab (in demographic terms).

Each entity could have its own parliament and governmental administration.


The state as a whole could have a federal government which would be responsible primarily for national security (for the entire territory of the federated state) – foreign policy and economic affairs including a common currency for both entities (as already exists in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). The federal government’s personnel and leadership would be drawn from the two entitities.

Ironically, annexation was originally proposed by the late Chaim Herzog when he served as the first military governor of the West Bank immediately after the Six Day War.

He was opposed then by the National Religious Party which was destined to spawn the ideological core of Gush Emunim and other Jewish settlement movements.


Its rationale then too was that annexation would foster intermarriage.

It all boils down to the likelihood that the prospective election will give Netanyahu a chance to implement domestic reforms, especially in the economic and social spheres.

These should include a more equitable distribution of private income so as to reduce or (preferably) eliminate the phenomenon of so-called “tycoons” lording it over the rest of the economy, and reduction of the cost of new or suitable housing so that young couples will be able to afford it and the deterioration of overcrowded neighborhoods can be stopped.

The winner (presumably Netanyahu) also might be in a better position to rehabilitate the tens of thousands of Africans who entered Israel illegally in the past five years, by integrating as many of them as possible and facilitating the emigration or deportation of those who cannot adjust to Israeli society to alternative destinations elsewhere in the world. These steps certainly are preferable to letting them converge on neglected urban areas, especially south Tel Aviv, and turning them into crime-infested slums.

The writer is a veteran foreign correspondent.